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ABSTRACT
The coming decades may see the large scale deployment of networked cyber-physical systems
to address global needs in areas such as energy, water, healthcare, and transportation. However,
as recent events have shown, such systems are vulnerable to cyber attacks. They are not only
econoically important, but being safety critical, their disruption or misbehavior can also cause
injuries and loss of life. It is therefore important to secure such networked cyber-physical systems
against attacks. In the absence of credible security guarantees, there will be resistance to the
proliferation of cyber-physical systems, which are much needed to meet global needs in critical
infrastructures and services.
This study addresses the problem of secure control of networked cyber-physical systems.
This problem is different from the problem of securing the communication network, since cyber-
physical systems at their very essence need sensors and actuators that interface with the physical
plant, and malicious agents may tamper with sensors or actuators, as recent attacks have shown.
We consider physical plants that are being controlled by multiple actuators and sensors com-
municating over a network, where some sensors and actuators could be “malicious." A malicious
sensor may not report the measurement that it observes truthfully, while a malicious actuator may
not apply actuation signals in accordance with the designed control policy.
In the first part of this work, we introduce, against this backdrop, the notions of securable and
unsecurable subspaces of a linear dynamical system, and show that they have important opera-
tional meanings for both deterministic and stochastic linear dynamical systems in the context of
secure control. These subspaces may be regarded as analogs of the controllable and unobservable
subspaces reexamined in an era where there is intense interest in cybersecurity of control systems.
In the second part of the work, we propose a general technique, termed “Dynamic Watermark-
ing,” by which honest nodes in the system can detect the actions of malicious nodes, and disable
closed-loop control based on their information. Dynamic Watermarking employs the technique
of honest actuators injecting a “small" random noise, known as private excitation, into the system
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which will reveal tampering of measurements by malicious sensors. We lay the foundations for
the theory for how such an active defense can be used to secure networked systems of sensors and
actuators.
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1. INTRODUCTION*
The 21st century could well be the era of large-scale system building. Several large-scale
cyber-systems are envisioned to be formed by the interconnection of many embedded devices com-
municating with each other, and interacting with the physical world. They include smart energy
grid, intelligent transportation systems, internet of things, telesurgical systems, distributed chemi-
cal plants, and robotics. Their operation requires tight integration of communication, control, and
computation, and they have been broadly termed as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS).
While the importance and benefits of cyber-physical systems require no emphasis, their sus-
tained proliferation is contingent on some key challenges being addressed, security being a primary
one. Since CPSs have many applications in safety-critical scenarios, security breaches of these sys-
tems can have adverse consequences including economic loss, injury and death.
There have been many instances of demonstrated attacks on cyber-physical systems in the re-
cent past [3, 4]. In Maroochy-Shire, Australia, in the year 2003, a disgruntled ex-employee of a
sewage treatment corporation hacked into the computers controlling the sewage system and issued
commands which led to a series of faults in the system [5, 3]. This is an insider attack, where the
adversary has the necessary credentials to access and issue control commands to the system. We
will return to this point later. Another example is the attack on computers controlling the Davis-
Besse nuclear power plant in Ohio. The Slammer worm, which infected about 75, 000 hosts in the
internet in under ten minutes, also infected the computers controlling the nuclear power plant, dis-
abling the safety monitoring systems [3]. While the Slammer worm was not designed to target the
nuclear power plant, the use of commodity IT software in control systems made them vulnerable
to such attacks [3]. A more recent example is the cyber attack on the Ukrainian power system in
the year 2015 which caused a power outage which affected about 200, 000 customers for several
*Reprinted with permission from “Dynamic Watermarking: Active Defense of Networked Cyber-Physical Sys-
tems," by B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar in Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 105, no. 2, pp. 219-240, Feb. 2017 by
IEEE.
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Figure 1.1: A Cyber-Physical System
hours [6]. Another pertinent example is the Stuxnet worm which, in the year 2010, exploited a
vulnerability in Microsoft Windows to subvert critical computers controlling centrifuges in Iran’s
uranium enrichment facility [7]. Having subverted the computers, it issued control commands that
caused the centrifuges to operate at abnormally high speeds, causing them to tear themselves apart.
In order to keep the attacks undetected by software-implemented alarm routines and officials in the
control room, Stuxnet recorded the sensor values in the facility for twenty-one seconds before car-
rying out each attack, and replayed those twenty-one seconds in a constant loop during the attack.
Stuxnet has been claimed to be the first known digital weapon [7], and, since then, cyberwarfare
has emerged as a serious concern for cyber-physical systems due to the many advantages it offers
to the attacker such as allowing it to remain anonymous, and attack without geographical con-
straints, etc. Today, the resources required to carry out such attacks on critical infrastructures are
generally available [8], underlining the urgent need for the research community to pay attention to
the problem.
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In this thesis, we examine the problem of detecting attacks on networked cyber-physical sys-
tems. These systems can be thought of as having two layers - a physical layer, which consists of
the plant, actuators, controllers, and sensors, that interact with physical signals, and a cyber layer,
that networks the components of the physical layer. Components in both the cyber layer as well
as the physical layer could be subverted or “malicious," as illustrated in Fig. 1.1. While securing
the cyber layer is certainly of importance, by itself, it does not address the security of the cyber-
physical system as a whole. The Maroochy-Shire incident is a classic illustration of this point,
where the malfunctioning of the plant was not the result of an attack on the network layer, but of
authorized individuals attacking the physical layer by the issue of improper control commands.
At first glance, it appears as though securing the physical layer is more difficult than secur-
ing the cyber layer. In the problem of network security, there is a clear distinction between an
honest party and an adversary. Attributes such as credentials and cryptographic keys distinguish
honest parties from adversaries. However, when it comes to securing the physical layer, no such
demarcation exists. Any authorized party is also a potential adversary.
However, we show in this thesis that what works in favor of securing the physical layer, and
what we exploit, is the fact that the actions of every node interfacing with the physical layer get
transformed into physical signals, and these signals can be subjected to scrutiny for semantic con-
sistency. To elaborate, consider a physical system consisting of a plant, a set of actuators, and a
set of sensors. If the input-output relation of the physical plant is known, then, by observing the
signals at various points in the system, it is possible to make inferences about the actions of the
sensors and the actuators in the system. By combining this inference with the knowledge of how
the various nodes are expected to behave, malicious behavior can potentially be revealed. This
intuition will be made precise in subsequent chapters.
The ideas of controllable and unobservable subspaces of a linear dynamical system, introduced
by Kalman in [9], play a central role in the theory of control systems. They provide, for example,
necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a stabilizing control law for any linear dy-
namical system of interest. Analogous to the notions of controllable and unobservable subspaces,
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we begin by examining in this thesis the notions of “securable" and “unsecurable" subspaces of
a linear dynamical system, which we show have operational significance in the context of secure
control.
Consider a multiple-input, multiple-output, discrete-time linear dynamical system, an arbitrary
subset of whose sensors and actuators may be malicious. The malicious sensors may not truthfully
report the measurements that they observe, and the malicious actuators may not apply their control
inputs in accordance with the specified control law. Moreover, the malicious actuators and sen-
sors may act in collusion when applying malicious inputs and reporting inaccurate observations.
They may strategically tailor them to disrupt the system. In such a setting, even if the system is
controllable and observable, the desired control objective of the honest sensors and actuators may
not be achievable. The honest nodes in the system may believe the state trajectory to be a certain
sequence {x[0],x[1], . . .}, whereas the actual state trajectory of the system may be very different.
It is against this backdrop that we define the notions of securable and unsecurable subspaces of a
linear dynamical system as, roughly, the set of states that the system could actually be in, or ever
reach, without the honest sensors ever being able to detect, based on their measurements, that the
system had visited that state, or that there was any malicious activity in the system. Our results
characterize the securable and unsecurable subspaces of a linear system. The unsecurable subspace
is an invariant subspace in that if the system is initialized in such a subspace, the malicious nodes
can synthesize control actions that keep the system in that subspace without the honest nodes ever
being able to detect any malicious activity in the system. They may be regarded as the analogs of
the controllable and unobservable subspaces reexamined in an era where there is intense interest
in cybersecurity of control systems. The aforementioned characterization is amenable to computa-
tion. We also address the case of systems with noise, i.e., linear stochastic dynamical systems. We
show that the securable and unsecurable subspaces defined in the context of deterministic systems
also have operational meaning in the context of stochastic systems.
One way to view these results is as negative or impossibility results which state that given a
linear control system with certain malicious sensors and actuators, it is impossible for the honest
4
sensors in the system to distinguish certain state trajectories from others. Consequently, it may be
impossible to guarantee that the system does not reach certain states that are considered “unsafe.”
An alternate viewpoint is to look at these results from a system designer’s perspective. The results
could be regarded as providing guidelines to an engineer for designing secure control systems. For
example, for a specified amount of resilience required of the control system, typically quantified by
a set of Byzantine nodes that the system should tolerate, or for a specification that the system should
not visit certain “unsafe” states, the results can be translated into conditions that the securable
and unsecurable subspaces should satisfy in order to meet the security specifications. This can
potentially constitute a principled approach to design systems that are secure by construction, as
opposed to designing systems to maximize a performance metric, and only subsequently installing
ad-hoc security measures as an afterthought.
In the next part of this thesis, we propose a technique of active defense, termed “Dynamic
Watermarking,” which enables the designer to expand the securable subspace of a linear system.
The fundamental idea of Dynamic Watermarking is this: If an actuator injects into the system a
random probing signal that is not disclosed to other nodes in the system, then, combined with the
knowledge of the plant dynamics, the actuator expects the signals to appear in transformed ways at
various points in the system. Based on the information that the actuator receives from the sensors
about the signals at various points, it can potentially infer if there is malicious activity in the system
or not.
We develop the technique of watermarking to secure the physical layer of a noisy dynamical
system. We examine the protocol whereby honest actuator nodes deliberately superimpose certain
stochastically independent probing signals on top of the control law they are intended to apply. We
propose specific "tests" that the actuator nodes perform to infer malicious activity, and establish
their effectiveness. As a particular illustration of the results, we show that even if all the sensors
are malicious, and the actuators have no measurements that they can directly make and have to
completely rely on the malicious sensors for all their purported measurements, then even in such
an adverse environment, the actuators can under appropriate conditions ensure that the additional
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distortion on performance that the malicious sensors can cause is of mean-square zero, if they are
to remain undetected. Using this approach of active defense, we establish that under appropriate
conditions, no matter in what way the adversarial sensors collude, the amount of distortion that
they can add without exposing their presence can have an average power of only zero.
As alluded to above, the method we examine is a dynamic version of "watermarking," [10]
where certain indelible patterns are imprinted into a medium that can detect tampering [10, 11, 12].
It shows how one can watermark dynamic signals so that one can detect malicious misbehavior on
the part of sensors or actuators. On top of a secure communication system, it provides overall
security to a cyber-physical system against malicious sensors and actuators.
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents an overview of related work
on this subject. In Chapter 3, we introduce the notions of the securable and unsecurable subspaces
of a linear dynamical system, and present a sequence of results that culminate in a characterization
these subspaces. These results are the discrete-time analogs of those developed in [13, 14, 15] for
continuous-time linear dynamical systems, and some of them are also contained in [16]. Chapter 4
extends the results of Chapter 3 to the case of a perfectly observed stochastic discrete-time linear
dynamical system, and shows that the notions of securable and unsecurable subspaces also have
operational meaning in this context. Chapter 5 further extends the above results to one of the most
general system models used in modern control theory - partially observed stochastic linear dynam-
ical systems with both process and measurement noise. In Chapter 6, we move away from passive
defense techniques and introduce the concept of active defense of networked cyberphysical sys-
tems, and describe the approach of Dynamic Watermarking. We establish the security guarantees
that it provides in a variety of popular control system contexts. Chapter 7 addresses the problem
of designing security-guaranteeing dynamic watermarks. Specifically, given a finite-dimensional
perfectly-observed linear system with arbitrarily distributed process noise, we derive the neces-
sary and sufficient conditions that the watermark should satisfy in order to provide a fundamental
security guarantee. Chapter 8 addresses a scenario in which there are malicious sensors and actu-
ators mixed with honest sensors and actuators, and wherein the honest actuators watermark their
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control inputs and conduct certain tests to detect malicious sensors. The state space of any such
system can be decomposed into two orthogonal subspaces, called the watermark-securable and the
watermark-unsecurable subspaces, such that the malicious sensors and actuators cannot degrade
the state estimation performance of the honest sensors and actuators along the watermark-securable
subspace. A certain subset of the watermark-securable subspace is characterized in this chapter.
Chapter 9 extends the above results to a class of nonlinear systems describing a vehicular cyber-
physical system, and presents the results of a laboratory demonstration of Dynamic Watermarking
to secure an automated transportation system. Chapter 10 concludes the thesis.
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2. RELATED WORK*
The vulnerability and the need to secure critical infrastructure from cyberattacks has been rec-
ognized at least as early as 1997 [17]. Subsequent reports [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23] cited demon-
strated attacks, identifying potential threats, and analyzing the effects of successful attacks on
specific systems. The large-scale replacement of proprietary control software and protocols by
commodity IT software and protocols by the industry in order to allow for interoperability and
rapid scalability has increased the vulnerability of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) to cyberat-
tacks, and roadmaps were prepared to address security of control systems in various sectors such
as the energy sector [24], water sector [25], chemical sector [26], and the transportation sector
[27].
Some of the initial work [28] has addressed the definition of what constitutes a secure control
system. Certain key operational goals such as closed-loop stability and performance metric of
interest are noted in [28], and it is proposed that a secure control system must achieve these opera-
tional goals even when under attack, or at least cause only a gradual degradation. It also identifies
how the problem of secure control of networked systems departs from the traditional problems of
network security and information security. In the former, authorized users or insiders can launch
attacks on the system causing physical damage, as in the Maroochy-Shire incident. Hence, net-
work and information security measures such as intrusion prevention and detection, authentication,
access control, etc., fundamentally cannot address these attacks. Therefore, securing the network
does not amount to securing the NCS. In this thesis, we build a framework on top of a secure com-
munication network to secure the NCS. There has been recent work showing how one can indeed
build such a communication network that provides provable guarantees on security, throughput as
well as delays [29].
*Parts of this chapter are reprinted with permission from “Dynamic Watermarking: Active Defense of Networked
Cyber-Physical Systems," by B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar in Proceedings of the IEEE, vol. 105, no. 2, pp.
219-240, Feb. 2017 by IEEE.
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A theoretical study of secure control benefits from having a model for the adversary, and [30]
defines certain adversary and attack models. A popular attack on communication networks is the
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack, in which the adversary floods the communication network with
useless packets, rendering it incapable of transporting useful information. Another attack is the
deception attack, where an adversary impersonates another node and transmits false information
on its behalf. In the context of a networked control system, the adversary could employ a Denial-
of-Service (DoS) attack to prevent the controller and actuator from receiving the data required for
their operation, and could employ deception to cause an actuator node to issue incorrect actuation
signals. A framework to study the evolution of the physical process under DoS and deception
attacks is presented in [30].
Classical estimation algorithms such as the Kalman filter can be extended to include the pres-
ence of an unreliable network, which may stem from either the characteristics of the network or
from adversarial presence, with some packets dropped. This affects the performance of the estima-
tion and control algorithm. Motivated by this scenario, a large body of research has been devoted
to addressing the stability of estimation and control algorithms for systems with intermittent ob-
servations, c.f. [31, 32, 33, 34, 35] and references therein. Though this line of work does not
explicitly model adversarial behavior, some of these ideas have been employed in the literature of
secure control. For instance, [36] studies, using some of the machinery developed in [31] in the
context of control over lossy communication networks, the effect of a DoS attack on the control
performance. Also addressed in the literature is the effect of deception attacks on estimation and
control performance. In [37], the effect of false data fed by the compromised sensors to the state
estimator is studied. The goal is to characterize the set of all estimation biases that an adversary
can inject without being identified. A related work is [38], where fundamental trade-offs between
the detection probability (for a fixed false alarm rate) and the estimation error that the adversary
can cause, are studied for single-input-single-output systems.
Attack strategies that are designed to be undetected are referred to as stealthy attacks. Refer-
ence [16] addresses the problem of taking pro-active measures to reveal stealthy attacks, and also
9
develops methods to design a system in a manner that renders such attacks infeasible. Characteriza-
tion of attacks are feasible without detection or identification in continuous-time linear dynamical
systems are presented in [13, 14, 15].
Several techniques have also been developed to counter attacks on cyber-physical systems. A
technique for correct recovery of the state estimate in the presence of malicious sensors is presented
in [39],along with a characterization of the number of malicious sensors that can be tolerated by
the algorithm. A well-known attack on control systems is the replay attack, where the adversary
records the sensor measurements for a fixed period of time and replays them during the attack so
as to maintain the illusion of a normal operating condition. It was shown in [40] that only systems
for which the matrix (A + BL)(I − KC) is stable are susceptible to replay attacks, where L is
the feedback gain and K is the steady-state Kalman gain. Consequently, a method to secure the
system from replay attack is presented in [40, 41, 42, 43]. The fundamental idea is to inject into
the actuation signal a component that is not known in advance. Specifically, [40, 42] consider
the replay attack, employed in Stuxnet, and introduce a technique, termed Physical Watermarking,
wherein the controller commands the actuators to inject into the system a component that is ran-
dom and not known in advance in order to secure the system against such an attack. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first use of the idea of watermarking. It is shown that by employing
Physical Watermarking, the covariance of the innovations process when the system is "healthy"
and that when it is under attack, are significantly different, enabling the estimator to detect the at-
tack using a χ2 detector. This technique is extended in [43] to detect an adversary employing more
intelligent attack strategies. Specifically, the adversary is assumed to possess a set of capabilities,
based on which a specific attack strategy, consisting of the adversary generating false measurement
values that are reported to the estimator, is identified. It is shown that Physical Watermarking can
counter such an adversary. Including a random component in the actuation signal would clearly
affect the running cost, and [44] develops an optimal policy to switch between cost-centric and
security-centric controllers, by formulating the problem as a stochastic game between the system
and the adversary. A method to detect false-data injection is presented in [45], where the focus is
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on zero-dynamics attacks, attacks which cannot be detected based on input and output measure-
ments. A method to verify the measurements received from multiple sensors is presented in [46],
which exploits correlations between sensor measurements and other features to weed out the mea-
surements from malicious sensors. Though not presented in the context of a dynamical system, the
ideas presented in [46] could in principle be extended to incorporate system dynamics.
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3. THE SECURABLE AND UNSECURABLE SUBSPACES OF A LINEAR CONTROL
SYSTEM*
3.1 Introduction
The ideas of controllable and unobservable subspaces of a linear dynamical system, introduced
by Kalman, play a central role in the theory of control systems. They provide, for example, neces-
sary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a stabilizing control law for a linear dynamical
system of interest. Analogous to the notions of controllable and unobservable subspaces, we ex-
amine in this chapter the notions of “securable" and “unsecurable" subspaces of a deterministic
linear dynamical system, and show that they have important operational meanings in the context
of secure control.
3.2 Problem Formulation
Consider a pth order discrete-time linear dynamical system with m inputs and n outputs de-
scribed by
x¯[t+ 1] = Ax¯[t] +Bu¯[t],
y¯[t+ 1] = Cx¯[t+ 1],
x¯[0] = x0. (3.1)
where x¯[t] ∈ Rp denotes the state of the system at time t, u¯[t] ∈ Rm denotes the input applied to
the system at time t, y¯[t] ∈ Rn denotes the output of the system at time t, and A,B, and C are real
matrices of appropriate dimensions.
Throughout this thesis, we will denote by z[t] the values reported by the sensors at time t.
*Reprinted with permission from “Control systems under attack: The securable and unsecurable subspaces of a
linear stochastic system," by B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar in Emerging Applications of Control and Systems
Theory. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2018, pp. 217-228.
12
If sensor i, i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, is honest, then zi[t] = y¯i[t] for all t. We assume that an arbitrary,
known, possibly history-dependent control policy g = {g1, g2, ...} is in place, and denote by u¯g[t]
the control policy-specified input at time t, the policy being applied on the reported sequence {z}
and not on {y¯}. I.e., u¯g[t] = gt(zt), where zt := [zT [0] zT [1] . . . zT [t]]T . Since u¯[t] denotes the
input applied to the system at time t, if actuator i, i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m}, is honest, then u¯i[t] = u¯gi [t] for
all t.
We assume the adversarial nodes in the system to be near-omniscient, in the sense that at time
t = 0, they have perfect knowledge of the initial state x0 of the system. On the other hand, the
honest nodes in the system, at any time t, have access only to the measurements zt that are reported
until that time. Clearly, this assumption represents a worst-case scenario from the point of view
of the honest nodes in the system. Consequently, the results presented in this chapter serve as
fundamental bounds that apply regardless of the capabilities of the attacker, and in particular, even
for systems where the adversary’s knowledge may be more limited.
Note that if all the nodes in the system are honest, and if the pair (A,C) is observable, then the
nodes can correctly estimate the initial state x0 of the system by time p − 1. Consequently, they
can correctly estimate the state x¯[t] of the system at any time t. However, when there are malicious
sensors and/or actuators present in the system, this need not be the case. Specifically, the honest
nodes in the system could be under the impression that the state of the system at some time t is
x̂[t], while in reality, the system could be in state x¯[t] 6= x̂[t]. This brings us to the central question
that is addressed in this chapter: Suppose that there are malicious nodes present in the system and
that they act in a fashion that keeps them undetected. Suppose also that the honest nodes believe
the system’s state evolution to be {x̂[0], x̂[1], x̂[2], . . .}. Under these conditions, what are the set
of states that the system can actually be in, or ever reach? This set essentially contains the set
of states that the malicious nodes can steer the system to. For this reason, we term this set as the
“unsecurable" subspace of the system (A,B,C). The orthogonal complement of this is called
the “securable" subspace. The projection of the uncertain state on this subspace is actually what
the honest sensors and actuators believe it is, whether the system is not under attack or is under a
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stealthy attack. It is the largest such subspace. A formal definition of securable and unsecurable
subspaces is presented in the next section.
3.3 Securable and Unsecurable Subspaces of Linear Control Systems
In order to determine if malicious nodes are present in the system or not, each honest sensor i
subjects the reported measurement sequence {z} to the following test. If and only if the test fails
(at any time t) does the sensor declare that malicious nodes are present in the system. It raises an
alarm only when it is sure that the system is under attack. When there is no evidence of an attack,
it does not raise an alarm.
The rest of the chapter follows the notation specified in the appendix of this chapter.
Test: At each time t, check if the reported sequence of measurements up to that time zt satisfies
the following condition: ∃x̂0 ∈ Rp such that,
zt − F [t− 1]u¯gt−1 = Γ[t]x̂0. (3.2)
Proposition 1. If all the nodes in the system are honest, the reported measurements {z} pass (3.2)
at each time t. Conversely, if the reported measurements {z} pass (3.2) at each time t, then there
exists an initial state x[0] such that z[t] is the output of the system at time t under control {u¯g}, and
so, there is no definitive reason for the honest sensor to declare that malicious nodes are present
in the system.
Proof. First assume that all the nodes in the system are honest. Then, z[t] = y¯[t] for all t, and so,
zt− F [t− 1]u¯gt−1 = y¯t− F [t− 1]u¯gt−1 = Γ[t]x0. Consequently, (3.2) reduces to checking if ∃x̂0
such that ∀t, Γ[t]x0 = Γ[t]x̂0, which is clearly true.
Next assume that the reported measurement sequence {z} satisfies (3.2). Then, if the initial
state x¯[0] = x̂0, and u¯ ≡ u¯g (i.e., d¯ ≡ 0), we would have y¯t = Γ[t]x̂0 +F [t− 1]u¯gt−1 = zt, where
the last equality follows from (3.2).
In what follows, we assume that the measurements reported by the malicious sensors pass the
above test, and examine the limits of what the malicious nodes can do under this constraint.
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Since the reported measurements {z} pass (3.2), it follows in particular that ∃x̂0 ∈ Rp such
that ∀t,
zt−1 − F [t− 2]u¯gt−2 = Γ[t− 1]x̂0, (3.3)
y¯H [t]−
t−1∑
i=0
CHA
iBu¯g[t− 1− i] = CHAtx̂0. (3.4)
The following proposition is a (partial) converse of the above statement.
Proposition 2. Suppose that there exist x̂0, zτ−1M , and d¯τ−1 such that (3.3) and (3.4) hold for t = τ .
Then, there is a vector zM [τ ] that satisfies Test (3.2) at time τ .
Proof. Consider zM [τ ] = CMAτ x̂0 +
∑τ−1
i=0 CMA
iBu¯g[τ − 1 − i]. It is straightforward to verify
that it satisfies (3.2).
The above proposition states that it is sufficient for the malicious nodes to consider strategies
that only ensure “consistency" at the outputs of the honest sensors. The outputs to be reported by
the malicious sensors can be fabricated accordingly.
The next proposition, along with Theorem 2, shows that one can consider a simpler system
consisting of only malicious actuators, honest sensors, and a control policy that is identically zero,
and translate the conclusion obtained from the analysis of such a system to the more general system
(3.1). In other words, one can dispense with the honest actuators and malicious sensors. There is
no loss of generality in assuming that the control policy is identically equal to zero, and that the
system has only honest sensors and malicious actuators.
Given the system described by (3.1), consisting of honest and malicious nodes as described
before, consider the following reduction of the system where all sensors are honest, all actuators
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are malicious, and the control policy is identically equal to zero:
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +BMd[t],
yH [t+ 1] = CHx[t+ 1],
x[0] = x0. (3.5)
where yH [t] are the measurements observed by the (honest) sensors at time t, d[t] are the inputs
applied by the (malicious) actuators at time t. We will refer to system (3.5) as the “reduced system"
of system (3.1), or simply the “reduced system" when there is no ambiguity. Note that the reduced
system has the same state space as its parent system (3.1), and is also initialized with the same
state as its parent. It is only the inputs and the outputs of the systems that are different. As before,
the malicious actuators are assumed to be near-omniscient so that they have perfect knowledge
of the initial state x0. It is also worth noting that the reduced system may be neither controllable
nor observable, even if the parent system is. For the reduced system, Test (3.2) reduces to the
following, and is performed by the (honest) sensors.
Test for the reduced system: Check if ∃x˜0 ∈ Rp such that for all t,
ytH = ΓH [t]x˜0. (3.6)
Proposition 3. Suppose that there exists a sequence {d} for the reduced system satisfying test
(3.6). Then, if the malicious actuators in the parent system (3.1) inject {d¯} ≡ {d}, there exist
fabricated measurements {zM} that can be reported by the malicious sensors in the parent system
that pass Test (3.2) with x̂0 = x˜0.
Proof. For the reduced system, we have
yH [t] = CHA
tx0 +
t−1∑
i=0
CHA
iBMd[t− 1− i]. (3.7)
Now, suppose for induction that there exist measurements zM [0], zM [1], . . . , zM [t − 1] that the
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malicious sensors can report for system (3.1) when the malicious actuators inject d¯[i] = d[i],
i = 0, 2, ..., t − 2, such that the reported measurements pass test (3.2) up to time t − 1 with
x̂0 = x˜0. The base case of t = 1 holds since the malicious sensors in the parent system can report
zM [0] = CM x˜0. This amounts to assuming that (3.3) holds with x̂0 = x˜0. Now, if the malicious
actuators in the parent system inject, at time t− 1, d¯[t− 1] = d[t− 1], then,
y¯H [t] = CHA
tx0 +
t−1∑
i=0
CHA
iBu¯g[t− 1− i] +
t−1∑
i=0
CHA
iBMd[t− 1− i].
Substituting (3.7) in the above gives
y¯H [t] = yH [t] +
t−1∑
i=0
CHA
iu¯g[t− 1− i].
Since the output of the reduced system satisfies (3.6), we have yH [t] = CHAtx˜0. Substituting this
into the above equation gives
y¯H [t]−
t−1∑
i=0
CHA
iu¯g[t− 1− i] = CHAtx˜0,
which satisfies (3.4) for x̂0 = x˜0. The desired result follows from Proposition 2.
The following definition is of central importance.
Definition 1. Consider a system (A,B,C) of the form (3.1) with initial state x0. The unsecurable
subspace for state s0 of the system is the maximal set of states V(s0) such that for each v ∈ V(s0),
there exist t, {d¯}, {zM} such that x¯[t] = v and (3.2) holds for x̂0 = s0.
In particular, for the reduced system (A,BM , CH), the unsecurable subspace for state s0 is the
maximal set of states VR(s0) such that for each v ∈ VR(s0), there exist t, {d} such that x[t] = v
and (3.6) holds for x˜0 = s0.
In other words, the unsecurable space for s0 is the set of states that the system can be in if the
honest nodes are deceived into inferring the initial state as s0. Note that for the reduced system (or
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even the parent system for that matter), the vector sequence that the honest nodes believe is the
state trajectory is completely determined by what they believe the initial state is (or the set that
they believe the initial state lies in, if the system is unobservable). If the unsecurable subspace is
of dimension greater than zero, it (i) states that the malicious nodes cannot distort certain linear
combinations of the state without being detected, and (ii) specifies those linear combinations that
are “intact."
The following theorem characterizes the unsecurable subspace and provides an algorithm to
compute it.
Theorem 1. Consider a reduced system (A,BM , CH) of the form (3.5). For such a system,
(i) The unsecurable subspace VR(0) for state 0 is the maximal set W ⊆ Rp such that ∀w ∈ W,
(a) CHw = 0, and
(b) ∃d such that Aw +BMd ∈ W.
(ii) The unsecurable subspace for state s0, VR(s0), is
VR(s0) = {s0 + w : w ∈ VR(0)}. (3.8)
Proof. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 1. The set W is a subspace.
Proof. Let w1,w2 ∈ W . We have from the definition of W , that HM [t− 1]dt−1i = ΓH [t]wi has a
solution dt−1i for all t, i = 1, 2. It follows that the equation HM [t− 1]dt−1 = ΓH [t](k1wi + k2w2)
has a solution dt−1, viz., dt−1 = k1dt−11 +k2d
t−1
2 for all t, which in turn implies that k1w1+k2w2 ∈
W.
We now show that W is equal to VR(0). The crux of the argument is that W is an invariant
subspace in the following sense.
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Lemma 2. If the system’s state visits W at any time t, then the malicious actuators can synthesize
control actions that keep the state in W at all subsequent times.
Proof. We show this via induction. Let w ∈ W, and let x[t] = w, which also serves as the base
case for induction. Assume for induction that x[τ ] ∈ W , where τ ≥ t is a fixed time. Then,
x[τ + 1] = Ax[τ ] +BMd[τ ]. Since x[τ ] ∈ W, it follows from the definition of W that there exists
a control choice d for d[τ ] such that Ax[τ ] +BMd[τ ] ∈ W, implying that x[τ + 1] ∈ W.
Remark: Owing to the above Lemma, W is called the “controlled invariant subspace" in linear
system theory [47].
Now, suppose that x[0] = w and w ∈ W. We then have from Lemma 2 that there exists a
sequence {d} that the malicious actuators can apply as inputs such that x[t] ∈ W for all t. Since
W ⊆ N(CH) by definition, we have yH [t] = CHx[t] = 0 for all t. Consequently, (3.6) holds for
x˜0 = 0, and it follows from Definition 1 that w ∈ VR(0). Hence, W ⊆ VR(0).
Now suppose that v ∈ VR(0). We then have from Definition 1 that ∃{d} that the malicious
actuators can apply as inputs to the system such that x[t] = v for some t and (3.6) holds for x˜0 = 0.
This implies that yH [t] = 0 for all t. Since 0 = yH [t] = CHx[t] = CHv, we have that v ∈ N(CH),
satisfying the first condition to be an element of W . Since {d[t],d[t + 1], ...} is a sequence that
the malicious actuators can apply such that x[t′] ∈ N(CH) for all t′ ≥ t, v satisfies the second
condition to be an element of W . Therefore, v ∈ W, and VR(0) ⊆ W . Combining the two results,
we have W = VR(0).
(ii) Let v ∈ {s0 + w : w ∈ VR(0)}, and let x[0] = v. Then, ytH = ΓH [t]v + HM [t − 1]dt−1 =
ΓH [t]s0 + ΓH [t]w + HM [t − 1]dt−1 for all t. Since w ∈ VR(0), it follows from the definition of
VR(0) that there exists sequence {d} so that ΓH [t]w + HM [t − 1]dt−1 = 0 for all t. Therefore,
if the actuators inject such a sequence {d}, then, ytH reduces to ytH = ΓH [t]s0. Therefore, (3.6)
holds with x˜0 = s0, and so, {s0 + w : w ∈ V(0)} ⊆ VR(s0).
Next, let v ∈ VR(s0). Then, we have from the definition of VR(s0) that ∃{d′}, τ such that
x[τ ] = v and ΓH [t]s0 = ytH for all t. This in turn implies that ∃{d} such that x0 = v and
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ΓH [t]s0 = y
t
H for all t. Also, when x0 = v, we have for all t, y
t
H = ΓH [t]v + HM [t − 1]dt−1.
Combining the two, we have that there exists {d} such that ΓH [t]s0 = ΓH [t]v + HM [t − 1]dt−1
for all t. This means that v solves, for all t,
[ΓH [t] HM [t− 1]]
 v
dt−1
 = [ΓH [t] HM [t− 1]]
s0
0
 ,
so that for all t,
 v
dt−1
 =
s0
0
+ w˜,
where w˜ ∈ N([ΓH [t] HM [t − 1]]). Denote by w the first p entries of w˜, and it follows from the
definition of VR(0) that w˜ ∈ VR(0). Hence, v must be of the form s0 + w,w ∈ VR(0), and hence,
VR(s0) ⊆ {s0 + w : w ∈ V(0)}.
Combining the two results, we have VR(s0) = {s0 + w : w ∈ V(0)}.
The following theorem translates the above conclusions obtained from the reduced system (3.5)
to the original system (3.1) that is of interest.
Theorem 2. The unsecurable subspace V(s0) for the system (A,B,C) is the same as the unsecur-
able subspace VR(s0) for its reduction (A,BM , CH).
Proof. Let v ∈ VR(s0). Then, it follows form the definition of VR(s0) that for the reduced system
(3.5), there exists {d} that can be applied by the actuators so that (3.6) is satisfied for x˜0 = s0
when x0 = v. Therefore, by Proposition 3, v ∈ V(s0), and so, VR(s0) = V(s0).
Next, let v ∈ V(s0). Then, from the definition of V(s0), we have for system (3.1) that ∃{d}, {zM}
such that for all t, zt = Γ[t]s0 + F [t − 1]u¯gt−1 when x0 = v. This implies that y¯tH = ΓH [t]s0 +
H[t − 1]u¯gt−1 . Since we also have y¯tH = ΓH [t]v + H[t − 1]u¯gt−1 + HM [t − 1]dt−1, substituting
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this in the previous equation gives
ΓH [t]v +HM [t− 1]dt−1 = ΓH [t]s0. (3.9)
Now, if the actuators apply the above sequence {d} to the reduced system (with initial state v), we
have for each t, ytH = ΓH [t]v + HM [t − 1]dt−1 = ΓH [t]s0, where the last equality follows from
the (3.9). Hence, (3.6) is satisfied with x˜0 = s0, and hence, V(s0) ⊆ VR(s0).
Combining the two results, we have V(s0) = VR(s0).
The characterization of VR(0) given in Theorem 1 allows one to use standard algorithms that
compute (A,R(BM))−controlled invariant subspaces of a linear dynamical system for computing
its unsecurable subspace.
Definition 2. The securable subspace S of a discrete-time linear dynamical system of the form
(3.1) is the orthogonal complement of V(0), the unsecurable subspace of the zero state.
The securable subspace has the interpretation of the maximal set of states that the malicious
nodes cannot steer the system to without leaving a nonzero trace at the output of the honest sensors.
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the performance of a stochastic linear dynamical system in the securable
subspace, which provide further operational meaning to it.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have introduced the notions of the securable and the unsecurable subspaces
of a linear dynamical system. The unsecurable subspace has the interpretation as a set of states
that the system could actually be in, or ever reach, as a consequence of malicious actions of the
adversarial nodes, without the honest sensors in the system ever detecting definitively any mali-
cious activity. This is an invariant subspace in the sense that once the state of the system enters this
space, the malicious sensor and actuator nodes in the system can collude to keep the system in this
space forever without the honest sensors ever being able to confirm any malicious activity based
on their own observations or the ones being reported to them. The orthogonal complement of this
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subspace, the securable subspace, has the interpretation in the context of deterministic systems as
the set of states that the malicious nodes cannot steer the system to without leaving a nonzero trace
at the output of the honest sensors. A characterization of these subspaces, and an algorithm to
compute them for any linear system and any combination of malicious sensors and actuators is ob-
tained by a standard recourse to geometric control methods. These subspaces also have relevance
to the case where the system is noisy, and these are elaborated in the following chapters.
Notation
The following notation is used throughout this chapter.
1. Let s1 < s2 < ... < shs denote the indices of the honest sensors, ψ1, ψ2, ..., ψms denote those
of the malicious sensors, and a1 < a2 < ... < ama denote those of the malicious actuators.
Then,
• CH is the hs × p matrix whose ith row is the sthi row of C, i = 1, 2, ..., hs,
• BM is the p×ma matrix whose ith column is the athi column of B, i = 1, 2, ...,ma,
• y¯H [t] is the hs × 1 vector whose ith component is the sthi entry of y¯[t], i = 1, 2, ..., hs,
• zM [t] is the ms × 1 vector whose ith entry is the ψthi entry of z[t], i = 1, 2, ...,ms,
• d¯[t] is thema×1 vector whose ith component is d¯i[t] := u¯ai [t]− u¯gai [t], i = 1, 2, ...,ma.
2. xt denotes [xT [0] xT [1] . . . xT [t]]T .
3. Γ[t] := [CT (CA)T (CA2)T . . . (CAt)T ]T .
4. ΓH [t] := [(CH)T (CHA)T . . . (CHAt)T ]T .
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5.
F [t] :=

0 0 . . . 0
CB 0 . . . 0
CAB CB . . . 0
...
... . . .
...
CAtB CAt−1B . . . CB

,
6.
H[t] :=

0 0 . . . 0
CHB 0 . . . 0
CHAB CHB . . . 0
...
... . . .
...
CHA
tB CHA
t−1B . . . CHB

,
HM [t] :=

0 0 . . . 0
CHBM 0 . . . 0
CHABM CHBM . . . 0
...
... . . .
...
CHA
tBM CHA
t−1BM . . . CHBM

.
7. N(·) denotes the null space of a matrix, andR(·) denotes the range space of a matrix.
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4. THE SECURABLE SUBSPACE OF A LINEAR STOCHASTIC SYSTEM WITH
MALICIOUS SENSORS AND ACTUATORS*
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we introduced the notions of securable and unsecurable subspaces
of a deterministic linear dynamical system. In this chapter, we view these subspaces from the
standpoint of stochastic linear dynamical systems, and establish important operational meanings
for them in the stochastic context. Of the many potential applications that the results developed
in this chapter may have, perhaps the most significant is in synthesizing control systems that are
provably secure by design.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formulates the problem, and reca-
pitulates the notions of securable and unsecurable subspaces of a linear dynamical system. Section
4.3 is devoted to establishing certain key geometric properties of the securable subspace. These
properties are exploited in Section 4.4 to establish an operational meaning for the securable and
the unsecurable subspace in the context of fully-observed stochastic systems.
Notation: Given a vector x and a subspace W , xi denotes the ith entry of x and xW denotes the
projection of x on the subspace W . Given a matrix A, Ai,× denotes the ith row of A, and A×,i
denotes its ith column. Given a vector x, we denote by xTT the expression xTx, and by xTTW , the
expression xTWxW .
*Reprinted with permission from “The securable subspace of a linear stochastic system with malicious sensors
and actuators," by B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar in Proceedings of the 55th Annual Allerton Conference on
Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), pp. 911-917, 2017, IEEE.
24
4.2 Securable and Unsecurable Subspaces of Linear Dynamical Systems
Consider an m× n stochastic linear dynamical system of order p described by
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bu[t] + w[t+ 1],
y[t+ 1] = Cx[t+ 1], (4.1)
where x[t] ∈ Rp is the state of the system, u[t] ∈ Rm is the input applied to the system, y[t] ∈ Rn
is the output of the system, w[t] ∼ N (0, σ2wI) is i.i.d across time and denotes the process noise.
The matrices A, B, and C are assumed to be known. While the results pertaining to the stochastic
case (contained in Section 4.4) assume that C = I, the results contained in this section and Section
4.3 hold for arbitrary C, unless otherwise specified.
As mentioned before, throughout this thesis, we denote by z[t] the measurements reported by
the sensors at time t. If sensor i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is honest, then, zi[t] ≡ xi[t]. A malicious sensor
may report zi[t] 6= xi[t].
We suppose that a known but arbitrary and possibly history-dependent control policy {git}, i =
1, . . . ,m is in place, so that actuator i, if honest, applies the input git(z
t) at time t, where zt :=
(z[0], . . . , z[t]). Note that since the honest actuators may not have access to the actual output
sequence xt due to the presence of malicious sensors, they apply the control law on the reported
measurements rather than the actual measurements. The malicious actuators, however, may not
adhere to the control law, and can apply any input that they please.
Let a1, . . . , ama denote the indices of thema malicious actuators, ai ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, i = 1, . . . ,ma.
Define for malicious actuator ai, the input distortion at time t as dai [t] := uai [t]− gait (zt), which is
the difference between the actual input that it applies and the control law-specified input that it is
supposed to apply. Then, the system evolves in closed loop as
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bgt(z
t) +BMd[t] + w[t+ 1],
y[t+ 1] = Cx[t+ 1], (4.2)
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where d[t] := [da1 [t] . . . dama [t]]
T is the vector containing the distortions of the malicious ac-
tuators at time t, and BM := [B×,a1 . . . B×,ama ] is the submatrix of B formed by the columns
corresponding to the malicious actuators.
Denote by o1, . . . , ohs the indices of the hS honest sensors in the system, oi ∈ {1, . . . , n}, i =
1, . . . , hs. Define CH := [CTo1,× . . . C
T
ohs ,×]
T , which is the submatrix of C formed by the rows
corresponding to the honest sensors.
4.2.1 Securable and Unsecurable Subspaces
Definition 3. For the system (4.1) consisting of some malicious sensors and actuators, the unse-
curable subspace for state 0, or simply the unsecurable subspace, is the maximal subset V of the
state space such that ∀v ∈ V ,
1. CHv = 0,
2. ∃d, possibly dependent on v, such that Av +BMd ∈ V.
It is the maximal (A,BM)−invariant subspace contained in N (CH).
Definition 4. The securable subspace S of system (4.1) is the orthogonal compliment of its unse-
curable subspace. I.e.,
S := V ⊥.
An operational meaning for these subspaces in the context of deterministic linear dynamical
systems is presented in [48]. Specifically, in deterministic systems, the unsecurable subspace has
the interpretation as the set of states that the malicious nodes can steer the system to ever, without
the honest nodes ever detecting that the system had visited that state or that there is any malicious
activity in the system. This interpretation does not extend to systems that are stochastic in nature,
such as (4.1). In the following sections, we establish an operational meaning for the securable
subspace for stochastic linear dynamical systems described by (4.1) for the case of a fully observed
system, i.e., C = I. Specifically, we show that the securable subspace is the maximal subspace
of the state space along which the state estimation error of the honest nodes is of zero covariance,
26
where the state estimate x̂[t] of the honest nodes at time t is simply x̂[t] = z[t], and their state
estimation error at time t is x̂[t]− x[t].
To elaborate, note that if all the sensors in a fully observed system were honest, then the state
estimation error of the honest sensors and actuators would be identically zero. However, since
certain sensors could be malicious, the honest nodes in the system may not have perfect estimates
of the state, thereby incurring a state estimation error at each time. However, as we show in the
subsequent sections, this state estimation error, when projected on the securable subspace, has
zero covariance. One of the implications of this is that if the malicious nodes wish to remain
undetected, then no matter what attack strategy they employ, they cannot distort the projection of
the actual state on the securable subspace beyond adding a zero-power sequence.
4.3 The Geometry of the Securable Subspace
This section is devoted to establishing certain key structural properties of the securable sub-
space that are used in Section 4.4 to establish its operational meaning.
Definition 5. A k−step unsecurable subspace, denoted by Uk, is defined as
Uk := {v : ∃d0, . . . ,dk−2 s.t.
CHv = 0,
CH(Av +BMd0) = 0,
CH(A2v + ABMd0 +B
Md1) = 0,
...
CH(Ak−1v + . . .+BMdk−2) = 0.}, (4.3)
for k = 1, . . . , r, where r := min{i ∈ N : Ui = V }.
For finite-dimensional linear systems, it can be shown that r < ∞ (in fact, r ≤ p). Note also
that U1 = N (CH).
Intuitively, Uk is the set of states which, if the system is initialized at, can be made indistin-
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guishable to the honest sensors from the zero initial state for at least k epochs by some choice of
inputs of the malicious actuators.
Note from (4.3) that the (k + 1)−step unsecurable subspace contains the k−step unsecurable
subspace, i.e., the subspaces are monotone decreasing in k. The r−step unsecurable subspace is
simply the unsecurable subspace:
V = Ur ⊂ Ur−1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ U1 ⊆ X , (4.4)
whereX := Rp denotes the state space of the system. Note that in the above hierarchy, by definition
of r, we have Ur 6= Ur−1. It is equally straightforward to verify that U1, . . . ,Ur are subspaces.
The following lemma shows that in (4.4), the set containments are in fact strict, so that the
k−step unsecurable subspaces are strictly decreasing in k.
Lemma 3. Suppose that r > 1. Then, ∀i ≤ r − 1, Ui+1 ⊂ Ui.
Proof. The proof for the case when i = r−1 follows trivially by the very definition of r. Consider
the case when i ≤ r − 2, and suppose for contradiction that for some i ≤ r − 2, Ui = Ui+1. Then,
it follows from (4.3) that ∀v ∈ Ui+1, ∃d such that Av + BMd ∈ Ui = Ui+1. This implies, from
the definition of V , that Ui+1 ⊆ V, which contradicts (4.4) since V ⊂ Ui+1.
The case N (CH) = X is of limited interest, as is made clear in the next section. We assume
henceforth that this is not the case. Combining this assumption with Lemma 1, we have
V = Ur ⊂ Ur−1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ U1 ⊂ X . (4.5)
The above hierarchy is sufficient to assert the existence of orthonormal bases B˜0, B˜1, . . . , B˜r
for X ,U1, . . . ,Ur, respectively, with B˜r ⊂ B˜r−1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ B˜0. Now, using X ,U1, . . . ,Ur, we derive
r + 1 orthogonal subspaces as follows.
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Definition 6. For k = 1, . . . , r − 1, define the k−step securable subspace as
Sk := Uk 	 Uk+1, (4.6)
where Uk	Uk+1 := Span{B˜k\B˜k+1}. The 0−step securable subspace is defined as S0 := X	U1 =
N (CH)⊥.
Intuitively, the k−step securable subspace is a set of states which when the system is initialized
at, can be made indistinguishable to the honest sensors from the zero initial state for exactly k
epochs by some choice of inputs of the malicious actuators. In particular, it cannot be made
indistinguishable for k + 1 epochs. A precise interpretation is given in Lemma 3.
The following lemma establishes the geometry of the securable subspace: The securable sub-
space is the span of all k−step securable subspaces.
Lemma 4. The securable subspace S := V ⊥ is composed of k−step securable subspaces in that
S = S0 + . . .+ Sr−1.
Proof. S0 + . . .+ Sr−1 = (X 	 U1) + (U1 	 U2) + . . .+ (Ur−1 	 V ) = X 	 V = V ⊥.
Lemma 5. For every sk ∈ Sk, ∃d0, . . . ,dk−2 such that
CHsk = 0,
CH(Ai−1sk + Ai−2BMd0 + . . .+BMdi−2) = 0, i = 2, . . . , k.
Moreover, for every 0 6= sk ∈ Sk, @d0, . . . ,dk−1 such that CHsk = 0, CH(Ai−1sk+Ai−2BMd0 +
. . .+BMdi−2) = 0, i = 2, . . . , k + 1.
Proof. The first statement of the lemma follows from the fact that Sk ⊂ Uk. To prove the second
statement of the lemma, suppose the contrary. Then, it follows that sk ∈ Uk+1. Since Sk ⊥ Uk+1
and sk 6= 0, we have sk /∈ Sk, a contradiction.
Lemma 6. For every 0 6= sk ∈ Sk, k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1},∃d such that Ask +BMd ∈ Sk−1.
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Proof. Omitted.
4.4 Operational Meaning of the Securable Subspace for Stochastic Systems
In this section, we establish operational meanings for securable and unsecurable subspaces in
the context of fully-observed stochastic linear dynamical systems of the form (4.1).
Observe that if there are no malicious nodes in the system, then, x[t+ 1]−Ax[t]−Bgt(zt) =
w[t+ 1], and hence,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
[x[t+ 1]− Ax[t]−Bgt(zt)][x[t+ 1]− Ax[t]−Bgt(zt)]T = σ2wI.
Based on this observation, each honest node performs the following tests to detect the presence of
malicious nodes:
• Test: Check if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt))(z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt))T = σ2wI. (4.7)
If the reported measurements {z} do not pass this test, then the honest nodes declare the presence
of malicious nodes in the system.
Recall from Section 4.1 that the notation (x)Q denotes the projection of vector x on the sub-
space Q. Let Pk denote the projection matrix corresponding to the subspace
∑k
j=1 Sj. It follows
from (4.7) that for k = 0, . . . , r − 1,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt))T∑k
j=1 Sj
(z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt))∑k
j=1 Sj
= Tr[( lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt))TP Tk Pk(z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt))]
= σ2wTr[PkP
T
k ]. (4.8)
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Defining σ2k := σ
2
wTr[PkP
T
k ], from (4.8) we have that for k = 0, . . . , r − 1,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt))T∑k
j=1 Sj
(z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt))∑k
j=1 Sj
= σ2k. (4.9)
The following theorem establishes the operational meaning for the securable subspace in the
context of fully observed stochastic linear dynamical systems.
Theorem 3. Let m[t] := z[t] − x[t] be the state estimation error of the honest nodes at time t. If
the reported measurements {z} pass the test (4.7), then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
||mS[t]||2 = 0.
Proof. We show by induction on k that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
||mSk [t]||2 = 0
∀k ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}. I.e., the projection of the state estimation error on the k−step securable
subspaces has zero power. This in turn implies the desired result.
We first note that since we have a system where all the states are directly observed, i.e., C = I ,
we have S0 = N (CH)⊥ = Span({ei : i ∈ {o1, . . . , ohS}}), where ei is a p × 1 vector whose ith
entry is unity and all other entries are zero. It follows that mS0 [t] =
∑hS
i=1 moi [t]eoi = 0, where
the last equality follows from the fact that at any time t, the distortion introduced by the honest
sensors is zero. It follows that mS0 [t] ≡ 0, and so,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
mTS0 [t]mS0 [t] = 0.
This serves as the base case for induction.
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Assume for induction that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
mTSi [t]mSi [t] = 0
for i = 0, . . . , q. Since z[t + 1] − Az[t] − Bgt(zt) = m[t + 1] − Am[t] + BMd[t] + w[t + 1],
substituting this in (4.9) for k = q gives (recall from Section 4.1 the notation of (x)TTW )
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(m[t+ 1]− Am[t] +BMd[t] + w[t+ 1])TT∑q
j=0 Sj
= σ2q . (4.10)
Now, write m[t] = mV [t]+mS[t], and mS[t] = mS0 [t]+ . . .+mSr−1 [t]. It follows from the defini-
tion of the unsecurable subspace that for all t, there exists dV [t] such thatAmV [t]+BMdV [t] ∈ V ,
and from Lemma 4 that there exist dSq+2 [t], ...,dSr−1 [t] such that (−AmSi [t] + BMdSi [t]) ∈
Si−1, i = q + 2, . . . , r − 1. Define dU [t] := d[t] − dSq+2 [t] − . . . − dSr−1 [t] − dV [t]. Substi-
tuting these in (4.10) gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(mS0 [t+ 1]− AmS0 [t]
+ mS1 [t+ 1]− AmS1 [t]
+ . . .
+ mSq [t+ 1]− AmSq [t]
+ mSq+1 [t+ 1]− AmSq+1 [t] +BMdU [t]
+ mSq+2 [t+ 1]− AmSq+2 [t] +BMdSq+2 [t]
+ mSq+3 [t+ 1]− AmSq+3 [t] +BMdSq+3 [t]
+ . . .
+ mSr−1 [t+ 1]− AmSr−1 [t] +BMdSr−1 [t]
+ mV [t+ 1]− AmV [t] +BMdV [t]
+ w[t+ 1])TT∑q
j=0 Sj
= σ2q . (4.11)
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Since −AmSi [t] + BMdSi [t] ∈ Si−1 for i = q + 2, . . . , r − 1, they vanish when projected on the
subspace
∑q
j=0 Sj, i.e., their projection is the zero vector. Similarly, mSq+1 [t+1], . . . ,mSr−1 [t+1]
also vanish when projected on the subspace
∑q
j=0 Sj. Therefore, the above reduces to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(mS0 [t+ 1]− AmS0 [t]
+ mS1 [t+ 1]− AmS1 [t]
+ . . .
+ mSq [t+ 1]− AmSq [t]
− AmSq+1 [t] +BMdU [t] + w[t+ 1])TT∑q
j=0 Sj
= σ2q . (4.12)
Note that from the induction hypothesis, we have that the term
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
(mS0 [t+ 1]− AmS0 [t]
+ mS1 [t+ 1]− AmS1 [t]
+ . . .
+ mSq [t+ 1]− AmSq [t])TT∑q
j=0 Sj
= 0.
Expanding (4.12) and substituting the above equality yields
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(−AmSq+1 [t] +BMdU [t] + w[t+ 1])TT∑q
j=0 Sj
= σ2q . (4.13)
Using the martingale stability theorem [49, Lemma 2(iii)], it follows after some algebra that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
(−AmSq+1 [t] +BMdU [t])TT∑q
j=0 Sj
= 0. (4.14)
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Lemma 7. ∀q ∈ {1, . . . , r − 2}, ∃ > 0 such that ∀sq+1 ∈ Sq+1 and for any d,
(Asq+1 +B
Md)TT∑q
j=0 Sj
≥  sTq+1sq+1. (4.15)
Proof. Let ŝq+1 ∈ Sq+1 with ||̂sq+1|| = 1. Define I(ŝq+1) := infd ||(Aŝq+1 + BMd)∑q
j=0 Sj
|| =
infd ||A˜ŝq+1 + B˜Md||, where A˜ := PqA, B˜M := PqBM , and Pq is the projection matrix for the
subspace
∑q
j=0 Sj. Clearly, the value I(ŝq+1) can be achieved by a vector d =: d̂(ŝq+1), not
necessarily unique, all of whose entries are finite. It is also easy to verify that for any k ∈ R,
I(kŝq+1) = kI(ŝq+1), (4.16)
and that d̂(kŝq+1) = kd̂(ŝq+1).
Now, the function I(x) is continuous in x. To see this, let α(x) := A˜x, and β(x) :=
dist(x,R(−B˜M)) be the distance function to set R(−B˜M). Then, I = β ◦ α. Since both α
and β are continuous functions, it follows that I is a continuous function.
Now, consider ′ = inf ||sq+1||=1 I(sq+1), which is the minimization of a continuous function
over a compact set ∆ := {s ∈ Sq+1 : ||s|| = 1}. It follows that the infimum is attained by some
element s∗q+1 ∈ ∆, i.e., ′ = ||(As∗q+1 + BMd∗)∑qj=0 Sj || for some d∗. Note that since 0 6= s∗q+1 ∈
Sq+1, we have (As∗q+1 +B
Md)∑q
j=0 Sj
6= 0 for all choices of d, and hence, ′ > 0. Combining this
with (4.16), we have
||(Asq+1 +BMd)∑q
j=0 Sj
|| = ||(A||sq+1|| sq+1||sq+1|| +B
Md)∑q
j=0 Sj
|| = I(||sq+1|| sq+1||sq+1||)
= ||sq+1||I( sq+1||sq+1||) ≥ ||sq+1||
′.
Squaring the above inequality completes the proof.
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Combining (4.15) with (4.14), we have
0 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
||(−AmSq+1 [t] +BMdU [t])∑qj=0 Sj ||2 ≥  limT→∞
1
T
T−1∑
t=0
||(mSq+1 [t])∑qj=0 Sj ||2,
which completes the proof.
The following corollary shows that the unsecurable subspace is, in general, the minimal sub-
space “containing" all of the covariance of the state estimation error.
Corollary 1. Under the same conditions as in Theorem 1,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
mS[t]m
T
S [t] = 0. (4.17)
Consequently,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
m[t]mT [t] = lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
mV [t]m
T
V [t]. (4.18)
Proof. Let mS,i[t] denote the ith entry of mS[t]. Then, it follows from Theorem 1 that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
m2S,i[t] = 0
for i = 1, . . . , p. It follows that for all i, j,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
mS,i[t]mS,j[t] = 0.
The above results establish the extent to which malicious sensors can distort the actual mea-
surements in a stealthy attack. Given a control objective, this also has implications on the extent to
which malicious actuators can deviate from their control law-specified inputs, and consequently,
the extent to which the actual performance metrics of the system deviate from their optimal values.
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4.5 Concluding Remarks
The notions of securable and unsecurable subspaces of a linear dynamical system, introduced
in the context of secure control, have important operational meanings for deterministic linear dy-
namical systems. This chapter has examined these subspaces from the vantage point of a fully-
observed stochastic linear dynamical system, and has established operational meanings for them
in the stochastic context. Specifically, the securable subspace is shown to be, in general, the max-
imal subspace of the state space on which the projection of the state estimation error incurred by
the honest nodes, due to the presence of malicious nodes, has zero covariance. Consequently, the
unsecurable subspace is, in general, the minimal subspace that “contains" all of the covariance of
the state estimation error. Extensions of this result to more general models such as that of partially-
observed stochastic linear dynamical systems with both process and observation noise are reported
in the next chapter.
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5. ON THE OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SECURABLE SUBSPACE FOR
PARTIALLY OBSERVED LINEAR STOCHASTIC SYSTEMS*
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we generalize the results in Chapters 3 and 4 and establish the operational
meaning of the securable subspace in the context of general multiple-input-multiple-output par-
tially observed stochastic linear dynamical systems with both Gaussian process and observation
noise, which class constitutes one of the most general models used in modern linear system theory.
Specifically, we show that for these systems, the securable subspace has the operational meaning
as that subspace of the state space along which the malicious sensors and actuators cannot distort
the MMSE state estimate that would be obtained had there been no malicious nodes in the system,
beyond adding a zero power sequence, if they wish to remain undetected. This in turn implies that
the covariance of the projection of the state estimation error of the honest nodes on the securable
subspace remains at its designed value in spite of arbitrary attack strategies of the malicious nodes,
if the malicious activity is to remain undetected.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the problem setting
that we consider in this chapter. Section 5.3 is devoted to establishing the operational meaning
of the securable subspace in the context of general partially-observed stochastic linear dynamical
systems. Section 5.4 concludes the chapter.
Notation: Given a vector x, we denote by xTT the outer product xxT .Given subspacesW1, . . . ,Wp
of some vector space, we denote by ⊕pl=1Wl the span of subspacesW1, . . . ,Wp. Given a vector x
and a subspaceW , we denote by xW the projection of x onW .
*Reprinted with permission from “On the Operational Significance of the Securable Subspace for Partially Ob-
served Linear Stochastic Systems," by B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar in Proceedings of the 2018 IEEE Confer-
ence on Decision and Control (CDC), pp. 2068-2073, 2018, IEEE.
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5.2 Problem Setup
Consider a pth order linear dynamical system with m inputs and n outputs described by
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bu(t) + w(t+ 1),
y(t+ 1) = Cx(t+ 1) + n(t+ 1), (5.1)
where x(t) ∈ Rp, u(t) ∈ Rm, y(t) ∈ Rn, w(t) ∼ N (0, Q) is the process noise distributed i.i.d.
across time, n(t) ∼ N (0, R) is the measurement noise distributed i.i.d. across time, the process
and measurement noise processes are independent, and A,B,C,Q,R are matrices of appropriate
dimensions. We further assume that (A,C) is observable, (A,Q1/2) is reachable, and R > 0.
As throughout this thesis, the scenario that we address in this chapter is one where an arbitrary
subset of the sensors and actuators in the system could be malicious. A malicious sensor need not
report the measurements that it observes truthfully, and a malicious actuator need not apply inputs
in accordance with the designated control policy. The honest nodes in the system do not know
the identity of the malicious nodes in the system, or even if there are any malicious nodes in the
system or not. The malicious nodes, however, know the identity of all other malicious nodes in the
system, so that they can exchange information among themselves thereby allowing them to carry
out coordinated attacks.
We assume that an arbitrary, possibly history-dependent control policy {gt} is in place which
specifies the control input ug(t) that has to be applied at time t as a function of the reported
measurements zt := (z(0), . . . , z(t)) upto time t, i.e., ug(t) = gt(zt). If actuator i, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
is honest, then ui(t) ≡ ugi (t) for all t. However, if actuator-i is malicious, then this need not
be the case, and the actuator can apply any input that it wishes. We denote by d(t) the “input
distortion" introduced by the malicious actuators, i.e., d(t) := uM(t) − ugM(t), where uM(t) is
a vector that collects the entries of u(t) corresponding to the malicious actuators, and ugM [t] is
a vector that collects the control policy-specified inputs corresponding to the malicious actuators.
Clearly, these vectors belong to Rma , wherema is the number of malicious actuators in the system.
38
Consequently, the system (5.1) evolves in closed loop according to
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bug(t) +BMd(t) + w(t+ 1),
y(t+ 1) = Cx(t+ 1), (5.2)
where BM denotes the submatrix of B formed by the columns corresponding to the malicious
actuators.
In the previous chapters, we considered special cases of system (5.1), viz., the case of deter-
ministic systems where there is no process or measurement noise, and the only uncertainty is in
the initial conditions of the system [48], and the case of fully-observed stochastic systems (i.e.,
C = Ip and there is no measurement noise) [50], and established operational meanings for the
securable subspace in these contexts. In this chapter, we generalize the above results and estab-
lish the operational meaning of these subspaces in the general context of partially observed linear
stochastic systems of the form (5.1) with both process and measurement noise, which is one of the
most general models describing linear systems.
5.3 Operational Meaning of the Securable Subspace for Partially Observed Systems
This section is devoted to establishing the operational meaning of the securable subspace for
partially observed linear stochastic systems.
Consider the linear dynamical system (5.1) evolving in closed loop according to (5.2). The
MMSE-optimal state prediction x̂R(k + 1|k), given the true actuation inputs and sensor measure-
ments, is obtained from the Kalman filtering equations as
x̂R(k + 1|k) = Ax̂R(k|k) +Bug(k) +BMd(k),
x̂R(k + 1|k + 1) = x̂R(k + 1|k) + LνR(k + 1). (5.3)
where νR(k+1) := y(k+1)−Cx̂R(k+1|k) is the “real" innovations at time k, and L is the steady-
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state Kalman gain. For simplicity, we are assuming here that the system is in steady state and we
are employing the steady-state Kalman gain. The proof extends in a straightforward manner to the
use of time-varying gain, and is omitted for brevity of exposition. Note that the honest nodes in the
system may not be able to compute x̂R(k+ 1|k) or x̂R(k+ 1|k+ 1) since they may not be privy to
the true measurements {y} or the input distortion {d}.
The honest nodes in the system, in the absence of any evidence on the contrary, begin with the
presumption that all nodes in the system are honest, and based on this, compute the state estimates
x̂F (k + 1|k + 1) as
x̂F (k + 1|k) = Ax̂F (k|k) +Bug(k),
x̂F (k + 1|k + 1) = x̂F (k + 1|k) + LνF (k + 1). (5.4)
where νF (k + 1) := z(k + 1)− Cx̂F (k + 1|k). In order to check whether there are any malicious
nodes in the system or not, the honest nodes conduct the following test.
Test: For all q ∈ {1, . . . , r−1}, check if the reported sequence of measurements {z} satisfy (recall
the notation (·)TT from Section 5.1)
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z(k + q)− Cx̂F (k + q|k))TT = Σq, (5.5)
where Σq := E[(y(k + q) − Cx̂R(k + q|k)TT ] is the covariance matrix of the MMSE-optimal
q−step-ahead output prediction error. Note that if there are no malicious nodes in the system,
the above test would be passed by the reported measurements almost surely, and therefore, if the
reported measurements fail the above test, then the honest nodes can conclude the presence of
malicious nodes in the system. Therefore, if the malicious nodes wish to remain undetected, then
they are constrained to reporting measurements that pass (5.5). While the above test is presented in
an asymptotic form, it can be converted into a finite-time test with certain false alarm and detection
rates using standard methods.
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The following theorem establishes the operational significance of the securable subspace in the
context of partially observed stochastic linear dynamical systems.
Theorem 4. Consider the system (5.1) with malicious sensors and actuators, and suppose that the
pair (A,C) is observable, (A,Q1/2) is reachable, and R > 0. If the reported measurements {z}
satisfy (5.5), then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∥∥∥(x̂F (k + 1|k)− x̂R(k + 1|k))S∥∥∥2 = 0.
Proof. Define
δ(k + q|k) := x̂F (k + q|k)− x̂R(k + q|k). (5.6)
Since the reported measurements pass test (5.5), we have that for every q ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z(k + q)− Cx̂F (k + q|k))TT = Σq.
Let hS be the number of honest sensors in the system, and assume without loss of generality that the
sensors measuring the outputs y1 through yhs are honest (since the rows ofC and the corresponding
entries of y, etc., can be rearranged to achieve this). We note that the upper hs entries of z(k + 1),
denoted zH(k+ 1), agree with the upper hs entries of y(k+ 1), denoted yH(k+ 1), since these hs
sensors are honest. Hence, equating the upper-left hs × hs sub-matrix of the above equality yields
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(yH(k + q)− CH x̂F (k + q|k))TT = ΣqH ,
where ΣqH is the upper-left hs × hs sub-matrix of Σq. Using (5.6), the above can be written as
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(yH(k + q)− CH x̂R(k + q|k)− CHδ(k + q|k))TT = ΣqH ,
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Denoting the vector CHδ(k+ q|k) by δH(k+ 1|k), and the vector yH(k+ q)−CH x̂R(k+ q|k) by
y˜H(k+q|k), and noting that limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
k=0 (y˜
H(k+q|k))TT = ΣqH , the above equality simplifies
to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
δH(k + q|k)δHT (k + q|k)− y˜H(k + q|k)(δH(k + q|k))T
−δH(k + q|k)(y˜H(k + q|k))T = 0. (5.7)
Now, the second term in the above sum can be rewritten as
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
y˜H(k + q|k)δH(k + q|k)T =
q−1∑
i=0
lim
τ→∞
1
τ
τ∑
g=1
y˜H(i+ gq|i+ (g − 1)q)
δH(i+ gq|i+ (g − 1)q).
Now, y˜H(i+gq|i+(g−1)q) is independent ofFi+(g−1)q whereas δH(i+gq|i+(g−1)q) ∈ Fi+(g−1)q.
Moreover, {y˜H(i + gq|i + (g − 1)q)δH(i + gq|i + (g − 1)q)}, viewed as a sequence in g, is i.i.d.
across time. Using the Martingale Stability Theorem (MST) [49], (5.7) reduces to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
δH(k + q|k)δHT (k + q|k) = 0. (5.8)
Now, note that
x̂R(k + q|k) = Aq−1x̂R(k + 1|k) +
q−2∑
l=0
AlBug(k + q − l − 1|k)
−
q−2∑
l=0
AlBM d̂(k + q − l − 1|k), (5.9)
and that
x̂F (k + q|k) = Aq−1x̂F (k + 1|k) +
q−2∑
l=0
AlBug(k + q − l − 1|k), (5.10)
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where d̂(k+q−l−1|k) := E[d(k+q−l−1)|Fk)]. Subtracting (5.9) from (5.10) and left-multiplying
the result by CH yields
CHδ(k + q|k) = CH [Aq−1δ(k + 1|k)−
q−2∑
l=0
AlBM d̂(k + q − l − 1|k)].
Since the sequence {CHδ(k + q|k)} is of zero power following (5.8) for all q ∈ {1, . . . , r}, we
have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣CH [Aq−1δ(k + 1|k)− q−2∑
l=0
AlBM d̂(k + q − l − 1|k)]∣∣∣∣2 = 0. (5.11)
Now, in order to show that {δS(k+ 1|k)} is of zero power, we show, via induction, that each of the
sequences {δS0(k + 1|k)}, . . . , {δSr−1(k + 1|k)} is of zero power.
Note that substituting the value q = 1 in (5.8) gives limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
k=0
∥∥CHδ(k + 1|k)∥∥2 = 0,
which in turn implies that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∥∥δS0(k + 1|k)∥∥2 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∥∥∥CHT (CHCHT )−1CHδ(k + 1|k)∥∥∥2 = 0.
This establishes the base case for induction.
Now, we assume for induction that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∥∥δSi(k + 1|k)∥∥2 = 0
for all i ∈ {0, . . . , j}. Substituting q = j + 1 in (5.11) and expanding δ(k + 1|k) in terms of its
components in S0, . . . ,Sr−1 and V gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣CH [ r−1∑
f=0
AjδSf (k + 1|k) + AjδV (k + 1|k)−
j−1∑
l=0
AlBM d̂(k + j − l|k)]∣∣∣∣2 = 0.
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Using the induction hypothesis, the above reduces to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣CH [ r−1∑
f=j+1
AjδSf (k + 1|k) + AjδV (k + 1|k)−
j−1∑
l=0
AlBM d̂(k + j − l|k)]∣∣∣∣2 = 0.
(5.12)
Now, it follows from the definition of the unsecurable subspace that there exist d̂V (k+j|k), . . . , d̂V (k+
1|k) such that
AjδV (k + 1|k)−
j−1∑
l=0
AlBM d̂V (k + j − l|k) ∈ V ⊆ N (CH). (5.13)
Similarly, it follows from Lemma 1 that for every f ∈ {j + 2, . . . , r − 1}, there exist d̂f (k +
1|k), . . . , d̂f (k + j|k) such that
AjδSf (k + 1|k)−
j−1∑
l=0
AlBM d̂f (k + j − l|k) ∈ N (CH). (5.14)
Consequently, define for l = 0, . . . , j − 1,
γ(k + j − l|k) := d̂(k + j − l|k)− d̂V (k + j − l|k)−
r−1∑
f=j+2
d̂f (k + j − l|k).
Substituting for d̂(k + j − l|k) in (5.12) using the above equality and then applying (5.13) and
(5.14) on the result gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣CH [AjδSj+1(k + 1|k)− j−1∑
l=0
AlBMγ(k + j − l|k)]∣∣∣∣2 = 0. (5.15)
Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, the above yields, after some algebra, that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∥∥δSj+1(k + 1|k)∥∥2 = 0,
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thereby completing the induction.
Let x˜F (k + 1|k) := x(k + 1)− x̂F (k + 1|k), and define x˜R(k + 1|k) likewise. The following
result presents an equivalent operational meaning for the securable subspace.
Corollary 2. Assume as in Theorem 1. If the reported measurements {z} satisfy the test (5.5),
then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
x˜FS (k + 1|k)(x˜FS (k + 1|k))T = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
x˜RS (k + 1|k)(x˜RS (k + 1|k))T .
It follows from this that the covariance of the projection of the state estimation error of the
honest nodes on the securable subspace remains at its optimal value.
Proof. Note that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
x˜FS (k + 1|k)(x˜FS (k + 1|k))T = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(xS(k + 1)− x̂FS (k + 1|k))TT
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(xS(k + 1)− x̂RS (k + 1|k)− δS(k + 1|k))TT
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(xS(k)− x̂RS (k + 1|k))TT , (5.16)
where the last equality follows as a consequence of Theorem 1.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have considered multiple-input-multiple-output partially observed linear
stochastic systems with both process and measurement noise, in which an arbitrary subset of the
sensors and actuators could be malicious. We have shown that for any such system, its state
space can be decomposed into two orthogonal subspaces, called the securable and the unsecurable
subspaces, such that the covariance of the projection of the one-step-ahead state estimation error of
the honest nodes on the securable subspace remains at its optimal value regardless of what attack
strategy the malicious sensors and actuators choose to employ, as long as the malicious sensors
45
and actuators wish to remain undetected. The malicious nodes, therefore, can degrade the state
estimation performance only along the unsecurable subspace of the linear dynamical system.
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6. DYNAMIC WATERMARKING: ACTIVE DEFENSE OF NETWORKED
CYBERPHYSICAL SYSTEMS*
6.1 Introduction
Fig. 6.1, reproduced from Chapter 1, illustrates the basic architecture of a Networked Cyber-
Physical System. At the heart of the system is a physical plant with m inputs and n outputs. Each
input is controlled by an independent actuator, and each output is measured by an independent
sensor. The dynamics of the physical plant along with the ambient noises map the actuation signals
applied by the actuators to outputs that are measured by the sensors. The plant model and the noise
statistics are known to all sensors and actuators in the system. The outputs observed by the sensors
are communicated to entities called controllers through an underlying communication network.
Each controller’s job is to compute, in accordance with a specified control policy, the particular
actuation signals that must be applied. The result of this computation is then communicated to the
actuators through the communication network, which then apply the actuation signals. We assume
that the network is complete, so that every node in the network can communicate with every other
node. We use the term “nodes" generically to refer to any entity in the network. Therefore, in
Fig. 6.1, some nodes are actuators, some are sensors, some are controllers, and some could just
be relays whose only job is to forward the information from one node to another. In this work, we
assume that each node has both communication and computational capabilities, thereby allowing
the controllers to be collocated with the actuators.
However, certain sensors in the system could be "malicious" (suggestive of this, some nodes
in Fig. 6.1 are marked in red), and the other nodes are said to be "honest." We further assume that
the malicious nodes know the identity of all other malicious nodes in the system, allowing them to
*All sections of this chapter except Section 6.9 are reprinted with permission from “Dynamic Watermarking:
Active Defense of Networked Cyber-Physical Systems," by B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar in Proceedings of the
IEEE, vol. 105, no. 2, pp. 219-240, Feb. 2017, IEEE.
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Figure 6.1: A Networked Cyber-Physical System
collude to achieve their objective, whereas the honest nodes don’t know which of the other nodes
are malicious or honest. A malicious sensor is a sensor node which does not report accurately
the measurements that it observes. Rather, it reports a distorted version of the measurements. A
malicious router node may not forward the packets that it receives, may forward packets that it
does not receive (while claiming otherwise), alter packets before forwarding, introduce intentional
delays, impersonate some other node in the system, etc. Therefore, the challenges of securing a
Networked Cyber-Physical System are two-fold:
1) Secure the cyber layer that comprises the communication network, ensuring confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of network packets, and
2) Secure the sensors and actuators interfacing with the physical layer.
The former is achieved by a combination of traditional approaches such as cryptography and a
more recent line of work reported in [29, 51, 52], while the latter is the subject of this chapter.
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Based on our assumption that the communication network is complete, and that the cyber layer
has been secured, we suppose that every node in the network knows the identity of the node from
which a packet that it receives originated, and knows if a packet that it receives was tampered with
by any node along the route. Therefore, in the sequel, we abstract the cyber layer as consisting of
secure, reliable, delay guaranteed bit pipes between any pair of nodes in the network. In particular,
we imagine that there exists a secure, reliable, delay guaranteed bit pipe between any particular
sensor and actuator node.
Finally, the plant that is being controlled is abstracted as a stochastic linear dynamical system
described by time-invariant parameters. While any system that is of practical interest is most cer-
tainly non-linear, we focus on linear systems for two reasons. The first is that a linear system lends
itself to tractable analysis, and enables one to separate the complexity arising out of the problem
at hand from the complexity arising as a consequence of the system’s non-linearity. Secondly,
a theory developed for linear systems provides valuable insights and design principles that often
transcend the particulars of the model and apply to a much broader class of systems. The wide
applicability of Kalman’s pioneering work on linear control systems [53] stands testimony to this
fact.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides a system-theoretic formulation of
the problem. Section 6.3 describes our approach of active defense for networked cyber-physical
systems. Section 6.4 opens by describing the method in the relatively simple context of a scalar
linear Gaussian system and rigorously establishes the associated theoretical guarantees. Section
6.5 treats the more general class of scalar auto-regressive systems with exogenous noise (ARX
systems) that is Gaussian. Section 6.6 extends these ideas to the more general ARMAX systems
with arbitrary delay, a model that is frequently encountered in process control. Section 6.7 deals
with partially observed SISO systems with Gaussian process and measurement noise. Section 6.8
considers perfectly observed multi-input, multi-output linear Gaussian systems in state-space form,
and Section 6.9 treats the general case of a partially observed MIMO system with both process and
measurement noise. Section 6.10 describes how our results can potentially be extended to non-
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Gaussian systems. Section 6.11 shows how the theoretical results lead to statistical tests that can
be used to detect malicious behavior within a delay bound with a controlled false alarm rate.
6.2 Problem Formulation
We are now in a position to state the problem in precise terms (with notation as indicated in the
Appendix). Consider an m× n stochastic linear dynamical system of order p, described by
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bu[t] + w[t+ 1], (6.1)
where A ∈ Rp×p, B ∈ Rp×m, u[t] is the input applied to the plant at time t, {w} is a sequence
of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) Gaussian random vectors with zero mean and
covariance martix σ2wI , independent of the initial state x0 of the system.
While a malicious sensor can report different measurements to different actuators, the con-
sistency of the reported measurements can be checked by allowing the actuators to exchange the
reported measurements among themselves. This constrains the malicious sensors to report the
same value to all honest nodes in the system. The sensor node j reports to the honest nodes
in the system the value zj[t] as the measurement that it observes at time t. We define z[t] :=
[z1[t] z2[t] z3[t] · · · zn[t]]T . We will call z[t] for t ≥ 0 the measurements reported by the sensors.
Note that the sensor j is honest if zj[t] = xj[t] ∀t.
We assume that a control policy is in place, known to all nodes in the system, and allow for it
to be history dependent, so that the ith input at time t, ugi [t], dictated by the policy is
ugi [t] = g
i
t(z
t), (6.2)
where zt := {z[0], z[1], ..., z[t]}. We can suppose without loss of generality that the controller that
computes this control law is collocated with the actuator node.
Our goal is to secure the control system by developing techniques that prevent the malicious
nodes from causing excessive distortion if they are to remain undetected. We will suppose that the
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purpose of control law (6.2) is to improve the regulation performance of the system with respect to
the disturbances affecting it. For some of the performance results we will assume that the system is
open-loop stable, and show that the adversarial nodes cannot affect the performance of the system
without remaining undetected, and if detected then they can be disconnected, returning the system
to stable behavior. The fundamental results characterizing what is the most that the adversarial
nodes can do while remaining undetected, are applicable to all systems, stable or unstable.
6.3 Dynamic Watermarking
The key idea which allows the honest nodes to detect the presence of malicious nodes in the
system is the following. Let g denote the control policy in place that specifies inputs to be applied in
response to observed outputs. At each time instant t, an actuator node superimposes on its control
policy-specified input ugi [t], a random variable ei[t] that it draws independently from a specified
distribution. Therefore, the input that actuator i applies at time t is
ui[t] = u
g
i [t] + ei[t]. (6.3)
This is illustrated in Fig. 6.2. The random variables e0[t], e1[t], e2[t] · · · are independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.), independent of the control policy-specified input. The distribution
that they are chosen from is made public (i.e., made known to every node in the system), but the
actual values of the excitation are not disclosed. In fact, this is how the honest actuators can check
whether signals are being tampered with as they travel around the control loop. We refer to these
random variables as an actuator node’s privately imposed excitation, since only that actuator node
knows the actual realization of the sequence.
To see why private excitation helps, consider the example of a single-input-single-output (SISO)
system where the sensor is malicious and the actuator is honest. Suppose that the control policy in
place is g = (g1, g2, . . . , gt, . . .), where gt specifies the input to be applied at time t in response to
outputs up till that time. The actual outputs of the plant up to time t are xt := (x[0], x[1], . . . , x[t]).
However the outputs reported to it by the malicious sensor are zt := (z[0], z[1], . . . , z[1]), which
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Figure 6.2: The actuator node i superimposes a private excitation whose realization is unknown to
other nodes on to its control inputs. Reprinted with permission from [1].
may differ from xt. The actuator therefore applies the control input u[t] = gt(zt) at time t, without
using any private excitation. Then, we have the system
x[t+ 1] = ax[t] + bgt(z
t) + w[t+ 1], (6.4)
where w[t] is the zero-mean process noise with variance σ2w.
If the actuator does not superimpose a private excitation, the sensor knows, for each time t,
the input u[t] applied by the actuator. This is because it knows both the measurement sequence
zt that it reported to the actuator as well as the control policy {g1, g2, ...} that the honest actuator
has implemented. Hence, the malicious sensor can report a sequence of measurements {z[t]} to
the actuator without even "looking" at the output, but by simply "simulating a linear stochastic
system" after generating its own i.i.d. process noise {w′} from the same distribution as that of
{w}, as follows.
z(t+ 1) = az(t) + bgt(z
t) + w′(t+ 1). (6.5)
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The actuator cannot detect that the sensor is malicious since the sequence {w′}, having been chosen
from the same distribution as {w}, could have been the actual process noise.
However, by superimposing a private excitation that is unknown to the sensor, the actuator
forces the sensor to report measurements that are correlated with {ei}, lest it be exposed, as we
will show in the sequel. In the following sections, we prove that thereby constraining the sensor to
report measurements that are correlated with the private excitation essentially limits the amount of
distortion that the sensor can get away with while remaining undetected to be essentially zero in a
mean-square sense.
This active defense technique is similar in spirit to the technique of digital watermarking [10]
in electronic documents. Electronic documents can be easily transmitted and reproduced in large
numbers. In doing so, the source of the document may be deleted, and can result in copyright
violations. To protect the identity of its author, or any other information about the document,
the electronic document is "watermarked" before being made available electronically. A digital
watermark is a digital code that is robustly embedded in the original document [11]. By robust,
it is meant that the code cannot be destroyed without destroying the contents of the document.
This code typically contains information about the document that needs to be preserved. Though
preferable, it is not a requirement that the watermark be imperceptible. The only requirement is
that it does not distort the actual contents beyond certain acceptable limits [11]. Applications of
digital watermarking also include data authentication, where fragile watermarks are used which
get destroyed when the data is tampered with [11], and data monitoring and tracking.
This approach for secure control is analogous to digital watermarking. As we show in the sub-
sequent sections, with regard to, for example, the above case where we considered a compromised
sensor, injecting private excitation that is unknown to the sensor effectively "watermarks" the pro-
cess noise, in the sense that the sensor cannot separate the private excitation from the process noise.
Hence, any attempt on the part of the sensor to distort the process noise (which is the only compo-
nent of the output unknown to the actuators) will also distort the "watermark," allowing the honest
nodes to detect malicious activity.
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Specifically, given a general MIMO system of the form (6.1), we define
v[k] := z[k]− Az[k − 1]−Bu[k − 1]−w[k],
so that if the sensors truthfully report z[t] ≡ y[t], then, v ≡ 0. As will be shown, the sequence {v}
has the interpretation of the additive noise distortion introduced by the malicious sensors to the
process noise. A similar definition can also be provided for a partially observed system, as we will
show in Section 6.7. In this case, the sequence {v} has the interpretation of the additive distortion
introduced by the malicious sensors to the innovations process. Now, based on {v}, we define the
following quantity.
Definition 7. We call
lim sup
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
‖v[k]‖2
as the additive noise distortion power of the malicious sensors.
The “fundamental security guarantee," described in the sequel, provided by Dynamic Water-
marking is that the additive noise distortion power is restricted to be zero if the malicious sensors
are to remain undetected. We establish this in several linear control system contexts in this chapter.
6.4 Active Defense for Networked Cyber-Physical Systems: The SISO Case with Gaussian
noise
In this section, to illustrate the results in a simple context, we focus on single-input, single-
output linear stochastic dynamical systems with Gaussian noise. The system is described by
x[t+ 1] = ax[t] + bu[t] + w[t+ 1], (6.6)
where a, b, x[t], u[t], w[t] ∈ R, with {w[t]} being zero-mean i.i.d. Gaussian process noise of
variance σ2w. The actuator wishes to implement a control law {gt}, i.e., it wishes to implement
u[t] = gt(x
t), where xt := (x[0], x[1], · · · , x[t]). However, the actuator does not have access to xt.
It relies on a sensor that measures x[t]. However, since the sensor could be malicious, it reports
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measurements z[t] to the actuator, where z[t] could differ from x[t]. We consider an honest actua-
tor that is meant to, and implements the control policy {g}, but adds a private excitation {e} as a
defense. Specifically, the actuator applies to the system the input
u[t] = gt(z
t) + e[t]. (6.7)
Note that even though it implements the control policy {g}, the policy is applied to the mea-
surements z[t] reported by the sensor, which could differ from the true output x[t]. The private
excitation e[·] added is independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and Gaussian of mean 0 and
variance σ2e . Therefore, the system evolves in closed-loop as
x[t+ 1] = ax[t] + bgt(z
t) + be[t] + w[t+ 1]. (6.8)
We propose that the honest actuator perform certain "tests" to check if the sensor is malicious
or not. Towards developing these tests, note that the actual sequence of states {x[t]} of the system
satisfies
x[t+ 1]− ax[t]− bgt(zt) = be[t] + w[t+ 1]. (6.9)
Therefore, we have
{x[t+ 1]− ax[t]− bgt(zt)}t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, b2σ2e + σ2w), (6.10)
and
{x[t+ 1]− ax[t]− bgt(zt)− be[t]}t ∼ i.i.d. N (0, σ2w). (6.11)
Based on the above observations, we propose that the actuator perform the following natural tests
for variance to check if the sensor is honestly reporting x[t]. The actuator checks if the reported
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sequence {z[t]} satisfies conditions (6.10) and (6.11), which the true output {x[t]} would satisfy if
the sensor were truthfully reporting z[t] ≡ x[t]. We write the tests in an asymptotic form below, as
a test conducted over an infinite time interval. They can be reduced to statistical tests over a finite
time interval in standard ways, which we elaborate on in Section 6.11.
1) Actuator Test 1: Check if the reported sequence of measurements {z[t]} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1]− az[k]− bgk(zk)− be[k])2 = σ2w. (6.12)
2) Actuator Test 2: Check if the reported sequence of measurements {z[t]} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1]− az[k]− bgk(zk))2 = (b2σ2e + σ2w). (6.13)
Define
v[t+ 1] := z[t+ 1]− az[t]− bgt(zt)− be[t]− w[t+ 1],
so that for an honest sensor which reports z[t] ≡ x[t], v[t] = 0 ∀t. We term the quantity
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
v2[k]
the additive noise distortion power of a malicious sensor for reasons explained later. The ensuing
theorem proves that a malicious sensor with only zero additive noise distortion power can pass the
above two tests, thereby remaining undetected.
Theorem 5. If {z[t]} passes tests (6.12) and (6.13), thereby remaining undetected, then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
v2[k] = 0. (6.14)
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Proof. Since {z} satisfies (6.12), we have,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
(v[k] + w[k])2 = σ2w. (6.15)
Hence,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
v2[k] + 2v[k]w[k] + w2[k] = σ2w.
Since limT→∞ 1T
∑T
k=1w
2[k] = E{w2[k]} = σ2w, we have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
v2[k] + lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
2v[k]w[k] = 0. (6.16)
Since {z} also satisfies (6.13), we have,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
(v[k] + be[k − 1] + w[k])2 = b2σ2e + σ2w.
So,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
(v[k] + w[k])2 + lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
b2e2[k − 1] + lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
2be[k − 1](v[k] + w[k])
= b2σ2e + σ
2
w.
Using (6.15), and the fact that {e} has variance σ2e , the above reduces to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
e[k − 1](v[k] + w[k]) = 0.
Invoking the fact that e[k − 1] and w[k] are independent ∀k and zero mean, it further reduces to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
e[k − 1]v[k] = 0. (6.17)
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The above equation implies that the sequence {v}, added by the sensor, must be empirically un-
correlated with the actuator’s private noise sequence {e}.
Let Sk := σ(xk, zk, ek−2), ŵ[k] := E[w[k]
∣∣Sk]. Since
w[k] = x[k]− ax[k − 1]− bgk−1(zk−1)− be[k − 1],
we have
(xk−2, ek−2)→ (x[k − 1], x[k], zk)→ w[k]
forming a Markov chain. Consequently, ŵ[k] := E[w[k]
∣∣σ(ek−2, xk−2, x[k − 1], x[k], zk)] =
E[w[k]
∣∣σ(x[k−1], x[k], zk)]. Since x[k]−ax[k−1]−bgk−1(zk−1) (which is equal to be[k−1]+w[k])
is i.i.d. Gaussian for different k, we have [54]
ŵ[k] =
σ2w
b2σ2e + σ
2
w
(be[k − 1] + w[k]) = β(be[k − 1] + w[k]), (6.18)
where β := σ
2
w
b2σ2e+σ
2
w
< 1.
Let w˜[k] := w[k] − ŵ[k]. Then, (w˜[k − 1],Sk) is a Martingale difference sequence. This is
because w˜[k − 1] ∈ Sk, and
E[w˜[k]
∣∣Sk] = 0. (6.19)
We also have v[k] ∈ Sk (in fact, v[k] ∈ σ(xk, zk)). Hence, Martingale Stability Theorem (MST)
[49] applies, and we have
T∑
k=1
v[k]w˜[k] = o(
T∑
k=1
v2[k]) +O(1). (6.20)
Now,
T∑
k=1
v[k]w[k] =
T∑
k=1
v[k](ŵ[k] + w˜[k]) =
T∑
k=1
v[k]ŵ[k] + o(
T∑
k=1
v2[k]) +O(1).
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Employing the specific form of the estimate (6.18), we have from the above,
T∑
k=1
v[k]w[k] =βb
T∑
k=1
v[k]e[k − 1] + β
T∑
k=1
v[k]w[k] + o(
T∑
k=1
v2[k]) +O(1).
Hence,
T∑
k=1
v[k]w[k] =
βb
1− β
T∑
k=1
v[k]e[k − 1] + o(
T∑
k=1
v2[k]) +O(1).
From (6.17), we have
∑T
k=1 v[k]e[k − 1] = o(T ). It follows that
T∑
k=1
v[k]w[k] = o(
T∑
k=1
v2[k]) + o(T ) +O(1). (6.21)
So,
T∑
k=1
v2[k] +
T∑
k=1
2v[k]w[k] = (1 + o(1))(
T∑
k=1
v2[k]) + o(T ) +O(1)
Dividing the above equation by T , taking the limit as T → ∞, and invoking (6.16) completes the
proof.
Remark: Note that the only sources of uncertainty in the system are the initial state of the system
x[0] and the sequence of noise realizations {w[1], w[2], w[3], · · · }. The sensor reporting a sequence
of measurements is equivalent to it reporting a sequence of process noise realizations, since the
actuator expects z[t+ 1]− az[t]− bgt(zt)− be[t], which it can compute, to be equal to the process
noise w[t+ 1]. From the definition of v[t], we have
z[t+ 1]− az[t]− bgt(zt)− be[t] = w[t+ 1] + v[t+ 1].
The left hand side of the above equation can be computed by the actuator, and therefore, it can also
compute the sequence {w+v}. What the theorem states is that a malicious sensor cannot distort the
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noise realization {w[1], w[2], w[3], · · · } beyond adding a zero-power sequence to it. Suppose the
control law g has been designed to provide good noise regulation performance of a stable system,
then the performance of the system is good, subject only to the slightly increased cost of the private
excitation of variance σ2e . As we discuss in Section 6.11, this can be reduced to a low enough value
that permits detection of a malicious sensor within a specified delay with an acceptable level of
false alarm probability.
Theorem 6. Suppose |a| < 1, i.e., the system is stable.
(i) Define the distortion d[t] := z[t]− x[t]. Then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
d2[k] = 0.
(ii) If the malicious sensor is to remain undetected, the mean-square performance of x[t] is the
same as the reported mean-square performance z[t] that the actuator believes it is:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
x2[k] = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
z2[k].
(iii) Suppose the control law is ug(t) = fx(t) with |a + bf | < 1. The malicious sensor cannot
compromise the performance of the system if it is to remain undetected, i.e., the mean-square
performance of the system is
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
x2[k] =
σ2w + b
2σ2e
1− |a+ bf |2 .
Proof. Note that
d[k + 1] = z[k + 1]− x[k + 1]
= (az[k] + bgk(z
k) + be[k] + w[k + 1] + v[k + 1])− (ax[k] + bgk(zk) + be[k] + w[k + 1])
= a(z[k]− x[k]) + v[k + 1] = ad[k] + v[k + 1].
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The distortion experienced by the actuator can therefore be thought of as the output of a linear
dynamical system driven by an input sequence {v[t]} satisfying (6.14). Therefore,
d[k] =
k−1∑
n=0
anv[k − n],
where limT→∞ 1T
∑T
p=1 v
2[p] = 0. From the stability of a, it follows that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
d2[k] = 0. (6.22)
Note that x[k] = z[k] − d[k]. Hence x2[k] = z2[k] + d2[k] − 2(γz[k])(γ−1d[k]). Now
|2(γz[k])(γ−1d[k])| ≤ (γ2z2[k]) + (γ−2d2[k]). Therefore,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
x2[k] ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(1 + γ2)z2[k] + (1 + γ−2)d2[k].
Since the result is true for any γ > 0, taking the limit γ → 0 and noting that the mean-square of d
is 0 gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
x2[k] ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
z2[k]. (6.23)
Similarly, since z[k] = x[k] + d[k], we have z2[k] = x2[k] + d2[k] + 2(γx[k])(γ−1z[k]). Repeating
the same argument as before, we have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
z2[k] ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(1 + γ2)x2[k] + (1 + γ−2)d2[k].
Taking the limit as γ → 0, and noting that mean-square of d is 0, the above reduces to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
z2[k] ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
x2[k]. (6.24)
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The second result follows from (6.23) and (6.24). The third result is immediate noting that the
mean-square of {z} converges to σ2w+b2σ2e
1−|a+bf |2 .
6.5 Active Defense for Networked Cyber-Physical Systems: The SISO ARX Case
The results developed in the previous section can be extended to a more general ARX system
model. Specifically, we consider a unit delay, strictly minimum phase, single-input, single-output
system described by
y[t+ 1] = −
p∑
m=0
amy[t−m] +
h∑
r=0
bru[t− r] + w[t+ 1], (6.25)
where am, br, y[t], u[t], w[t] ∈ R, b0 6= 0, and with {w[t]} being zero-mean i.i.d. Gaussian pro-
cess noise of variance σ2w. Let q
−1 denote the backward shift operator. The above system can
equivalently be expressed as
A(q−1)y[t] = q−1B(q−1)u[t] + w[t], (6.26)
where A(q−1) := 1 + a0q−1 + a1q−2 + ... + apq−(p+1), and B(q−1) := b0 + b1q−1 + ... + bhq−h,
with B(q−1) being strictly minimum phase, i.e., all its roots lie strictly outside the unit circle.
We consider an honest actuator that is meant to, and implements the control policy {g}, and
adds a private excitation {e} as a defense. Unlike in the system considered in Section-6.4, the
output of the ARX system at any particular time depends on the past inputs. Specifically, the output
at any time instant contains contributions of private excitation injected in the past. Hence, simply
injecting an i.i.d. sequence of Gaussian random variables will not result in an output distribution
that is i.i.d. across time.
However, since the actuator knows the past values of the private excitation, and also the transfer
function of the system, it can perform "pre-equalization" by filtering the private excitation sequence
before injecting it into the system. The filter, which we refer to as the pre-equalizer, has to be
chosen in such a way that the component of the private excitation that appears in the output of the
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plant is an i.i.d. sequence of mean 0 and variance b20σ
2
e . We let
e′[t] := − 1
b0
(b1e
′[t− 1] + b2e′[t− 2] + . . .+ bhe′[t− h]) + e[t],
where e[t] is i.i.d. and Gaussian of mean 0 and variance σ2e . Since the system is strictly minimum
phase, this is a stable generation of an excitation sequence [54].
With a pre-equalizer in place, the effective input applied by the actuator is
u[t] = gt(z
t) + e′[t]. (6.27)
where {e′}t is the output of the pre-equalizer, and zt is the sequence of measurements reported by
the sensor up to time t. Therefore, the system evolves in closed-loop as
y[t+ 1] = −
p∑
m=0
amy[t−m] +
h∑
r=0
brgt−r(zt−r) + b0e[t] + w[t+ 1], (6.28)
where {e[t]} is a sequence of i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with mean 0 and variance σ2e . Hence,
from the point of view of actuator tests and associated results, the above problem is similar to that
described in Section-6.4.
We propose that the actuator perform the following tests to check if the sensor is reporting the
measurements honestly.
1) Actuator Test 1: Check if the reported sequence of measurements {z[t]} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1] +
p∑
m=0
amz[k −m]−
h∑
r=0
brgk−r(zk−r)− b0e[k])2 = σ2w. (6.29)
2) Actuator Test 2: Check if the reported sequence of measurements {z[t]} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1] +
p∑
m=0
amz[k −m]−
h∑
r=0
brgk−r(zk−r))2 = (b20σ
2
e + σ
2
w). (6.30)
63
Consequently, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 can be extended as follows.
Theorem 7. 1) Let v[t+ 1] := z[t+ 1] +
∑p
m=0 amz[k −m]−
∑h
r=0 brgk−r(z
k−r)− b0e[t]−
w[t+ 1], so that for an honest sensor which reports z[t] ≡ y[t], v[t] = 0 ∀t. If {z[t]} passes
tests (6.29) and (6.30), then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
v2[k] = 0. (6.31)
2) If the malicious sensor is to remain undetected, the mean-square performance of {y} is what
the actuator believes it is, which is the mean-square performance of {z}. Hence if the control
law was designed to provide a certain mean-square performance, then that is the value that
is indeed attained.
Proof. Omitted, since the proof follows the same sequence of arguments as the proof of Theorem
1.
In the following section, we extend the technique to systems with arbitrary delay and colored
noise, i.e., the more general ARMAX model, see [55].
6.6 Active Defense for Networked Cyber-Physical Systems: The SISO ARMAX Case
A general ARMAX system with arbitrary but finite delay is a model that is encountered often
in process control. In this section, we develop a Dynamic Watermarking scheme to secure such
systems. We show that by commanding the actuator to inject private excitation whose spectrum is
matched to that of the colored process noise entering the system, it can be ensured that a malicious
sensor is constrained to distorting the process noise, the only quantity unknown to the actuator, by
at most a zero-power signal. This amounts to a form of Internal Model Principle [56] for Dynamic
Watermarking, and is a phenomenon that doesn’t emerge in the analysis of a simple SISO or an
ARX system treated in the previous sections.
A general ARMAX system with finite delay l is described by
y[t] = −
p∑
k=1
aky[t− k] +
h∑
k=0
bku[t− l − k] +
r∑
k=0
ckw[t− k]. (6.32)
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Without loss of generality, we assume that c0 = 1. Let q−1 be the backward shift operator, so that
q−1y[t] = y[t− 1]. Then, the above system can be expressed as
A(q−1)y[t] = q−lB(q−1)u[t] + C(q−1)w[t], (6.33)
where a0 := 1, A(q−1) := a0 +a1q−1 + ...+apq−p, B(q−1) := b0 + b1q−1 + ...+ bhq−h, C(q−1) :=
c0 + c1q
−1 + ... + crq−r, and B(q−1) and C(q−1) are assumed to be strictly minimum phase. To
secure the system, the actuator applies the control
u[t] = ug[t] +B−1(q−1)C(q−1)e[t], (6.34)
where ug[t] is the control policy-specified input sequence and {e} is a sequence of i.i.d Gaussian
random variables of zero mean and variance σ2e , denoting the actuator node’s private excitation.
Since B(q−1) is assumed to be minimum phase, (6.34) is a stable generation of the control input
u[t]. Consequently, the output of the system obeys
A(q−1)y[t] = q−lB(q−1)ug[t] + q−lC(q−1)e[t] + C(q−1)w[t], (6.35)
implying that
y[t] = −
p∑
k=1
aky[t− k] +
h∑
k=0
bku
g[t− l − k] +
r∑
k=0
cke[t− l − k] +
r∑
k=0
ckw[t− k]. (6.36)
While the q−domain derivation is just formal, the above difference equation can be obtained rig-
orously.
Define λ[t] := e[t− l] + w[t]. Then, the output of the system can be expressed as
y[t] = −
p∑
k=1
aky[t− k] +
h∑
k=0
bku
g[t− l − k] +
r∑
k=0
ckλ[t− k]. (6.37)
We now develop tests that the actuator should perform to detect maliciousness of the sensor. The
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fundamental idea behind the tests is to check if the prediction-error of the reported sequence {z}
has the appropriate statistics. Specifically, the actuator processes the reported measurements with
a prediction-error filter defined through the following recursion for all t ≥ 0.
zt|t−1 = −
p∑
k=1
akz[t− k] +
h∑
k=0
bku
g[t− l − k] +
r∑
k=1
ckz˜[t− k], (6.38)
z˜[t] = z[t]− zt|t−1. (6.39)
The filter is assumed to be initialized with z˜[−k] = λ[−k], k ∈ {−1,−2, ...,−r}. It is easy to
verify that the above filter produces z˜[t] ≡ λ[t] if z[t] ≡ y[t]. Based on this observation, we
propose that the actuator perform the following tests.
1. Actuator Test 1: The actuator checks if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z˜[k]− e[k − l])2 = σ2w. (6.40)
2. Actuator Test 2: The actuator checks if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
z˜2[k] = σ2w + σ
2
e . (6.41)
The following theorem shows that the above tests suffice to ensure that a malicious sensor can-
not introduce any distortion beyond addition of a zero-power signal to the process noise. i.e., a
malicious sensor of only zero additive noise distortion power can pass the above tests to remain
undetected.
Theorem 8. Define v[t] :=
∑p
k=0 akz[t − k] −
∑h
k=0 bku
g[t − l − k] −∑rk=0 ckλ[t − k], so that
for an honest sensor reporting z ≡ y, v ≡ 0. If the sensor passes tests (6.40) and (6.41), then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
v2[k] = 0.
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Proof. From (6.38) and (6.39), one gets
r∑
k=0
ckz˜[t− k] = z[t] +
p∑
k=1
akz[t− k]−
h∑
k=0
bku
g[t− l − k] =
r∑
k=0
ckλ[t− k] + v[t]. (6.42)
Equivalently, assuming appropriate initial conditions, one has
C(q−1)z˜[t] = C(q−1)λ[t] + v[t].
This gives
z˜[t] = λ[t] + vf [t],
where vf [t] := C−1(q−1)v[t]. Now,
z˜[t] = λ[t] + vf [t] = w[t] + e[t− l] + vf [t]. (6.43)
Since {z˜} passes (6.40), we have from the above,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(vf [k] + w[k])
2 = σ2w. (6.44)
This gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
v2f [k] + 2vf [k]w[k] = 0. (6.45)
Since {z˜} also passes (6.41), we have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(vf [k] + w[k] + e[k − l])2 = σ2w + σ2e . (6.46)
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This gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
v2f [k] + 2vf [k]w[k] + 2vf [k]e[k − l] = 0.
Combining the above with (6.45), we have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
vf [k]e[k − l] = 0. (6.47)
Comparing (6.45) and (6.47) with (6.16) and (6.17), we see that the filtered distortion measure
{vf} behaves the same way {v} does in the white noise case. Proceeding the same way as in the
proof of Theorem 1, one arrives at
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
v2f [k] = 0. (6.48)
Since v[k] = C(q−1)vf [k], and C(q−1) is minimum phase, it follows that limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
k=0 v
2[k] =
0.
6.7 Active Defense for Networked Cyber-Physical Systems: SISO Systems with Partial Ob-
servations
In this section, we address SISO systems with noisy, partial observations. We consider a pth
order single input single output system described by
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bu[t] + w[t+ 1], (6.49)
y[t+ 1] = Cx[t+ 1] + n[t+ 1]. (6.50)
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where x[t] ∈ Rp, and A, B, and C are known matrices of appropriate dimensions. The actuator,
being honest, applies the input
u[t] = gt(z
t) + e[t], (6.51)
where gt(zt) is the control policy-specified input, and e[t] ∼ N (0, σ2e) is a sequence of i.i.d random
variables denoting the actuator node’s private excitation. Consequently, the system evolves as
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bgt(z
t) + be[t] + w[t+ 1], (6.52)
y[t+ 1] = Cx[t+ 1] + n[t+ 1]. (6.53)
Let z[t] be the measurement reported by the sensor at time t. Since the sensor can be malicious,
z[t] need not equal y[t] for every t.
The actuator performs Kalman filtering on the reported measurements {z} as follows.
x̂F (k + 1|k) = Ax̂F (k|k) +Bgk(zk) +Be[k], (6.54)
x̂F (k + 1|k + 1) = Ax̂F (k|k) +Bgk(zk) +Be[k] +KkνF [k + 1], (6.55)
where νF [k + 1] := z[k + 1]−Cx̂F (k + 1|k), denotes the (possibly) faulty innovations computed
by the actuator, and Kk is the Kalman gain at time k.
We also define a Kalman filter that operates on the true measurements y[t] as follows.
x̂R(k + 1|k) = Ax̂R(k|k) +Bgk(zk) +Be[k], (6.56)
x̂R(k + 1|k + 1) = Ax̂R(k|k) +Bgk(zk) +Be[k] +KkνR[k + 1], (6.57)
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where νR[k + 1] := y[k + 1]−Cx̂R(k + 1|k) is the "real innovations" or "true innovations" of the
system. Of course, the actuator cannot implement the latter Kalman filter since it may not receive
y[k] from the sensor.
We now define
v[k + 1] := x̂F (k + 1|k + 1)− Ax̂F (k|k)−Bgk(zk)−Be[k]−KkνR[k + 1], (6.58)
so that for an honest sensor which reports z ≡ y, we have ν ≡ νR and consequently, v ≡ 0. The
actuator performs the following two tests to detect maliciousness of the sensor.
1) Actuator Test 1: Actuator checks if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k](x̂F (k + 1|k + 1)− Ax̂F (k|k)−Bgk(zk)−Be[k]) = 0 (6.59)
2) Actuator Test 2: Actuator checks if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(x̂F (k + 1|k + 1)− Ax̂F (k|k)−Bgk(zk)−Be[k])
(x̂F (k + 1|k + 1)− Ax̂F (k|k)−Bgk(zk)−Be[k])T = σ2RKKT , (6.60)
where σ2R denotes the variance of the true innovations process, and K is the steady-state Kalman
gain. We assume that (A,C) is observable so that the algebraic Riccati equation associated with
the Kalman gain has a unique nonnegative definite solution [54]. The following theorem shows
that the above tests suffice to ensure that a malicious sensor of only zero additive noise distortion
power can pass the tests to remain undetected.
Theorem 9. Suppose that the reported sequence of measurements passes the tests (6.59) and
(6.60). Then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
‖v[k + 1]‖2 = 0. (6.61)
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Proof. Since the reported sequence of measurements passes (6.59), we have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k](KkνR[k + 1] + v[k + 1]) = 0.
Since the true innovations are independent of the zero-mean private excitation, it follows that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k]v[k + 1] = 0. (6.62)
Since the reported sequence of measurements also passes (6.60), we have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(KkνR[k + 1] + v[k + 1])(KkνR[k + 1] + v[k + 1])
T = σ2RKK
T .
Simplifying, the above gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(KkνR[k + 1]v
T [k + 1]) + (KkνR[k + 1]v
T [k + 1])T + (v[k + 1]vT [k + 1]) = 0.
(6.63)
We define Sk := σ(x̂k|kR , x̂k|kF , zk, ek−2, yk−1),where x̂k|kR := {x̂R(k|k), x̂R(k−1|k−1), ..., x̂R(−1|−
1)}, and x̂k|kF is defined likewise. Define ν̂R[k] := E[νR[k]
∣∣Sk]. From the Kalman filtering equa-
tions, we have
Kk−1νR[k] = x̂R(k|k)− Ax̂R(k − 1|k − 1)−Bgk−1(zk−1)−Be[k − 1]
implying that
(x̂
k−2|k−2
R , x̂
k|k
F , e
k−2, yk−1)→ (x̂R(k − 1|k − 1), x̂R(k|k), zk)→ νR[k]
forms a Markov chain. Therefore, ν̂R[k] := E[νR[k]
∣∣σ(x̂k|kR , x̂k|kF , zk, ek−2, yk−1)] = E[νR[k]∣∣σ(x̂R(k−
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1|k − 1), x̂R(k|k), zk)]. Therefore, we have
Kk−1ν̂R[k] = Kν(Kk−1νR[k] +Be[k − 1]), (6.64)
where Kν := σ2RKk−1K
T
k−1(σ
2
RKk−1K
T
k−1 + σ
2
eBB
T )−1. Define Kk−1ν˜R[k] := Kk−1νR[k] −
Kk−1ν̂R[k]. Then, (Kk−1ν˜R[k−1],Sk) is a martingale difference sequence. This is because, ν˜R[k−
1] ∈ Sk, and
E[ν˜R[k]
∣∣Sk] = 0.
Also, v[k] ∈ Sk. Hence, MST applies, and we have
T∑
k=1
Kk−1ν˜R[k]vT [k] =

o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
1[k + 1]) . . . o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
p[k + 1])
o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
1[k + 1]) . . . o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
p[k + 1])
... . . .
...
o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
1[k + 1]) . . . o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
p[k + 1])

+O(1), (6.65)
where vi[k] denotes the ith component of v[k]. Now, since KkνR[k] = Kkν̂R[k] + Kkν˜R[k], from
(6.64), we have
Kk−1νR[k] = (I −Kν)−1Be[k − 1] + (I −Kν)−1Kk−1ν˜R[k]. (6.66)
Substituting this in (6.63) and equating the diagonals using (6.62) and (6.65) completes the proof.
6.8 Active Defense for Networked Cyber-Physical Systems: MIMO Systems with Gaussian
Noise
In this section, we investigate multiple-input-multiple-output (MIMO) linear stochastic dy-
namical systems. They pose additional challenges as compared to SISO systems since malicious
sensors in a MIMO system can attempt to collude so as to prevent the other nodes from detecting
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their presence. In this section, we show how the actuators can prevent the malicious nodes from
introducing "excessive" distortion, lest they expose their presence.
An m input MIMO Linear Dynamical System of order n is described by
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bu[t] + w[t+ 1] (6.67)
where x[t] ∈ Rn, u[t] ∈ Rm, A ∈ Rn×n, B ∈ Rn×m, and {w} is a zero-mean i.i.d. sequence of
Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrix σ2wIn. We consider the case where x is perfectly
observed.
Let z[t] be the measurements reported by the sensors to the other nodes in the system. Note
that since the nodes in the system are allowed to exchange reported measurements among them, all
malicious sensors have to be consistent and report the same (but possibly erroneous) measurements
to all honest nodes in the system. A history-dependent control policy is assumed to be in place,
which dictates that the ith input to the system at time t be
ugi [t] = g
i
t(z
t). (6.68)
As reasoned before, to secure the system, each actuator superimposes on the input specified
by the control policy, an additional zero-mean private excitation that it draws from a distribution,
here Gaussian, that is made public. It should be noted that while the distribution is made public,
the actual values of the excitation are not revealed by the actuator to any other node. The private
excitation value drawn at each time t is chosen to be independent of its private excitation values
at all the other time instants, of the private excitation values of other actuator nodes, and of the
control policy-specified input. Therefore, actuator i applies at time t the input
ui[t] = u
g
i [t] + ei[t] = g
i
t(z
t) + ei[t], (6.69)
where ei[t] ∼ N (0, σ2e) is independent of ej[k] for (j, k) 6= (i, t), x[m], z[m] for m ≤ t, and
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w[n] for all n. We assume that all actuators are honest, meaning that they apply control inputs in
accordance to (6.69).
We propose the following tests to be performed by each actuator i.
1) Actuator Test 1: Actuator i checks if the reported sequence of measurements {z} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk))(z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk))T
= σ2eBB
T + σ2wIn (6.70)
2) Actuator Test 2: Actuator i checks if the reported sequence of measurements {z} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
ei[k](z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk)) = B·,iσ2e (6.71)
In Actuator Test 2, we have simplified the test to directly check the quantity that is important, which
in this is case is the analog of (6.12). We note that for any set of conditions to be an admissible test,
they have to be (i) checkable by the sensors and actuators based on their observations and what is
reported to them, and (ii) satisfied if all parties are honest. The above two conditions satisfy these
two conditions.
Define
v[t+ 1] := z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt)−Be[t]−w[t+ 1],
so that if z[t] ≡ x[t], v[t] ≡ 0. It is easy to see that as in the case of SISO systems, the sequence {v}
has the intepretation as the additive noise distortion of the process noise deliberately introduced by
the malicious sensors. We term the quantity
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
||v[k]||2
the additive noise distortion power of the malicious sensors. The following theorem, akin to
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Theorem 1, proves that malicious sensors of only zero additive noise distortion power can pass the
above tests, thereby remaining undetected.
Theorem 10. Suppose that the reported sequence of measurements passes the tests (6.70), and
(6.71). If B is of rank n, then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
||v[k]||2 = 0. (6.72)
Proof. Since {z} satisfies (6.71), we have, ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ...,m},
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
ei[k](Be[k] + w[k + 1] + v[k + 1]) = σ
2
eB·(i).
It follows that for all i ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,m},
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
ei[k]v[k + 1] = 0. (6.73)
Therefore,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
e[k]vT [k + 1] = 0. (6.74)
Since {z} also satisfies (6.70), we have,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(Be[k] + w[k + 1] + v[k + 1])(Be[k] + w[k + 1] + v[k + 1])T = σ2eBB
T + σ2wIn
(6.75)
Using (6.74) and the fact that the process noise w[k+ 1], and the private excitation of the actuators
at time k are independent, the above simplifies to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(w[k + 1]vT [k + 1]) + (w[k + 1]vT [k + 1])T (v[k + 1]vT [k + 1]) = 0. (6.76)
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Define Sk := σ(xk, zk, ek−2), and ŵ[k] := E[w[k]
∣∣Sk]. Since
w[k] = x[k]− Ax[k − 1]−Bgk−1(zk−1)−Be[k − 1]),
we have
(xk−2, ek−2)→ (x[k − 1],x[k], zk)→ w[k]
forming a Markov chain. Consequently, ŵ[k] := E[w[k]
∣∣σ(xk−2, ek−2,x[k − 1],x[k], zk)] =
E[w[k]
∣∣σ(x[k − 1],x[k], zk)]. Therefore,
ŵ[k] = KW (Be[k − 1] + w[k]), (6.77)
where KW := σ2w(σ
2
eBB
T + σ2wI)
−1. Now define w˜[k] := w[k]− ŵ[k]. Then, (w˜[k − 1],Sk) is a
martingale difference sequence. This is because w˜[k − 1] ∈ Sk, and
E[w˜[k]
∣∣Sk] = 0. (6.78)
Also, v[k] ∈ Sk. Hence, MST applies, and we have
T−1∑
k=0
w˜[k + 1]vT [k + 1] =

o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
1[k + 1]) . . . o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
p[k + 1])
o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
1[k + 1]) . . . o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
p[k + 1])
... . . .
...
o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
1[k + 1]) . . . o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
p[k + 1])

+O(1), (6.79)
where vi[k + 1] denotes the ith element of v[k + 1].
Using the above, we have
w[k + 1] = ŵ[k + 1] + w˜[k + 1] = KW (Be[k] + w[k + 1]) + w˜[k + 1]. (6.80)
From the assumption on the rank of B, it follows that KW has all eigenvalues strictly lesser than
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unity. Therefore, simplifying the above,
w[k + 1] = (I −KW )−1KWBe[k] + (I −KW )−1w˜[k + 1]. (6.81)
Substituting this into (6.76), using (6.74) and (6.79), and equating the qth entry along the diagonal,
we have
T−1∑
k=0
v2q [k + 1] + o(
T−1∑
k=0
v2q [k + 1]) = o(T ). (6.82)
Since this is true for all q ∈ {1, 2, ..., p}, dividing the above by T and taking the limit as T → ∞
completes the proof.
6.9 Active Defense for Networked Cyber-Physical Systems: Partially Observed MIMO Sys-
tems with Gaussian Process and Measurement Noise
Consider a pth order m × n partially observed MIMO stochastic linear dynamical system
described by
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bu[t] + w[t+ 1],
y[t+ 1] = Cx[t+ 1] + n[t+ 1], (6.83)
where x[t] ∈ Rp is the system’s state at time t, u[t] ∈ Rm and y[t] ∈ Rn are respectively the
system’s input and output at time t, w[t] ∼ N (0, Q) and n[t] ∼ N (0, R) with R > 0 are respec-
tively the process and observation noises at time t, and A,B,C are known matrices of appropriate
dimensions which specify the system dynamics. We assume that the random processes {w} and
{n} are independent, and also that each of them is i.i.d. across time.
We denote by z[t] the measurements reported by the sensors at time t to the controller. A
truthful sensor is supposed to report z ≡ y, but a malicious sensor may report any values for {z}.
*Section 6.9 is reprinted with permission from “On minimal tests of sensor veracity for dynamic watermarking-
based defense of cyber-physical systems," by B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar in Proceedings of the 9th Interna-
tional Conference on Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS), pp. 23-30, 2017, IEEE.
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We assume the existence of a general history-dependent control policy {gt} according to which
the controller computes the input that the actuators should apply at each time t. This control policy
is made public, meaning that it is known to all the nodes in the system. While the control policy
is supposed to be applied on the actual output sequence {y}, since the controller does not directly
measure the plant’s outputs, it is implemented on {z} as reported by the sensors. Additionally, as
outlined in the previous section, in order to secure the system from malicious sensors, the controller
commands the actuators to superimpose a private excitation sequence {e} on the sequence of
control policy-specified inputs. Hence, the net input applied to the system at time t is given by
u[t] = gt(z
t) +e[t], where e[t] ∼ N (0, σ2eI), i.i.d across time, is the controller’s private excitation,
and zt := (z[0], z[1], ..., z[t]) denotes the past values of {z}. Consequently, the system evolves as
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bgt(z
t) +Be[t] + w[t+ 1],
y[t+ 1] = Cx[t+ 1] + n[t+ 1], (6.84)
where gt(zt) := [g1t (z
t) , g2t (z
t), ..., gmt (z
t)]T .
Assume that (A,C) is observable, and (A,Q
1
2 ) is reachable. The controller performs Kalman
filtering on the reported sequence of measurements as follows. Let xF (k|k) denote the estimate
of the state x[k] given the information upto time k, i.e., (zk, ek−1), and xF (k|k − 1) denote the
estimate given the information upto time k − 1. They are given by the Kalman filtering equations:
xF (k + 1|k + 1) = AxF (k|k) +Bgk(zk) +Be[k] +Kk+1νF [k + 1], (6.85)
where νF [k + 1] := z[k + 1] − CxF (k + 1|k). We note that if the sensors were truthful, the
estimates above would be the conditional mean estimates, and ν[t + 1] would be the innovations
process [57] at time t. However, the sensor may be malicious, and so we refer to νF [t + 1] as the
“false innovations" at time t + 1. For the purpose of analysis, we also define the “true" Kalman
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filter which operates on {y}:
xT (k + 1|k + 1) = AxT (k|k) +Bgk(zk) +Be[k] +Kk+1νT [k + 1], (6.86)
where νT [k + 1] := y[k + 1]−CxT (k + 1|k) is the “true innovations" at time k + 1. We suppose
that the Kalman filters are initialized with the Kalman gain K0 set to its steady-state value K so
that they behave as time-invariant filters [54].
The dynamic watermarking tests we employ are based on the following two observations that
hold for the true Kalman filter:
1. e[k] is independent of KνT [k + 1], and
2. the sequence of conditional estimates {xT (k|k)} satisfies
{xT (k + 1|k + 1)− AxT (k|k)−Bgk(yk)−Be[k]} ∼ N (0, KΣKT ),
where
K = PCT (CPCT +R)−1 (6.87)
is the steady-state Kalman gain of the Kalman filter,
Σ = CPCT +R (6.88)
is the steady-state covariance matrix of the true innovations process, and P is the unique
nonnegative definite solution of the discrete algebraic Riccati equation P = APAT + Q −
APCT (CPCT + R)−1CPAT . The unique nonnegative definite solution P is guaranteed to
exist for the above Riccati equation since (A,C) is observable, (A,Q
1
2 ) is reachable, and
R > 0 [54]. The matrix P has the interpretation of the covariance matrix of the one-step
ahead state prediction error of the Kalman filter [54].
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The controller therefore performs the following two tests on the reported sequence of observations
{z}:
1. Controller Test 1: Check if the sequence of reported measurements satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(xF (k + 1|k + 1)− AxF (k|k)−Bgk(zk)−Be[k])
(xF (k + 1|k + 1)− AxF (k|k)−Bgk(zk)−Be[k])T = KΣKT . (6.89)
2. Controller Test 2: Check if the sequence of reported observations satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k](xF (k + 1|k + 1)− AxF (k|k)−Bgk(zk)−Be[k])T = 0. (6.90)
The above tests are equivalent to the tests proposed in [1]. In particular, the second test above can
be shown, via straightforward algebraic manipulations, to be equivalent to the corresponding test
for first-order SISO systems considered in [1]. We define
v[k + 1] := xF (k + 1|k + 1)− AxF (k|k)−Bgk(zk)−Be[k]−KνT [k + 1], (6.91)
and note that if there are no malicious sensors in the system, v ≡ 0.
The following theorem, which is a generalization of the results in [1], establishes the funda-
mental security guarantee provided by dynamic watermarking.
Theorem 11. Suppose that (A,C) is observable, (A,Q 12 ) is reachable, and R > 0. Further
suppose that the matrix CB is of rank n. Then, if the reported measurements {z} pass both (6.90)
and (6.89), it can be guaranteed that the additive noise distortion is of zero power, i.e.,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
‖v[k]‖2 = 0. (6.92)
Proof. We appeal to the following lemma.
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Lemma 1: Define M := Σ(Σ + σ2eCBBTCT )−1. If CB is of rank n, then, (I −M)−1 exists.
Proof.
I −M = I − Σ[Σ + σ2eCBBTCT ]−1. (6.93)
In the above, [Σ + σ2eCBB
TCT ]−1 is guaranteed to exist since Σ > 0 (because R > 0). Its inverse
is
(I −M)−1 = I + Σ(σ2eCBBTCT )−1, (6.94)
since (σ2eCBB
TCT )−1 exists because CB has rank n.
Since the reported measurements pass (6.90), we have using (6.91),
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k](KνT [k + 1] + v[k + 1])
T = 0.
Since e[k] is independent of the innovations νT [k + 1], the above simplifies to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k]vT [k + 1] = 0. (6.95)
Since the reported measurements also pass (6.89), we have using (6.91),
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(KνT [k + 1] + v[k + 1])(KνT [k + 1] + v[k + 1])
T = KΣKT .
Simplifying the above gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
KνT [k + 1]v
T [k + 1] + (KνT [k + 1]v
T [k + 1])T + v[k + 1]vT [k + 1] = 0. (6.96)
Define the σ-algebra Sk+1 := σ(yk+1, zk+1, ek−1,xk|kT ),where xk|kT := (xT (0|0),xT (1|1), ...,xT (k|k)).
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We also define ν̂T [k] := E[νT [k]
∣∣Sk], and ν˜T [k] := νT [k] − ν̂T [k]. Then, from the definition of
the innovations at time k + 1, we have
νT [k + 1] := y[k + 1]− CxT (k + 1|k) = y[k + 1]− CAxT (k|k)− CBgk(zk)− CBe[k].
(6.97)
From the above, it follows that
(yk, ek−1,xk−1|k−1T )→ (xT (k|k),y[k + 1], zk+1)→ νT [k + 1]
forms a Markov chain. Therefore,
ν̂T [k + 1] := E[νT [k + 1]
∣∣σ(yk+1, zk+1, ek−1,xk|kT )] = E[νT [k + 1]∣∣σ(xT (k|k),y[k + 1], zk+1)].
Combining the above with (6.97), we have the MMSE estimate as [54, Chapter 7, Lemma 2.5]
ν̂T [k + 1] = M(CBe[k] + νT [k + 1]). (6.98)
Hence,
νT [k + 1] = ν̂T [k + 1] + ν˜T [k + 1] = MCBe[k] +MνT [k + 1] + ν˜T [k + 1]
Rearranging and using Lemma 1, we have
νT [k + 1] = (I −M)−1MCBe[k] + (I −M)−1ν˜T [k + 1]. (6.99)
Now, the RHS of (6.97), and hence νT [k + 1], is measurable with respect to Sk+2. Also, since
ν̂T [k+1] ∈ Sk+1 ⊂ Sk+2, it follows that ν˜T [k+1] ∈ Sk+2. Clearly, E[ν˜T [k+2]
∣∣Sk+2] = 0. Hence,
we have that (ν˜T [k+ 1],Sk+2) is a martingale difference sequence. Moreover, since v[k+ 1], after
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some algebra, can be expressed as K(z[k + 1]− y[k + 1])−KCA(xF (k|k)− xT (k|k)), we have
v[k + 1] ∈ Sk+1. Hence, Martingale Stability Theorem (MST) [49, Lemma 2(iii)] holds, and we
have
T−1∑
k=0
ν˜T [k + 1]v
T [k + 1] =

o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k]) . . . o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k])
...
...
...
o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k]) . . . o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k])
+ [O(1)]p×p, (6.100)
where [O(1)]p×p denotes a p× p matrix all of whose entries are O(1). Substituting (6.99) in (6.96)
and using (6.95) and (6.100) yields
T∑
k=1
v[k]vT [k] +

o(T ) . . . o(T )
...
...
...
o(T ) . . . o(T )
+

o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k]) . . . o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k])
...
...
...
o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k]) . . . o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k])

+

o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k]) . . . o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k])
...
...
...
o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k]) . . . o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k])
 = o(T ). (6.101)
Dividing the above by T , equating the trace, and letting T →∞ completes the proof.
We now show that if one drops either of the two controller tests (6.90) or (6.89), then the
guarantee does not hold. We do so by explicitly constructing two attack strategies, each of which
passes exactly each one of the tests, and yet, limT→∞ 1T
∑T
k=1 ‖v[k]‖2 6= 0 for both the attacks.
Consider a special case of system (6.83), viz., a SISO first-order perfectly observed system
(p = m = n = C = 1, R = 0, Q = σ2w ∈ R+). In that case, xF (k|k) reduces to z[k], νT [k] to
w[k], K to 1, and Σ to σ2w. Consequently, tests (6.89) and (6.90) reduce respectively to
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1. Test 1: Check if the reported sequence of measurements {z} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
(z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk)−Be[k])2 = σ2w, (6.102)
2. Test 2: Check if the reported sequence of measurements {z} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
e[k](z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk)−Be[k]) = 0, (6.103)
and v[t+ 1] = z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt)−Be[t]− w[t+ 1].
Counterexample showing Controller Test 1 alone is not sufficient: Suppose that the reported
measurements are subjected to (6.102) alone, the first test. To show that this is not sufficient to
guarantee zero additive noise distortion power by the malicious sensor, consider the following
attack.
Suppose that the malicious sensor reports measurements {z} generated as
z[k + 1] = Az[k] +Bgk(z
k) + (
B2σ2e − σ2w
B2σ2e + σ
2
w
)(y[k + 1]− Ay[k]−Bgk(zk)). (6.104)
We now show that the sequence {z} so generated passes (6.102), the first test.
Define γ[k] := z[k]−Az[k− 1]−Bug[k− 1]−Be[k− 1], the quantity whose second moment
is being empirically tested in (6.102). Then, we have
γ[k] = z[k]− Az[k − 1]−Bgk−1(zk−1)−Be[k − 1]
= (
B2σ2e − σ2w
B2σ2e + σ
2
w
)(y[k]− Ay[k − 1]−Bgk−1(zk−1)−Be[k − 1])
= (
B2σ2e − σ2w
B2σ2e + σ
2
w
)(Be[k − 1] + w[k])−Be[k − 1]
= − 2σ
2
w
B2σ2e + σ
2
w
Be[k − 1] + (B
2σ2e − σ2w
B2σ2e + σ
2
w
)w[k]. (6.105)
From the above, it is clear that limT→∞ 1T
∑T
k=1 γ
2[k] of (6.102) is simply the variance of the RHS
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of the above, given by
(
−2σ2wB
B2σ2e + σ
2
w
)2 + (
B2σ2e − σ2w
B2σ2e + σ
2
w
)2.
This simplifies to σ2w, and hence, this attack passes Test 1.
Finally, for the above attack, it is easy to see that v[k + 1] = γ[k + 1] − w[k + 1] =
− 2σ2w
B2σ2e+σ
2
w
(Be[k] + w[k + 1]), and hence, limT→∞ 1T
∑T
k=1 v
2[k] = 4σ
4
w
B2σ2e+σ
2
w
6= 0.
Counterexample showing Controller Test 2 alone is not sufficient: Now suppose that the re-
ported measurements are subjected to (6.103) alone. To show that this is not sufficient to guarantee
zero additive noise distortion power by the malicious sensor, consider the following attack. The
sensor reports measurements {z} generated as
z[k + 1] = Az[k] +Bgk(z
k) + (y[k + 1]− Ay[k]−Bgk(zk) + λ[k + 1]), (6.106)
where λ[k + 1] ∼ N (0, σ2λ) is chosen by the sensor in an i.i.d. fashion across time, and also
independently of all random variables that it has observed till then.
To show that the sequence {z} so generated passes (6.103), the second test, note that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k](z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk)−Be[k])
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k](y[k + 1]− Ay[k]−Bgk(zk) + λ[k + 1]−Be[k])
= lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k](w[k + 1] + λ[k + 1]).
Sincew[k+1] and λ[k+1] are independent of e[k], the above reduces to 0, thereby passing (6.103),
and hence, (6.90).
However, for the above attack, it is easy to see that v[k + 1] = λ[k + 1], and hence,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
v2[k] = E[λ2[k]] = σ2λ 6= 0.
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Remark: It is well known that the innovations process of a stochastic process is a causal and
causally invertible transformation of the stochastic process with the property that it is uncorrelated
across time [57]. Hence, the innovations at time t can be thought of as summarizing all the “new"
information provided by the sensors at time t, information that could not have been predicted from
the past. Therefore, one can think of the honest sensors’ purpose as being to report the innovations
at each time t. Now, from (6.91), we have xF (k + 1|k + 1) − AxF (k|k) − Bgk(zk) − Be[k] =
KνT [k+ 1] + v[k+ 1]. The LHS of the above can be computed by the controller. Hence, v[k+ 1]
has a physical interpretation as the distortion added by the malicious sensors to the true innovations
at time k+1 (hence the nomenclature for additive noise distortion power). What the above theorem
says is that the malicious sensors cannot distort the true innovations process beyond adding a zero-
power sequence to it if they wish to remain undetected.
We now consider linear control designs that provide some guarantee on the quadratic state
tracking error. The design need not be an optimal LQG design, but one that merely aims at pro-
viding some upper bound on the aforementioned quantity. The following theorem shows that for
stable systems, guaranteeing that any additive noise distortion is of power zero is sufficient to en-
sure that the malicious sensors do not increase the quadratic cost of the state from its design value
in the case of linear designs.
Theorem 12. Suppose that the system (6.83) is open-loop stable, i.e., A has all its eigenvalues in
the open left half-plane, and define
d[k] := xF (k|k)− xT (k|k). (6.107)
If the reported measurements pass (6.90) and (6.89), then,
1.
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
‖d[k]‖2 = 0. (6.108)
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2. Suppose that the control policy is a linear feedback policy gt(zt) = FxF (t|t), and a con-
trol objective is quadratic regulation. Then, the true quadratic regulation performance
limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
k=0 ‖xT (k|k)‖2 of the system is no different from what the controller thinks
it is, in the sense that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
‖xF (k|k)‖2 = lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
‖xT (k|k)‖2 (6.109)
3. Under the same conditions as (2) above, the malicious sensors cannot increase the quadratic
regulation cost of the system limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
k=0 ‖xT (k|k)‖2 from the value that would be ob-
tained if all the sensors were honest.
Proof. Subtracting (6.86) from (6.85), we have d[k + 1] = Ad[k] + K(νF [k + 1] − νT [k + 1]).
From (6.85), we have KνF [k+1] = xF (k+1|k+1)−AxF (k|k)−Bgk(zk)−Be[k]. Combining
this with (6.91) gives K(νF [k+1]−νT [k+1]) = v[k+1]. Substituting this in the above equation
gives d[k + 1] = Ad[k] + v[k + 1]. Since {v} is of zero power and A is stable, result (1) follows.
Now, from (6.107), we have xF (k|k) = xT (k|k) + d[k]. By triangular inequality, we have
‖xF (k|k)‖ ≤ ‖xT (k|k)‖+‖d[k]‖. Hence, ‖xF (k|k)‖2 ≤ ‖xT (k|k)‖2+‖d[k]‖2+2‖γxT (k|k)‖‖γ−1d[k]‖
for all γ > 0. Since 2‖γxT (k|k)‖‖γ−1d[k]‖ ≤ ‖γxT (k|k)‖2 + ‖γ−1d[k]‖2, substituting this in the
above yields ‖xF (k|k)‖2 ≤ (1 + γ2)‖xT (k|k)‖2 + (1 + γ−2)‖d[k]‖2. Hence,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
‖xF (k|k)‖2 ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(1 + γ2)‖xT (k|k)‖2 + lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(1 + γ−2)‖d[k]‖2
The second term reduces to zero from the previous result. Since the above is true for all γ > 0,
taking γ → 0 gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
‖xF (k|k)‖2 ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
‖xT (k|k)‖2. (6.110)
Similarly, from (6.107), we have xT (k|k) = xF (k|k) − d[k]. Hence, ‖xT (k|k)‖ = ‖xF (k|k) −
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d[k]‖ ≤ ‖xF (k|k)‖+ ‖d[k]‖. Continuing as above, we arrive at
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
‖xT (k|k)‖2 ≤ lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
‖xF (k|k)‖2. (6.111)
Combining the above with (6.110) gives the second result.
It follows from the above result that even though the controller does not have access to the true
measurements {y}, it can empirically compute the true quadratic regulation cost E[‖xT (k|k)‖2] of
the system. It follows that the malicious sensors cannot increase the true quadratic regulation cost
of the system from its design value without exposing their presence.
6.10 Extension to Non-Gaussian Systems
The results developed in the previous sections assumed that the process noise follows a Gaus-
sian distribution. This assumption can be relaxed to a certain extent. In this section, we illustrate
how this may be relaxed for a single-input-single-output system.
Consider a SISO system described by
x[t+ 1] = ax[t] + bu[t] + w[t], (6.112)
where w[t] ∼ PW is an i.i.d. process with mean 0 and variance σ2w. In such a case, the actuator can
choose the distribution of its private excitation such that the output of the private excitation has the
same distribution as the process noise. Hence, the actuator applies to the system the input
u[t] = gt(z
t) + e[t], (6.113)
where be[t] ∼ PW is an i.i.d. sequence. As before, even though the actuator implements the control
policy {g}, the policy is applied to the measurements z[t] reported by the sensor, which could differ
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from the true output x[t]. Therefore, the system evolves in closed-loop as
x[t+ 1] = ax[t] + bgt(z
t) + be[t] + w[t]. (6.114)
The actuator then performs the following tests to check if the sensor is malicious or not.
1) Actuator Test 1: Check if the reported sequence of measurements {z[t]} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1]− az[k]− bgk(zk)− be[k])2 = σ2w. (6.115)
2) Actuator Test 2: Check if the reported sequence of measurements {z[t]} satisfies
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1]− az[k]− bgk(zk))2 = 2σ2w. (6.116)
As before, let
v[t+ 1] := z[t+ 1]− az[t]− bgt(zt)− be[t]− w[t+ 1],
so that for an honest sensor which reports z[t] ≡ x[t], v[t] = 0 ∀t. The additive noise distortion
power of a malicious sensor too is defined as before, i.e., as
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
v2[k].
The following result, a generalization of Theorem 1, shows that the above tests suffice to ensure
that a malicious sensor of only zero effective power can remain undetected.
Theorem 13. If {z[t]} satisfies tests (6.115) and (6.116), then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
v2[k] = 0. (6.117)
Proof. Following the same sequence of arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, we arrive at the
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following equalities:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
v2[k] + lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
2v[k]w[k] = 0, (6.118)
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
e[k − 1]v[k] = 0. (6.119)
Let Sk := σ(xk, zk, ek−2), and ŵ[k] := E[w[k]
∣∣Sk]. The general complication is that due to
non-Gaussianity, the conditional mean estimate may be non-linear in e[k − 1] and w[k], unlike in
the Gaussian case. However, since the sequence of observations are i.i.d., and the distribution of
the actuator’s private excitation is chosen to be the same as the distribution of the process noise,
we have
ŵ[k] =
1
2
(be[k − 1] + w[k]) = β(be[k − 1] + w[k]), (6.120)
where β := 1
2
. This can be written as
ŵ[k] = αe[k − 1] + βw[k],
where α := bβ. Let w˜[k] := w[k]− ŵ[k].
Now, the following result also holds following the same sequence of arguments employed in
the proof of Theorem 1:
T∑
k=1
v[k]w˜[k] = o(
T∑
k=1
v2[k]) +O(1). (6.121)
Hence, following similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, we obtain
T∑
k=1
v2[k] +
T∑
k=1
2v[k]w[k] = (1 + o(1))(
T∑
k=1
v2[k]) +O(1).
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Dividing the above equation by T , taking the limit as T →∞, and invoking (6.118) completes the
proof.
Remark: In the watermarking strategy used in the above system, in order to safeguard against ma-
licious actions of the sensors, the level of noise added is exactly equal to the process noise already
present in the system. Hence there is an amplification of the process noise’s standard deviation
by
√
2 that appears the price of guarding against malicious attack by the sensor. In contrast, in
the Gaussian case, we have seen that this extra cost can be made as small as desired by choosing
σ2e as small as desired, though of course at the cost of delaying detection with an acceptable false
alarm probability, as we discuss in the next section. In Chapter 7, we will characterize the set of
all watermark strategies that can guarantee (6.117).
6.11 Statistical Tests for Active Defense
The results developed in the previous sections are couched in an asymptotic fashion. They
characterize what can be detected and how that may be done. These asymptotic characterizations
can be used to develop statistical tests that reveal malicious activity in a finite period of time with
acceptable false alarm rates.
The task at hand is to develop statistical tests equivalent to asymptotic tests such as (6.12),
(6.13), (6.70), (6.71), which include tests for covariance matrices of certain random vectors. This
problem has been addressed in [58] in the context of fault detection in control systems, in which the
innovation sequence is tested for the properties of whiteness, mean, and covariance. Since these
are also the properties that have to be satisfied by the test sequences that we construct in (6.12),
(6.13), and (6.71), the same test described in [58] can be used.
Yet another test that is particularly well-suited for the problem at hand is the sequential proba-
bility ratio test, introduced in [59]. In the standard setting of sequential hypothesis testing, for each
time t, the set of all possible observations Sm (or the space of sufficient statistics) is partitioned into
three sets R0, R1, R. At each time t, a decision is made whether to select the null hypothesis (and
stop), select the the alternative hypothesis (and stop), or continue observing. The null (alternative)
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hypothesis is accepted and hypothesis testing is stopped if at some time t, the observations avail-
able till time t, denoted by {zts}, fall in the set R0 (R1). Hypothesis testing is continued at time t
if {zts} falls in R. One such sequential test is the sequential probability ratio test presented in [59],
where the likelihood ratio of observations up to time t, denoted by Λt, is compared against two
thresholds τ1 and τ2. The null (alternative) hypothesis is accepted at time t if Λt < τ1 (Λt > τ2). If
τ1 ≤ Λt ≤ τ2, another observation is drawn, and the process repeats.
There are a few aspects where the problem at hand departs from the above. These are enumer-
ated below. In what follows, the null hypothesis is that the control system is not under attack.
1) In the problem of secure control, it is not possible to attribute a distribution (or even a pa-
rameterized, finite-dimensional family of distributions) from which the observations would
occur under the alternative hypothesis (that the control system is under attack). Conse-
quently, a likelihood ratio cannot be defined, and the sequential probability ratio test cannot
be used. Hence, the problem at hand is not to test one hypothesis against another, but is only
that of rejecting the null hypothesis or otherwise.
2) In the classical setup as described in [59], in a finite time and with probability 1, the test stops,
and one hypothesis or the other is accepted. However, the adversary could be a "sleeper
agent". It could behave as an honest party for a long period of time, and then operate in a
malicious manner. Hence in our situation, at no time can one "accept" the null hypothesis
forever for all subsequent time. Therefore, in the systems of interest here, there are only
two possible decisions at any time t, reject the null hypothesis or continue observations. An
alternative, more positive way of stating this, is that the watermarking is ever vigilant to
detecting attacks, and never precludes the possibility of a future attack.
3) In the classical setting, optimal performance is obtained by considering all observations that
are available up to the time of making a decision. However, in our problem, an adversary
that behaves maliciously in a bursty fashion, is not likely to be detected since long term aver-
aging would nullify these effects. In order to account for this, a moving window approach or
92
exponential forgetting [54] could be employed over which a test statistic can be calculated.
In the moving window approach, the statistical test is conducted over a window of l obser-
vations, nl ≤ t < (n+ 1)l. In each window it assesses whether to reject the null hypotheses.
In this manner, malicious activity can be detected within l samples, with acceptable false
alarm rate. The choice of the excitation variance σ2e can be based on the acceptable detection
delay l, and the false alarm rate. In the exponential forgetting approach, the test discounts
past values by a geometric sequence. Its advantage is that it allows a recursive implemen-
tation that does not require the storing of a window of observations which may be a matter
of concern in electronic control units or processors of limited memory. Another advantage
is that just like the window length, the forgetting factor λ can be varied, with its value of λ
corresponding roughly to a window length of 9/(1− λ).
Based on the above, the basis of a statistical hypothesis test for the problem can be chosen as
follows. Under the null hypothesis, the sample covariance matrix follows the Wishart distribution
[60] (the multidimensional counterpart of the Chi-squared distribution). Hence, for a given false
alarm rate α, the threshold τ(α) can be determined for the likelihood function of the observations,
where the likelihood function considered for the test at time t is the probability density evaluated
at the l most recent observations. If this likelihood function exceeds the threshold at any time t,
an alarm is raised. If not, the test is repeated for the next time instant. The following simulation
example is illustrative.
Example: We consider the scenario of an ARX system addressed in Section-6.5. Specifically,
we consider a second order plant of the type common in process control. A single-input, single-
output stable plant obeying (6.25), with parameters a0 = 0.7, a1 = 0.2, b0 = 1, b1 = 0.5 and
σ2w = 1 is considered. Note that the chosen system is minimum phase, so that the pre-equalizer
required to filter the sequence of private excitation is stable.
The sensor is assumed to be initially well-behaved, but suddenly become malicious after a
certain period (denoting the time of initiation of attack), while the actuator is assumed to remain
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uncompromised. The actuator applies control inputs
u[k] = − 1
b0
(a0z[t] + a1z[t− 1] + b1u[k − 1]) + e[k],
where z[k] is the measurement reported by the sensor at time k, and e[k] ∼ i.i.d. N (0, 1) is the
actuator node’s private excitation. Therefore, the system evolves as
y[k + 1] = 0.7(y[k]− z[k]) + 0.3(y[k − 1]− z[k − 1]) + e[k] + w[k + 1].
The adversary attacks the system at some random time and begins to report false measurements.
In order to do so, the adversary estimates optimally the process noise at each instant from the
measurements that it observes. Since the process noise and the private excitation have the same
variance, the optimal estimate is simply 1
2
(y[k + 1]− 0.7(y[k]− z[k])− 0.3(y[k − 1]− z[k − 1]).
Once the adversary forms its estimate, it adds a noise correlated with the estimate as follows. The
adversary forms v[t] = n[t]−ŵ[t], where n[t] ∼ N (0, 1), the same distribution as w[t], and reports
z[t] = x[t]+v[t]. Note that in the absence of dynamic watermarking, employing this strategy would
enable the adversary to form perfect estimates of the process noise, and consequently, as reasoned
in Section-6.3, would render every detection algorithm useless.
Fig. 6.3 plots the evolution of the negative log likelihood function over time when dynamic
watermarking is employed. In our simulation, the adversary initiates attack at time epoch 4500. As
indicated in Fig. 6.3, the (windowed) negative log likelihood function corresponding to (6.29) stays
within limits until the attack. Around time epoch 4500, the likelihood function steadily increases,
indicating the onset of an attack. Based on tolerable false alarm rates, an appropriate detection
threshold can be set.
6.12 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have considered the problem of securing a cyberphysical system from ma-
licious sensors and have developed a general procedure termed “dynamic watermarking" that im-
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Figure 6.3: Sequential Hypothesis Testing for Attack Detection. Reprinted with permission from
[1].
poses private excitation signals on the actuation signals whose presence can be traced around the
loop to detect malicious behaviors of sensors. We have illustrated the technique in the context of a
variety of control system contexts including a simple first-order SISO system, ARX and ARMAX
systems, a staple model in industrial process control, and the partially-observed MIMO system with
process and measurement noise, one of the most general system models used in modern control
theory. We have established the fundamental security guarantee provided by dynamic watermark-
ing in all of the aforementioned system contexts. These guarantees are contingent on the controller
conducting two particular tests of sensor veracity, and it was shown via explicit construction of two
attack strategies that both of these tests are required in that neither can be dropped if the security
guarantees are to hold.
Addendum
Notation: This chapter uses the following notation.
• Scalars are denoted using lowercase: a
• Vectors are denoted using lowercase boldface: x
• The ith component of vector x: xi
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• Matrices are denoted using uppercase: A
• The ith column of matrix A: A·i
• The ith row of matrix A: Ai·
• The submatrix of A formed by the intersection of rows i through j and columns p through q:
Ai:j,p:q
• The matrix with ith column of A removed: A·(−i)
• The matrix with ith row of A removed: A(−i)·
• The vector with ith component of x removed: x−i
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7. ON THE DESIGN OF SECURITY-GUARANTEEING DYNAMIC WATERMARKS*
7.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we go beyond the class of Gaussian systems and address the problem of de-
signing watermarks for systems with arbitrarily distributed additive noise. Specifically, given a
perfectly observed, Multiple-Input-Multiple-Output (MIMO), linear stochastic system with inde-
pendent, identically distributed (i.i.d.) arbitrary process noise distribution, we derive the necessary
and sufficient conditions that the watermark should satisfy in order for the fundamental security
guarantee to hold.
The results of this chapter characterize the feasible set of watermarks that provide the funda-
mental security guarantee for any given noise distribution. Obtaining this set is a prerequisite for
designing optimal watermarking schemes that optimize desirable objectives such as minimizing
the watermark power, minimizing the maximum value that the watermark can assume, etc.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 formulates the problem. Section
7.3 contains the main result of the chapter, viz., the necessary and sufficient conditions that the
statistics of the watermark should satisfy in order for the fundamental security guarantee to hold.
Section 7.4 contains some concluding remarks.
Notation and terminology: Given a vector x, we denote by xi the ith entry of x, and by xTT the
matrix xxT . The letter Ψ always denotes a conditional expectation. Given two random variables
X and Y , we denote by ΨX(Y ) the conditional expectation E[X|Y ]. When clear from the context,
we drop the argument Y and denote the above conditional expectation by simply ΨX . The set of
random variables with finite second moments forms a Hilbert space with E[XY ] being defined
as the inner product between random variables X and Y . The projection operations on random
variables that are described in this chapter are all with respect to this inner product.
*Reprinted with permission from “On the Design of Security-Guaranteeing Dynamic Watermarks," by B. Satchi-
danandan and P. R. Kumar, IEEE Control Systems Letters, 2019, IEEE.
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7.2 Motivation and Problem Formulation
Consider a pth order, perfectly observed, multiple-input-multiple-output linear stochastic sys-
tem described by
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bu[t] + w[t+ 1], (7.1)
where x[t] ∈ Rp is the state as well as the output of the system at time t, u[t] ∈ Rm is the input
applied to the system at time t, w[t+ 1] ∈ Rp is the process noise affecting the state at time t+ 1,
and A and B are known matrices of appropriate dimensions. The process noise sequence {w} is
i.i.d. across time, and we denote by PW the probability distribution of w[t] at each time t. We
denote by µW the mean of the process noise, and by ΣW the matrix E(w[t]wT [t]). Apart from the
assumption that these two moments exist, no other assumption is made on the distribution PW .
The input at each time t is determined by a controller according to an arbitrary, possibly history-
dependent control policy {gt}, where gt : Rp×(t+1) → Rm is the function that maps the measure-
ment sequence reported by the sensors up to time t to the input applied by the actuators at time
t.
The problem setup that we consider in this chapter is one where an arbitrary subset of the sen-
sors in system (7.1) could be malicious. The malicious sensors may not report the measurements
that they observe in a truthful manner. Rather, they may distort the measurements that they ob-
serve in an arbitrary fashion, possibly according to some coordinated attack strategy, and report
the distorted measurements to the controller.
In order to defend against malicious sensors that may be present in the system, the controller at
each time t superimposes on the control policy-specified input a random signal e[t], known as the
watermark, chosen independently of all other random variables in the system up until that time,
and in an i.i.d. fashion across time. We denote by PE the probability distribution of e[t] at each
time t. We constrain the watermark to have finite second moment so that its mean and covariance
matrix exist. We denote by µE its mean and by ΣE the matrix E(e[t]eT [t]). The net input applied
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to the system at time t is u[t] = gt(zt) + e[t], and the system (7.1) evolves in closed loop as
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bgt(z
t) +Be[t] + w[t+ 1], (7.2)
where zt := {z[0], . . . , z[t]}.
Define ΣEW := E(e[t]wT [t + 1]). In order to detect whether or not there are any malicious
sensors in the system, the controller conducts the following tests, and declares the presence of
malicious sensors if any of them fail.
Test 1: The controller checks if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk))TT ?= BΣEBT + ΣW +BΣEW + ΣTEWBT . (7.3)
Test 2: The controller checks if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k] (z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk)−Be[k])T ?= ΣEW . (7.4)
Test 3: The controller checks if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk)−Be[k]) ?= µW . (7.5)
While the tests are presented in an asymptotic form, as illustrated in [61], they can be converted
into finite-time statistical tests with desired false alarm and misdetection rates via standard meth-
ods using thresholds on the finite time running averages. In comparison to [1], we have introduced
an additional test, viz., Test 3, for the case of non-Gaussian noise for reasons that will become ap-
parent later. Note that if all sensors are honest, so that z[t] ≡ x[t], then the reported measurements
will pass all of the above tests almost surely.
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Define
v[t+ 1] := z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt)−Be[t]−w[t+ 1]. (7.6)
This can be regarded as the additive distortion introduced by the sensors to the process noise at
time t+ 1. Note that if all sensors are honest, then the additive distortion v[t] ≡ 0. The fundamen-
tal security guarantee of DW [1, 62, 63] establishes that under certain conditions on the system
parameters, if the reported sequence of measurements {z} pass the aforementioned tests, then the
additive distortion can only be of zero power, no matter what attack strategy the malicious sensors
that may be present in the system employ. That is,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
||v[k]||2 = 0. (7.7)
This result has been established in [1, 62] in the context of Gaussian systems where the process
noise, the measurement noise, as well as the watermark are i.i.d. Gaussian random processes, and
it is the basis of other results which guarantee that the control performance of the system cannot
be degraded by the malicious sensors.
In this chapter, we extend the above result to systems of the form (7.1) which are affected by
noise having an arbitrary distribution PW . Given a noise distribution PW , unless the distribution
PE of the watermark is appropriately designed, the fundamental security guarantee of DW does
not hold, as illustrated by the following example.
Example: Consider the scalar system
x[t+ 1] = 0.9x[t] + u[t] + w[t+ 1], (7.8)
where {w} is a Bernoulli random process which takes the value 0 with probability 1
4
and the value
1 with probability 3
4
, and is i.i.d. across time.
Consider an output variance-minimizing stationary linear feedback policy gt(zt) = −0.9z[t],
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and a watermark that is drawn from a Bernoulli distribution i.i.d. across time, with P(e[t] = 0) = 1
2
and P(e[t] = 1) = 1
2
for all t. The closed loop system evolves as
x[t+ 1] = 0.9(x[t]− z[t]) + e[t] + w[t+ 1]. (7.9)
The actuator subjects the reported sequence of measurements {z} to Tests (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5),
and declares the presence of malicious sensors if any of them fail. In what follows, we construct
a specific attack that passes all three tests, but nevertheless successfully introduces an additive
distortion of non-zero power.
Note first that from (7.9), it follows that s[t+1] := x[t+1]−0.9x[t]+0.9z[t] = e[t]+w[t+1],
so that s[t+ 1] ∈ {0, 1, 2} for every t. Now, consider the attack
z[t+ 1] =

0.9 if s[t+ 1] = 0,
0.7 if s[t+ 1] = 1,
2.1 if s[t+ 1] = 2.
(7.10)
Then, the left-hand side (LHS) of (7.3) becomes limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
k=0 z
2[k + 1]. Since z[k + 1] is
distributed i.i.d. across time and takes the value 0.9 with probability 1
8
, the value 0.7 with proba-
bility 1
2
, and the value 2.1 with probability 3
8
, we have that the LHS of (7.3) almost surely equals
E(z2[t + 1]) = 2, which equals the right-hand side (RHS) of (7.3). It is equally straightforward
to verify that the other two Tests (7.4) and (7.5) are also passed by the sequence {z}. Since this
attack passes all three tests, it will go undetected by the attack detector. However, the additive
distortion that this attack introduces has power 3
20
6= 0. Hence, the watermark distribution that has
been chosen fails to provide the fundamental security guarantee (7.7).
On the other hand, if the watermark distribution PE is chosen to be Bernoulli which takes the
value 0 with probability 1
4
, the value 1 with probability 3
4
, and i.i.d. across time, then, as established
in Theorem 7 of [1], the fundamental security guarantee (7.7) holds, and no attack that introduces
any non-zero power additive distortion can manage to pass all three tests.
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As the above example illustrates, given a linear stochastic system, the probability distribution
of the watermark has to be carefully designed taking into account the noise probability distribution
if the fundamental security guarantee of Dynamic Watermarking is to hold. This brings us to the
central question addressed in this chapter: Given a closed loop system of the form (7.2), and the
probability distribution PW of the process noise, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions
that the probability distribution PE of the watermark should satisfy so that the fundamental security
guarantee (7.7) holds whenever the reported measurements {z} pass Tests (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5)?
The next section answers this question.
7.3 Design of Security-Guaranteeing Dynamic Watermarks
In this section, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions that the probability distribution
of the watermark should satisfy in (7.2) in order to provide the fundamental security guarantee. We
do this in two steps. First, in order to expose clearly the main ideas involved in studying Dynamic
Watermarking in a setting where the noise distribution is arbitrary, we simplify the problem and
formulate a core problem so that the only complications that arise in its analysis are those that
are introduced by the arbitrariness of the process noise distribution. Consequently, we first restrict
attention to system (7.2) where the matrixA = 0, the control policy is identically equal to zero, and
the adversary is restricted to employing stationary Markov attack policies. Here, by a stationary
Markov attack policy, we are employing the terminology of Markov Decision Processes to refer
to an attack policy which chooses the measurements to be reported at any time t as a function of
only the state of the system at that time. Then we show how these conditions also extend to the
more general case where the matrix A is arbitrary, the control policy is arbitrary, and the adversary
employs an arbitrary, possibly history-dependent and randomized attack policy which is unknown
to the honest nodes in the system. We begin with the first of these cases.
102
7.3.1 The core problem with zero dynamics matrix, zero control policy, and stationary
Markov attack policies
We consider in this subsection a special case of system (7.2) with A = 0 and gt = 0. In this
case, the system (7.2) reduces to
x[t+ 1] = Be[t] + w[t+ 1], (7.11)
and the additive distortion v[t+ 1] defined in (7.6), reduces to
v[t+ 1] = z[t+ 1]−Be[t]−w[t+ 1]. (7.12)
Define functions ΨW and ΨE by
ΨW (x[t+ 1]) := E[w[t+ 1]
∣∣x[t+ 1]], (7.13)
and
ΨE(x[t+ 1]) := E[e[t]
∣∣x[t+ 1]]. (7.14)
Note that the joint probability distribution of ΨW (x[t + 1]) and ΨE(x[t + 1]) does not depend
on the time t + 1, and hence we will henceforth omit the argument x[t + 1] in the following, and
simply use ΨW and ΨE to denote the above random vectors, noting that the results hold for all
x[t+ 1].
Recall from Section 4.1 that the notation ΨWi denotes the i
th component of the vector ΨW . The
following theorem provides the necessary and sufficient conditions on the watermark to ensure that
the additive distortion can only be of zero power.
Theorem 14. Consider the system (7.11). Suppose that the adversarial sensors employ a station-
ary attack policy, and that the reported sequence of measurements {z} passes the tests (7.3), (7.4)
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and (7.5). If
ΨWi ∈ Span{ΨE1 , . . . ,ΨEm, 1} (7.15)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
||v[k]||2 = 0. (7.16)
Moreover, if (7.15) does not hold, then, there exists a stationary attack passing tests (7.3), (7.4)
and (7.5), but for which (7.16) does not hold.
Proof. Using (7.12) and (7.11), we have that
v[t+ 1] = z[t+ 1]− x[t+ 1]. (7.17)
Since the attack policy employed by the adversary is assumed to be a stationary Markov policy, the
measurements reported by the sensors at time t+1 are a function of only their observations at time
t+ 1, and therefore, z[t+ 1] ∈ σ(x[t+ 1]), the σ−algebra generated by x[t+ 1]. Consequently,
v[t+ 1] ∈ σ(x[t+ 1]). (7.18)
The attack policy being a stationary Markov policy, {z} is a sequence of i.i.d. random vectors, and
therefore, the LHS of (7.4) almost surely equals E[e[0](z[1] − Be[0])T ]. From (7.17), (7.11), and
(7.4),
E(e[0]vT [1]) = 0. (7.19)
Also, the LHS of (7.3) almost surely equals E(z[1]zT [1]). Using (7.17), (7.3), (7.11) and (7.19),
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and carrying out some algebra, yields
E(v[1]vT [1]) + E(w[1]vT [1]) + E(v[1]wT [1]) = 0. (7.20)
Similarly, using (7.17) and (7.5) gives
E(v[1]) = 0. (7.21)
Now, note that
E(e[0]vT [1]) = E E{e[0]vT [1]∣∣x[1]} = E(ΨE(x[1])vT [1]), (7.22)
where the last equality follows from (7.18). Using this with (7.19) gives
E(ΨE(x[1])vT [1]) = 0. (7.23)
Combining (7.21), (7.23) and (7.15) gives
E(ΨW (x[1])vT [1]) = 0. (7.24)
Now,
E(ΨW (x[1])vT [1]) = E
{
E
[
w[1]
∣∣x[1]]vT [1]} = E(w[1]vT [1]), (7.25)
where the second equality follows from (7.18) and the law of iterated expectations. Combining
this with (7.24) gives E(w[1]vT [1]) = 0, and substituting this in (7.20) establishes (7.16).
Now we turn to the next assertion. Suppose that (7.15) does not hold. Define
S := Span{ΨE1 , . . . ,ΨEm, 1},
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and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, Φi := ΨWi − PS(ΨWi ), where PS denotes the operator that projects a
random variable onto the subspace S. It follows that for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p},
E(ΦiΨEj ) = 0 (7.26)
for all j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and
EΦi = 0. (7.27)
Now, define Φ := [Φ1 . . . Φp]T and consider the attack z[t + 1] = x[t + 1] − 2Φ(x[t + 1]).
The attacker can compute z[t + 1] since it depends only on x[t + 1], which it can measure. Then,
v[t + 1] = −2Φ(x[t + 1]). It follows from (7.27) that E(v[t + 1]) = 0, and from (7.26) that
E(ΨE(x[t + 1])vT [t + 1]) = 0. Hence, from (7.22), it follows that E(e[t]vT [t + 1]) = 0. Hence,
the attack passes Tests (7.4) and (7.5). Also, for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , p},
E(vivj) + E(viΨWj ) + E(ΨWi vj) = 4E(ΦiΦj)− 2E(ΦiΨWj )− 2E(ΨWi Φj)
= 4E(ΦiΦj)− 2E[Φi(Φj + PS(ΨWj ))]
− 2E[(Φi + PS(ΨWi ))Φj] = 0,
where the last equality follows using (7.26) and (7.27) since PS(ΨWi ) and PS(Ψ
W
j ), belonging to
the subspace spanned by {ΨE1 , . . . ,ΨEm, 1}, are some linear combinations of these random vari-
ables. Combining the above equality with (7.25) implies that the attack satisfies (7.20), which in
turn implies that the attack also passes test (7.3). Hence, the attack passes all three tests. How-
ever, since (7.15) does not hold, Φ 6= 0, and therefore E(||v[t + 1]||2) 6= 0, implying that the
fundamental security guarantee (7.16) does not hold.
The intuition behind condition (7.15) is as follows. The condition essentially implies that
the adversary cannot “separate" the process noise and the watermark along any subspace of the
system’s state space. Now, note that in order for the adversary to pass Test 1, it has to introduce a
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distortion that is correlated with the observations Be[t] + w[t + 1] in (7.11). However, since the
adversary cannot separate the noise and the watermark perfectly, the distortion that it introduces
will have to be correlated with both process noise as well as the watermark. Test 2, however,
ensures that any distortion introduced is not correlated with the watermark. Consequently, the
adversary is constrained to introducing a distortion that can only be of zero power.
Having characterized security-guaranteeing watermarks in a simplified system context, we now
address the general case where the matrix A in (7.1) is arbitrary, the control policy is arbitrary, and
the adversary is allowed to implement any arbitrary, history-dependent attack policy. We show
that in this general system context, a condition analogous to (7.15) serves as the necessary and
sufficient condition on the watermark distribution in order for the fundamental security guarantee
to hold.
7.3.2 The case of general MIMO systems with arbitrary control policy and arbitrary history-
dependent attack policies
Consider the closed loop system (7.2), an arbitrary subset of whose sensors may be malicious,
and suppose that the attack detector conducts the tests (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5). Define
ΨW (Be[t] + w[t+ 1]) := E(w[t+ 1]
∣∣Be[t] + w[t+ 1]), (7.28)
and
ΨE(Be[t] + w[t+ 1]) := E(e[t]
∣∣Be[t] + w[t+ 1]). (7.29)
In the above definitions, we have reused notation from the previous subsection owing to the fact
that both (7.13) and (7.28) signify analogous quantities, viz., the Minimum Mean-Squared Error
(MMSE) estimate of the process noise computable by the malicious sensors in the two system
models, and similarly, both (7.14) and (7.29) denote the MMSE estimate of the watermark.
The following theorem establishes in the context of a fully observed MIMO system the neces-
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sary and sufficient conditions that the watermark distribution should satisfy in order for the funda-
mental security guarantee to hold, and is a central result of this chapter.
Theorem 15. Consider the system (7.2) and suppose that the measurements {z} reported by the
sensors pass Tests (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5). If
ΨWi ∈ Span{ΨE1 , . . . ,ΨEm, 1} (7.30)
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
k=1
||v[k]||2 = 0. (7.31)
Moreover, if (7.30) does not hold, then there exists an attack passing Tests (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5),
but for which (7.31) does not hold.
Proof. Since the reported measurements pass Test (7.4), it follows from (7.6) that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
e[k]vT [k + 1] = 0. (7.32)
Define e˜[k] := e[k]−ΨE[k]. Then, the above equality becomes
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(ΨE[k] + e˜[k])vT [k + 1] = 0.
Now, the reported measurement z[k+ 1] at time k+ 1 can be a function of the past and the current
observations of the sensors. In addition, a malicious sensor at each time k + 1 could also adapt
its reported measurement to a random variable θ[k + 1] that it generates, which is independent
of all random variables that have been realized until that time. Define Gk := σ(xk, θk, ek−2). It
follows that z[k + 1] ∈ σ(xk+1, θk+1) ⊆ Gk+1, which in turn implies that v[k + 1] ∈ Gk+1. It is
also straightforward to verify that (e˜[k − 1],Gk+1) is a Martingale difference sequence. Using the
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Martingale Stability Theorem [49], we have that for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and all j ∈ {1, . . . , p},
T−1∑
k=0
e˜i[k]vj[k + 1] = o(
T−1∑
k=0
v2j [k + 1]) +O(1).
Substituting this in the previous equality gives
T−1∑
k=0
ΨE[k]vT [k + 1] =

o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k]) · · · o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k])
... . . .
...
o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k]) · · · o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k])
+ o(T ). (7.33)
Since the reported measurements also pass Test (7.3), we have that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
Be[k]vT [k + 1] + w[k + 1]vT [k + 1] + v[k + 1]eT [k]BT + v[k + 1]wT [k + 1]
+ v[k + 1]vT [k + 1] = 0.
Substituting (7.32) in the above equality yields
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
w[k + 1]vT [k + 1] + v[k + 1]wT [k + 1] + v[k + 1]vT [k + 1] = 0. (7.34)
Similarly, it follows from (7.5) that
T−1∑
k=0
v[k + 1] = o(T ). (7.35)
Define w˜[t+ 1] := w[t+ 1]−ΨW [t+ 1]. Then, (w˜[k],Gk+1) is a martingale difference sequence,
and using the Martingale Stability Theorem, we have that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , p},
T−1∑
k=0
w˜i[k + 1]vj[k + 1] = o(
T−1∑
k=0
v2j [k + 1]) +O(1). (7.36)
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We also have using (7.30), (7.33), and (7.35) that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , p},
T−1∑
k=0
ΨWi [k + 1]vj[k + 1] = o(
T−1∑
k=0
v2j [k + 1]) + o(T ). (7.37)
Adding (7.36) and (7.37) gives
T−1∑
k=0
w[k + 1]vT [k + 1] =

o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k]) · · · o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k])
... . . .
...
o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
1[k]) · · · o(
∑T
k=1 v
2
p[k])
+ o(T ). (7.38)
Substituting (7.38) in (7.34) establishes (7.31).
We now turn to the next assertion. Suppose that (7.30) does not hold. As in the proof of
Theorem 1, define S := Span{ΨE1 , . . . ,ΨEm, 1}, and define for each i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, Φi := ΨWi −
PS(ΨWi ), where PS is the operator that projects a random variable on the subspace S. Let Φ :=
[Φ1 . . .Φp]
T and consider the attack z[t + 1] = Az[t] + (x[t + 1] − Ax[t]) − 2Φ[t + 1], so that
v[t+1] = −2Φ[t+1]. Following similar arguments as in the proof of Theorem 1, it can be verified
that this attack passes all three tests (7.3), (7.4) and (7.5), but introduces non-zero powered additive
distortion to the process noise.
7.4 Concluding Remarks
The approach of Dynamic Watermarking provides provable security guarantees for cyberphys-
ical systems from arbitrary sensor attacks. Prior works have developed the theory of Dynamic
Watermarking and have established the fundamental security guarantee that it provides in the con-
text of systems affected by process and measurement noises that are Gaussian random processes.
In this chapter, we have gone beyond the class of Gaussian systems and have considered finite-
dimensional linear systems affected by arbitrarily distributed process noise. We have shown how
the fundamental security guarantee of Dynamic Watermarking fails in these system contexts when
the watermark distribution is not appropriately chosen. Consequently, we have derived for the class
of perfectly observed, finite-dimensional linear systems with arbitrarily process noise distribution,
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the necessary and sufficient conditions that the distribution of the watermark should satisfy in order
for it to provide the fundamental security guarantee. Extensions of this result to the case of par-
tially observed systems and systems affected by colored noise process could potentially constitute
the foundations of a theory for security-guaranteeing watermark design.
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8. ON THE WATERMARK-SECURABLE SUBSPACE OF A LINEAR SYSTEM
8.1 Introduction
In prior chapters, the approach of Dynamic Watermarking was established as providing prov-
able security guarantees against arbitrary sensor attacks in a variety of control system settings.
Specifically, it was shown that in a stochastic system in which Dynamic Watermarking is em-
ployed, under appropriate conditions, any adversarial sensor that may be present in the system
cannot distort the innovations process of the output by more than a zero-power signal if it wishes
to remain undetected. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, the notions of securable and unsecurable subspaces
of a linear system were introduced and shown to have important operational meanings in the con-
text of secure control. Specifically, it was shown that in the absence of Dynamic Watermarking,
the state space can be decomposed into two orthogonal subspaces, called the securable and the
unsecurable subspaces, such that the malicious sensors and actuators cannot degrade the state esti-
mation performance of the honest sensors and actuators along the securable subspace of the system
if they wish to remain undetected. In this chapter, we consider a system wherein Dynamic Wa-
termarking is employed and an arbitrary subset of both sensors and actuators could be malicious.
Analogous to prior results [48, 50], the state space of a system employing Dynamic Watermarking
too can be decomposed into two orthogonal subspaces, called the watermark-securable and the
watermark-unsecurable subspaces, such that the malicious sensors and actuators cannot degrade
the state estimation performance of the honest sensors and actuators along the watermark-securable
subspace if they are to remain undetected. The watermark-securable subspace is larger than the se-
curable subspace that can be guaranteed in the absence of Dynamic Watermarking. In this chapter,
we characterize a certain subset of the watermark-securable subspace.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 8.2 describes the problem setup. Section
8.3 contains certain definitions and results that will be used to establish the main result of the
chapter. Section 8.4 presents the main result. Section 8.5 concludes the chapter.
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Notation: Given a matrix B, we denote by R(B) the range space of B, and by N (B) the null
space of B. We denote by I an identity matrix whose dimensions will be clear from the context.
Given a vector x and a subspace S, we denote by xS the projection of the vector x on the subspace
S. Given two subspaces S1 and S2, we denote by S1 ⊕ S2 their span, and by S1S2 the projection
of S1 on S2. The letter P always denotes a projection matrix; by PX , we denote a matrix which
projects a vector right-multiplying it onto the subspace X .
8.2 Problem Formulation
Consider a pth order perfectly-observed linear stochastic system described by
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bu[t] + w[t+ 1],
y[t+ 1] = Cx[t+ 1], (8.1)
where x[t] ∈ Rp is the state of the system at time t, u[t] ∈ Rm is the input applied to the system at
time t,w[t+1] ∼ N (0, σ2W I) is the process noise affecting the system at time t+1, and y[t] ∈ Rn
is the system output at time t. In this chapter, we restrict attention to perfectly-observed systems,
i.e., C = I. The process noise is independent and identically distributed (iid) across time.
As mentioned in Section 8.1, we consider a setting wherein an arbitrary subset of sensors and
actuators in system (8.1) could be malicious. As always, we allow for the malicious nodes in the
system to know the identities of all other malicious nodes, and consequently for the possibility that
they exchange information among themselves via an underlying communication network, to carry
out coordinated attack strategies. The honest nodes do not know the identities of the honest or the
malicious nodes, or even if there are any malicious nodes in the system.
At each time t, each sensor is supposed to report the measurement that it observes to all other
sensors and actuators in the system. To allow for greater power for the malicious nodes, we suppose
that the honest sensors first announce their measurements to all other nodes in the system, after
which the malicious sensors report their measurements. This sequence of reporting allows the
malicious sensors to adapt the measurements that they report at each time to the measurements of
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all honest sensors until that time. In addition, they could also adapt their reported measurements
to the inputs of the malicious actuators, including their inputs at future times, if they wish to do so.
We now turn to the protocols followed by the actuators. As before, only the honest actuators
follow this protocol, while the malicious actuators can behave arbitrarily. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
we denote by {gi0, gi1, . . .} an arbitrary and possibly history-dependent control policy that actuator i
is supposed to employ in determining its inputs. The control policy-specified input ugi [t] of actuator
i at time t is
ugi [t] = g
i
t(z
t). (8.2)
The honest actuators watermark their control inputs. The net input ui[t] applied by an honest
actuator i at time t is therefore
ui[t] = g
i
t(z
t) + ei[t].
The malicious actuators can choose the inputs that they apply in an arbitrary manner. For a
malicious actuator j, denote by uj[t] the input that it applies at time t, and let ej[t] := uj[t]−gjt (zt).
Since actuator j is not honest, the statistics of the sequence {ej} may not be equal to the statistics
of the watermark.
Let e[t] := [e1[t] · · · em[t]]T . Denote by eH [t] the sub-vector of e[t] corresponding to the
entries of the honest actuators, and by eM [t] the sub-vector of e[t] corresponding to the entries of
the malicious actuators. Similarly, denote by BH the sub-matrix of B consisting of those columns
of B corresponding to the honest actuators, and by BM the sub-matrix of B consisting of those
columns of B corresponding to the malicious actuators. Then, system (8.1) evolves in closed loop
as
x[t+ 1] = Ax[t] +Bgt(z
t) +BHeH [t] +BMeM [t] + w[t+ 1],
y[t+ 1] = Cx[t+ 1], (8.3)
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where gt(zt) := [g1t (z
t) · · · gmt (zt)]T , and eH [t] ∼ N (0, σ2eI) and is i.i.d. across time. We also
denote by CH the submatrix of C (which in this chapter is the identity matrix) formed by its rows
that correspond to the honest sensors.
In order to check whether or not there are any malicious nodes in the system, the following
tests are carried out.
Test 1: Each honest node checks if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(z[k + 1]− Az[k]−Bgk(zk))TT = BBTσ2e + σ2wI. (8.4)
Test 2: Each honest actuator i checks if
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
ei[k](z[k + 1]− Az[k]) = B·iσ2e . (8.5)
Our goal is to characterize the extent to which the malicious sensors and actuators can distort
the state estimate of the honest actuators while remaining undetected by Tests (8.4) and (8.5). We
show that along a certain subspace of the state space Rp of system (8.3), no matter what attack
strategy the malicious nodes employ, they cannot degrade the “state estimation performance" of
the honest actuators if they are to remain undetected by Tests (8.4) and (8.5). This subspace is
characterized in the following sections.
8.3 Towards the Watermark-Securable and the Watermark-Unsecurable Subspaces of a
Linear System
In this section, we present a few preparatory results for establishing the main result of the
chapter. Recall the definitions of the unsecurable subspace V , the securable subspace S, the k−step
unsecurable subspaces Uk, and the k−step securable subspaces Sk from Chapter 4.
Lemma 8. The securable subspace S is the span of the k−step securable subspaces, i.e.,
S = S0 ⊕ . . .⊕ Sr−1.
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Proof. See Lemma 2 of [50].
Lemma 9. Let k ∈ {0, . . . , r − 1}. Then,
Uk = [⊕r−1i=kSk]⊕ V . (8.6)
Proof. Since U = Ur ⊂ Ur−1 ⊂ . . . ⊂ U1 ⊂ U0 := Rp, it follows that there exist sets B0, . . . ,Br
of orthonormal basis vectors for the subspaces U0, . . . ,Ur respectively such that Br ⊂ . . . ⊂ B0.
Then,
[⊕r−1i=kSi]⊕ V = [⊕r−1i=kSpan{Bi \ Bi+1}]⊕ V = [Span{Bk \ Br}]⊕ V = Span{Bk} = Uk. (8.7)
Lemma 10. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} and s ∈ Sk. There exists d such that
(As +BMd) ∈ [⊕r−1i=k−1Si]⊕ V . (8.8)
Proof. The result holds trivially for k = 1 since [⊕r−1i=0Si] ⊕ V = Rp, the entire state space.
Consider, therefore, the case when k > 1. It follows from the definition of Sk that Sk ⊂ Uk, and
therefore, s ∈ Uk. It follows from the definition of Uk that there exists d such that As + BMd ∈
Vk−1. Combining this with (8.6) yields the desired result.
Lemma 11. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} and s ∈ Sk \ {0}. For every d,
(As +BMd)⊕k−1i=0 Si 6= 0. (8.9)
Proof. Suppose for contradiction that (8.9) does not hold. Then, there exists d such that (As +
BMd)⊕k−1i=0 Si = 0, implying that (As + B
Md) ∈ [⊕r−1i=kSi] ⊕ V . Combining this with (8.6), we
have that As + BMd ∈ Uk. Therefore, we have that s ∈ Sk and that that there exists d such
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that As + BMd ∈ Uk implying that s ∈ Vk+1. Since Sk ∩ Vk+1 = {0}, it follows that s = 0, a
contradiction.
Lemma 12. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1} and s ∈ Sk \ {0}. For every d,
(As +BMd)[⊕k−1i=0 Si]∩([R(BM )]⊕k−1
i=0
Si
)⊥ 6= 0. (8.10)
Proof. Note first that for any two subspaces C1, C2 such that C1 ⊆ C2, we have that C2 = C1⊕ [C⊥1 ∩
C2]. Substituting C2 = ⊕k−1i=0 Si and C1 = [R(BM)]⊕k−1i=0 Si , we have
⊕k−1i=0 Si = [R(BM)]⊕k−1i=0 Si ⊕
[(
[R(BM)]⊕k−1i=0 Si
)⊥ ∩ [⊕k−1i=0 Si]].
Now, suppose for contradiction that (8.10) does not hold. Then, there exists d such that
(As +BMd)⊕k−1i=0 Si = (As +B
Md)([R(BM )]⊕k−1
i=0
Si
)⊥∩[⊕k−1i=0 Si] ⊕ (As +B
Md)[R(BM )]⊕k−1
i=0
Si
= (As +BMd)[R(BM )]⊕k−1
i=0
Si
,
where the last equality follows from the assumption that (8.10) does not hold. Since (As +
BMd)[R(BM )]⊕k−1
i=0
Si
∈ [R(BM)]⊕k−1i=0 Si , there exists d¯ such that
(BM d¯)⊕k−1i=0 Si = −(As +B
Md)[R(BM )]⊕k−1
i=0
Si
.
Therefore,
(As +BM(d + d¯))⊕k−1i=0 Si = (As +B
Md)⊕k−1i=0 Si + (B
M d¯)⊕k−1i=0 Si = 0,
where the last equality follows from the preceding two equalities. This, however, contradicts
Lemma 11.
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Lemma 13. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , r − 1}. There exists  > 0 such that for all s ∈ Sk,
∣∣∣∣(As)[⊕k−1j=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕k−1
j=0
Sj
)⊥
∣∣∣∣2 ≥  ||s||2. (8.11)
Proof. Define J(x) := ||P[⊕k−1j=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕k−1
j=0
Sj
)⊥Ax||. Let ¯ := inf{s¯∈Sk, ||s¯||=1} J(s¯). Let s∗ at-
tain the minimum of the continuous function J over the specified compact set. By (8.10), there ex-
ists a d such that (As∗+BMd)[⊕k−1i=0 Si]∩([R(BM )]⊕k−1
i=0
Si
)⊥ 6= 0. Since [R(BM)][⊕k−1j=0Sj ]∩[R(BM )]⊥⊕k−1
j=0
Sj
=
0, we have [As∗][⊕k−1i=0 Si]∩([R(BM )]⊕k−1
i=0
Si
)⊥ 6= 0. Hence, ¯ > 0, and for any unit vector s¯ ∈ Sk,
J(s¯) ≥ ¯. The desired result follows immediately.
Having defined the securable and the unsecurable subspaces and established certain key prop-
erties of theirs, we now characterize a certain subspace of the watermark-securable subspace of
system (8.3). Its operational meaning is established in Theorem 1 in the sequel.
Consider the set of all subspaces C such that
[R(BM)⊕R⊥(BH)]V ⊆ C ⊆ V , (8.12)
and for every c ∈ C,
[Ac]C⊥∩ V = 0. (8.13)
It is straightforward to verify that this set is closed under intersections. Define the subspace G1
as the smallest subspace satisfying (8.12) and (8.13), or more precisely, the intersection of all
subspaces satisfying (8.12) and (8.13). Recall from Section 4.1 the notation PX , which denotes
the projection matrix which projects a vector right-multiplying it onto the subspace X , and define
the subspace G2 as the span of the unstable subspace and the center subspace of the linear map
PG⊥1 ∩ VA.
Definition 8. Define the subspaceW of system (8.3) as
W := (G1 ⊕ G2)⊥ ∩ V . (8.14)
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As we show in Theorem 1, no matter what attack strategy the malicious nodes employ, they cannot
degrade the state estimation performance of the honest nodes along the subspaceW , if they wish
to remain undetected by Tests (8.4) and (8.5).
Lemma 14.
W ⊥ {R(BM)⊕R⊥(BH)}. (8.15)
Proof. We have from the definition of the watermark-securable subspace thatW ⊥ G1. We have
from the definition of G1 that (8.12) holds with C = G1, so that G1 ⊇ [R(BM) ⊕ R⊥(BH)]V .
Combining these two relations, we have that W ⊥ [R(BM) ⊕ R⊥(BH)]V . Let I1 be a matrix
whose columns form an orthonormal basis for the subspaceR(BM)⊕R⊥(BH) and I2 be a matrix
whose columns form an orthonormal basis for the subspaceW . Then, the previous relation implies
that IT2 PVI1 = 0, which can be rewritten as (P
T
V I2)
T I1 = 0. Since any orthogonal projection
matrix is symmetric, we have that PV = P TV . Using (8.14), we have that W ⊆ V , and hence,
(P TV I2) = I2. Consequently, I
T
2 I1 = 0, implying thatW ⊥ R(BM)⊕R⊥(BH).
Let
H := G1 ⊕ G2.
Lemma 15.
W ⊥ AH, (8.16)
where AH := {Ax : x ∈ H}.
Proof. It follows from the definition of G1 that (8.13) holds with C = G1, implying that
[AG1]G⊥1 ∩ V = 0. (8.17)
Using (8.14) and the identity that for any two subspaces X1 and X2, [X1 ⊕ X2]⊥ = X⊥1 ∩ X⊥2 , we
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haveW ⊆ G⊥1 ∩ V . Combining this with (8.17) gives
W ⊥ AG1. (8.18)
Note next that the subspace G2 is PG⊥1 ∩ VA-invariant, implying that
[AG2]G⊥1 ∩ V ⊆ G2. (8.19)
Now, G⊥1 ∩ V = G2 ⊕W . To see this, note that since G2 is the span of the center and the unstable
subspaces of PG⊥1 ∩VA, it follows that G2 ⊆ G⊥1 ∩ V . Let B1 be a matrix whose columns span the
subspace G1, the matrix B2 be a matrix whose columns span the subspace G2, and BW be a matrix
whose columns span the subspace W . Then, it follows from (8.14) that columns of the matrix
[B1 B2 BW ] span the unsecurable subspace V . The subspace G⊥1 ∩ V is therefore spanned by the
columns of the matrix [B2 BW ], from which it follows immediately that G⊥1 ∩ V = G2 ⊕ W .
Combining this with (8.19) yields [AG2]W = 0, i.e.,
W ⊥ AG2. (8.20)
Combining (8.18) and (8.20) implies (8.16).
8.4 The case of Perfectly-Observed MIMO Systems
Consider system (8.3) and recall that C = I . Each honest sensor performs the tests (8.4) and
(8.5). If the reported sequence of measurements {z} pass these tests, then there is no reason for
the honest nodes to suspect that there are any malicious nodes in the system, and therefore, their
estimate of the state at time k is simply z[k]. The state estimation error m[t] incurred by the honest
nodes at time t is therefore
m[t] := z[t]− x[t]. (8.21)
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The following theorem establishes that the projection of the state estimation error {m} along the
subspace S ⊕ W can only be of zero power, no matter what attack strategy the malicious nodes
employ.
Theorem 16. Consider the system (8.3) and suppose that the reported measurements {z} pass
tests (8.4) and (8.5) so that the malicious nodes remain undetected. Then,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣mS⊕W [k]∣∣∣∣2 = 0. (8.22)
Proof. We first show that the sequence {mS} is of zero power. Since for each honest sensor i,
i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, zi[k] ≡ xi[k], we have that mi[k] ≡ 0 for all such i. It follows that for a perfectly
observed system,
mS0 [k] ≡ 0. (8.23)
Suppose now for induction that {mSi} is of zero power for all i ∈ {0, . . . , l}. I.e.,
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
||mSi [k]||2 = 0 (8.24)
for all i ∈ {0, . . . , l}. We show that {mSl+1} is also of zero power. We have from (8.4) that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(m[k + 1]− Am[k] +BHeH [k] +BMeM [k] + w[k + 1])TT[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
= PlBB
TP Tl σ
2
e + σ
2
wPlP
T
l ,
(8.25)
where Pl is a projection matrix which projects a vector right-multiplying it to the subspace [⊕lj=0Sj]∩
([R(BM)]⊕lj=0Sj)⊥.
Now, write the vector m[t] as the sum of its components on the unsecurable subspace V and
the subspaces S0, . . . ,Sr−1, so that m[t] = mV [t] +
∑r−1
j=0 mSj [t]. It follows from Lemma 10 that
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for each i ∈ {l + 2, . . . , r − 1}, there exists di[k] such that
(−AmSi [k] +BMdi[k])⊕lj=0Sj = 0. (8.26)
It also follows from the definition of the unsecurable subspace V that there exists dV [k] such that
−AmV [k] +BMdV [k] ∈ V , and therefore,
(−AmV [k] +BMdV [k])⊕lj=0Sj = 0. (8.27)
Define dU [k] := eM [k]− dV [k]−∑r−1i=l+2 di[k]. Substituting this in (8.25) gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(
r−1∑
i=0
mSi [k + 1] + mV [k + 1]−
l∑
i=0
AmSi [k]
−AmSl+1 [k] +BMdU [k]
+
r−1∑
i=l+2
(−AmSi [k] +BMdi[k])− AmV [k] +BMdV [k]
+BHeH [k] + w[k + 1])TT[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
= PlBB
TP Tl σ
2
e + σ
2
wPlP
T
l . (8.28)
Using (8.26) and (8.27), the above simplifies to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(
l∑
i=0
mSi [k + 1]−
l∑
i=0
AmSi [k]
−AmSl+1 [k] +BMdU [k]
+BHeH [k] + w[k + 1])TT[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
= PlBB
TP Tl σ
2
e + σ
2
wPlP
T
l . (8.29)
The induction hypothesis implies that the sequence {∑li=0 mSi [k+ 1]−∑li=0AmSi [k]} is of zero
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power. Therefore, the above equality, after some algebra, further simplifies to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(−AmSl+1 [k] +BMdU [k])TT[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
+(−AmSl+1 [k] +BMdU [k])[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
×(BHeH [k] + w[k + 1])T[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
+(BHeH [k] + w[k + 1])[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
×(−AmSl+1 [k] +BMdU [k])T[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
= PlB
MBM
T
P Tl σ
2
e . (8.30)
Since [R(BM)][⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥ = {0}, we have that PlBM = 0, and consequently, the
Right Hand Side (RHS) of the above equality reduces to zero. Similarly, the vector BMdU [k]
projected on the subspace ([R(BM)]⊕lj=0Sj)⊥ equals zero, and consequently, the Left Hand Side
(LHS) also simplifies, and we have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(−AmSl+1 [k])TT[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
+ (−AmSl+1 [k])[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥(B
HeH [k] + w[k + 1])T[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
+ (BHeH [k] + w[k + 1])[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥(−AmSl+1 [k])T[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥
= 0.
(8.31)
For brevity of notation, let
(−AmSl+1 [k])[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥ =: α[k],
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and
(BHeH [k] + w[k + 1])[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥ := β[k + 1],
so that (8.31) becomes
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
αTT [k] + α[k]βT [k + 1] + β[k + 1]αT [k] = 0. (8.32)
Define the σ−algebra Fk := σ(zk,xk, eMk). Then, −AmSl+1 [k] ∈ Fk, and therefore α[k] ∈
Fk. Also, (BHeH [k] + w[k + 1],Fk+1) is a Martingale Difference Sequence, and so is (β[k +
1],Fk+1). The Martingale Stability Theorem (MST) [49] applies, and equating the ith entry along
the diagonal of (8.32) yields
T−1∑
k=0
α2i [k] + o(
T−1∑
k=0
α2i [k]) +O(1) = o(T ). (8.33)
Dividing the above equality by T and taking the limit as T →∞ implies that limT→∞ 1T
∑T−1
k=0 α
2
i [k] =
0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, which in turn implies that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
||(−AmSl+1 [k])[⊕lj=0Sj ]∩([R(BM )]⊕l
j=0
Sj
)⊥||2 = 0. (8.34)
Combining the above equality with (8.11) gives
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣mSl+1 [k]∣∣∣∣2 = 0, (8.35)
thereby completing the induction.
We next show that the sequence {mW} is of zero power. Define
v[t+ 1] := z[t+ 1]− Az[t]−Bgt(zt)−BHeH [t]−BMeM [t]−w[t+ 1], (8.36)
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It follows from (8.5) that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
eH [k](BHeH [k] +BMeM [k] + w[k + 1] + v[k + 1])T = σ2eB
HT ,
whence
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
eH [k](BHeH [k] +BMeM [k] + w[k + 1] + v[k + 1])TW = σ
2
eB
HTP TW ,
where PW denotes the matrix which projects a vector right-multiplying it onto the subspace W .
Using (8.15), the left-hand side (LHS) of the above equality simplifies, and we have
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
eH [k](PWBHeH [k] + wW [k + 1] + vW [k + 1])T = σ2eB
HTP TW ,
which in turn yields
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
eH [k]vTW [k + 1] = 0. (8.37)
It follows from (8.4) that
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(BHeH [k] +BMeM [k]w[k + 1] + v[k + 1])TTW = PWBB
TP TWσ
2
e + σ
2
wPWP
T
W ,
which using (8.15) simplifies to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
(PWBHeH [k] + wW [k + 1] + vW [k + 1])TT = PWBHBH
T
P TWσ
2
e + σ
2
wPWP
T
W .
Using (8.37), the above equality further simplifies to
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
wW [k + 1]vTW [k + 1] + vW [k + 1]w
T
W [k + 1] + vW [k + 1]v
T
W [k + 1] = 0. (8.38)
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The malicious sensors can adapt the measurements that they report at any time t to all past
observations as well as all past reported measurements. In addition, we also allow the mali-
cious sensors to employ an additional randomization in reporting their measurements. Let θ[t]
be a random variable independent of all measurements observed up to time t and all measure-
ments reported up to time t − 1. We allow the measurement z[t] that is reported at time t to
also depend on θ[t]. Define Fk := σ(xk,θk, eMk−1, eHk−2), ŵ[k + 1] := E[w[k + 1]|Fk+1],
ŵR(BH)[k + 1] := E[wR(BH)[k + 1]|Fk+1]. The quantities ŵR⊥(BH)[k + 1] and ŵW [k + 1] are
defined likewise. Now,
wW [k + 1] = PWw[k + 1] = PWwR(BH)[k + 1] + PWwR⊥(BH)[k + 1] = PWwR(BH)[k + 1],
(8.39)
where the last equality follows from (8.15). Let BH = QHRH be the QR-decomposition of the
matrix BH . I.e., the columns of the matrix QH form an orthonormal basis for the subspaceR(BH)
and the matrix RH is upper-triangular. We then have that for every k + 1, there exists a vector
wc[k + 1] such that
wR(BH)[k + 1] = Q
Hwc[k + 1]. (8.40)
We have from (8.3) that x[k + 1] − Ax[k] − Bgk(zk) − BMeM [k] = BHeH [k] + w[k + 1] =
QHRHeH [k]+QHwc[k+1]+wR⊥(BH)[k+1], implying that QH
T
(x[k+1]−Ax[k]−Bgk(zk)−
BMeM [k]) = RHeH [k] + wc[k + 1]. It follows that E[wc[k + 1]|Fk+1] = σ2w(σ2eRHRHT +
σ2wI)
−1(QHT (x[k + 1]− Ax[k]−Bgk(zk)−BMeM [k])), whence
ŵc[k + 1] := E[wc[k + 1]|Fk+1] = KW (RHeH [k] + wc[k + 1]), (8.41)
whereKW := σ2w(σ
2
eR
HRH
T
+σ2wI)
−1 has all eigenvalues strictly lesser than unity. Define w˜c[k+
1] := wc[k + 1]− ŵ[k + 1], so that wc[k + 1] = ŵc[k + 1] + w˜c[k + 1]. Substituting (8.41) in the
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above equality, we have wc[k + 1] = KWRHeH [k] +KWwc[k + 1] + w˜c[k + 1], whence
wc[k + 1] = (I −KW )−1KWRHeH [k] + (I −KW )−1w˜c[k + 1].
Substituting this in (8.40) gives
wR(BH)[k + 1] = Q
H(I −KW )−1KWRHeH [k] +QH(I −KW )−1w˜c[k + 1],
and substituting this in (8.39) gives
wW [k + 1] = PWQH(I −KW )−1KWRHeH [k] + PWQH(I −KW )−1w˜c[k + 1]. (8.42)
Now, (w˜c[k],Fk+1) is a martingale difference sequence, and v[k+1] ∈ Fk+1.Using the Martingale
Stability Theorem [49], we have
T−1∑
k=0
w˜c[k + 1]vTW [k + 1] =

o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
W1[k + 1]) . . . o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
Wp[k + 1])
... . . .
...
o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
W1[k + 1]) . . . o(
∑T−1
k=0 v
2
Wp[k + 1])
 (8.43)
Substituting (8.42) in (8.38), then using (8.37) and (8.43), and then equating the trace yields
lim
T→∞
1
T
T−1∑
k=0
∣∣∣∣vW [k + 1]∣∣∣∣2 = 0. (8.44)
We have from (8.36) and (8.3) that
v[t+ 1] = m[t+ 1]− Am[t] = mS [t+ 1] + mH[t+ 1] + mW [t+ 1]
− AmS [t]− AmH[t]− AmW [t].
Projecting v[t + 1] onto the subspace W and using (8.17) gives vW [t + 1] = mW [t + 1] −
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PWAmS [t]− PWAmW [t], which upon rearranging yields
mW [t+ 1] = PWAmW [t] + PWAmS [t] + vW [t+ 1].
Using (8.44), the fact that {mS} is of zero power, and the stability of the matrix PWA, we have
that {mW} is of zero power.
8.5 Conclusion
In prior chapters, the approach of Dynamic Watermarking was established as providing security
guarantees against arbitrary sensor attacks. In this chapter, we have considered a system which
includes malicious sensors and actuators mixed with honest sensors and actuators, and wherein the
honest actuators employ Dynamic Watermarking. Given any such system, we have characterized
a certain subspace of the watermark-securable subspace, and have established that the malicious
sensors and actuators cannot degrade the state estimation performance of the honest sensors and
actuators along this subspace.
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9. THEORY AND IMPLEMENTATION OF DYNAMIC WATERMARKING FOR
CYBERSECURITY OF ADVANCED TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS*
9.1 Introduction
Recently there has been great interest in automated and semi-automated transportation systems
involving various driver assists. These advanced systems rely on sensors to provide state informa-
tion and situational awareness to the control logic governing the vehicle. However, this has also
increased the vulnerability of these advanced transportation systems to cyber attacks. In fact, there
have been demonstrated cyber attacks on automobiles in the recent past [64, 65], where two hack-
ers have remotely subverted an automobile, taking control of its steering and braking units. This
ultimately led to the automobile manufacturer recalling over a million cars to patch the identified
vulnerabilities. Several other similar news reports [66, 67, 68] point the need for cybersecurity of
automated transportation systems. In this chapter we demonstrate how the technique of dynamic
watermarking can be employed to secure an automated transportation system against arbitrary at-
tacks on its sensors. This chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Woo-Hyun Ko of Texas A&M
University.
In the previous chapter, the technique of dynamic watermarking of signals has been proposed
to secure such cyberphysical systems. It has been shown that in theory, employing dynamic water-
marking and using two specific tests can detect erroneous sensor measurements for a large class of
linear systems. In this chapter, we investigate whether this method can actually be used in a real
transportation system to detect attacks on the positioning sensor systems and thereby prevent colli-
sions. For this purpose we extend the theory to allow for several nonlinearities not accounted for in
an idealized linear system on which the theoretical results have previously been established. After
*Reprinted with permission from “Theory and implementation of dynamic watermarking for cybersecurity of
advanced transportation systems," by W-H. Ko, B. Satchidanandan and P. R. Kumar in Proceedings of the 2016 IEEE
Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS), pp. 416-420, 2016, IEEE.
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Figure 9.1: Experimental Facility for Dynamic Watermarking. Reprinted with permission from
[2].
doing so, we have implemented the dynamic watermarking method on a laboratory autonomous
transportation system. We demonstrate in this chapter that this method successfully detects and re-
sponds to attacks on the position sensors which can potentially cause collisions, thereby preventing
collisions.
9.2 Attacking an autonomous transportation system by malicious attacks on sensors
Advanced transportation systems, whether fully autonomous or those that provide driver assist,
employ sensors to determine the position of a vehicle. Such sensors can be maliciously attacked.
We first begin by showing how such an attack can be used to create collisions. The experimental
setup, shown in Fig. 9.1, is a prototype of an intelligent transportation system housed in the
Cyberphysical Systems Laboratory of Texas A&M University. At the core of the system is a set
of vehicles that are required to follow a particular trajectory within a rectangular area. This can
be thought of as the high-level control objective. The system consists of a supervisory layer or a
high-level controller which decides the trajectory that each vehicle should follow.
Attached to the setup is a set of ten cameras which capture an image of the rectangular area
along with the vehicles once every 100ms. These images are transmitted to the vision sensors in the
system which accurately compute, from these raw images, the coordinates (xi, yi) and orientation
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θi of vehicle i at each sampling instant t. The vision sensors then transmit this information to
the vision server, which disseminates this information to other modules in the system such as the
low-level controller, supervisor, collision avoidance module, etc.
The low-level controller determines the control input to be applied to each vehicle using Model
Predictive Control. It computes the control input using the position and orientation information
of each vehicle that it obtains from the vision server, and also their reference trajectories that it
obtains from the supervisor. The controller then sends this information to the collision avoidance
module.
The collision avoidance module uses this control input, the position estimates provided by
the vision server, and the dynamic model of the vehicles to predict their position during the next
sampling epoch. If it detects a collision based on this computation, it instructs the actuator to halt
the vehicles. If not, it relays the control input computed by the controller as such to the actuator,
which then applies that particular input.
The plant model for vehicle i is given by its kinematic equations:
xi[t+ 1] = xi[t] + h cos(θi[t])vi[t] + h cos(θi[t])wix[t], (9.1)
yi[t+ 1] = yi[t] + h sin(θi[t])vi[t] + h sin(θi[t])wiy[t], (9.2)
θi[t+ 1] = θi[t] + hωi[t] + hwiθ[t], (9.3)
where h is the sampling time period (100ms in this case), vi[t] is the speed of the vehicle at sam-
pling epoch t and is one of the control inputs of the vehicles, and ωi[t] is the angular speed of the
vehicle at sampling epoch t and is the second control input of the vehicles. Also, wix[t], wiy[t],
and wiθ[t] are random variables whose variances we denote by σ2x, σ
2
y , and σ
2
θ respectively, and
they model the ambient noise entering the system as a consequence of small, random drifts in the
actual values of the applied control inputs from their set points. We model them as zero-mean,
i.i.d. normal random variables. For the purposes of our demonstration, it suffices to use just two
vehicles, so that i ∈ {1, 2}. We make both of them follow an elliptical trajectory, one behind the
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other. The attached video clip opens by showing the vehicle trajectories in the absence of both
attacks and dynamic watermarking.
Our system includes a collision avoidance module [69] that halts the vehicles when an immi-
nent collision is detected. To illustrate its behavior, when a manually controlled vehicle is made to
intercept the two vehicles’ trajectories, the collision avoidance module detects imminent collisions
and commands the actuators to halt the vehicles, thereby avoiding collisions. In a prior work [69],
it was shown that this system indeed guarantees collision freedom.
Next, we construct a specific attack which spoofs the collision avoidance module by sending
malicious position information to it. Specifically, we introduce maliciousness in the vision sensor
which computes the x−coordinate of the vehicles’ position from the image that it receives from
the cameras. The attack strategy then is as follows. Let tA denote the time at which the attack
begins. Then, z2x[tA] = x2[tA] + τ, where τ is the bias that the sensor adds to the x−coordinate of
the vehicle. For t > tA, the malicious sensor reports measurements {z2x} generated as
z2x[t+ 1] = z2x[t] + h cos(θ2[t])u
g
2(z
t
1, z
t
2) + cos(θ2[t])n[t], (9.4)
where n[t] ∼ N (0, σ2x). Therefore, once the attack begins, wrong position information is sent
to the vision server, and consequently to all other modules in the system. In particular, wrong
position information is sent to the collision avoidance module, which results in it not detecting im-
minent collisions. The attached clip demonstrates this attack which culminates in the two vehicles
colliding with each other.
9.3 Protecting transportation system from malicious attacks on sensors through a nonlinear
extension of dynamic watermarking
We now consider how the transportation system can be protected malicious attacks on sensors.
We first extend the theory of dynamic watermarking to nonlinear systems to address the equations
of vehicular motion. Consider a controller, as in Section-9.2, which computes the control policy-
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specified input and superimposes the watermark on it. The system evolves as
xi[t+ 1] = xi[t] + h cos(θi[t])u
g
i (z
t
1, z
t
2) + h cos(θi[t])eiv[t] + h cos(θi[t])wix[t], (9.5)
yi[t+ 1] = yi[t] + h sin(θi[t])u
g
i (z
t
1, z
t
2) + h sin(θi[t])eiv[t] + h sin(θi[t])wiy[t], (9.6)
θi[t+ 1] = θi[t] + hωi[t] + heiθ[t] + hwiθ[t], (9.7)
where eiv[t] ∼ N (0, σ2e) and i.i.d. across time is the watermark superimposed on the translation
velocity control input vi[t], eiθ[t] ∼ N (0, σ2θ) and i.i.d. across time is the watermark superimposed
on the angular velocity control input ωi[t], zi[t] = [zix[t], zix[t], zix[t]] = [zix[t], yi[t], θi[t]]T , and
zix[t] is vehicle-i’s x−coordinate reported by the vision sensor at time t, which is different from its
true value xi[t], ziy[k] and ziθ[k] are the values reported for yi[k] and θi[k] respectively, which are
equal to their true values at all times. The controller does not know a priori which of the sensors
are malicious, if any.
The nominal trajectory of the vehicles in the presence and absence of dynamic watermarking
are compared in Fig. 9.2. The mismatch between the nominal and actual trajectory is negligible,
and in principle, can be made arbitrarily small.
The controller performs the following tests to check for maliciousness. The tests are specified
only for {zix} below, but analogous tests are also carried out by the controller for {ziy} and {ziθ}.
While we state the following as standalone tests, they are subsumed by (6.70) and (6.71).
1. Test 1: The controller checks if
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
(zix[k + 1]− zix[k]− h cos(ziθ[k])ugi (zt1, zt2)− h cos(ziθ[k])eiv[k])2 = σ˜2x.
(9.8)
2. Test 2: The controller checks if
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
(zix[k + 1]− zix[k]− h cos(ziθ[k])ugi (zt1, zt2))2 = σ2c , (9.9)
133
-1000 -500 0 500 1000 1500 2000
x-position [mm]
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
y-
po
sit
io
n 
[m
m]
Without Dynamic Watermarking
With Dynamic Watermarking
Figure 9.2: Trajectories of the vehicles with and without Dynamic Watermarking. Reprinted with
permission from [2].
where
σ˜2x := lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
(h cos(θi[k])wix[k])
2, (9.10)
and
σ2c := lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
(h cos(θi[k])eiv[k] + h cos(θi[k])wix[k])
2 (9.11)
are the values that would be obtained for the LHS of (9.8) and (9.9) respectively had {zix} been
equal to {xi}. The above quantities are the sum of independent, but non-identically distributed
random variables. We assume that for the trajectory followed by the vehicles, the above limits
exist. Fig. 9.3 and Fig. 9.4) plot 1
t
∑t−1
k=0(h cos(θi[k])wix[k])
2 and 1
t
∑t−1
k=0(h cos(θi[k])eiv[k] +
h cos(θi[k])wix[k])
2 as a function of time, and support our assumption that the limits (9.10) and
(9.11) exist. These quantities were computed experimentally as follows in our demonstration.
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Since in the absence of attacks, we have
σ˜2x = lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
xi[k + 1]− xi[k]− h cos(θi[k])ugi (zk1, zk2)− h cos(θi[k])eiv[k],
and
σ2c = lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
xi[k + 1]− xi[k]− h cos(θi[k])ugi (zk1, zk2),
evaluating the RHS of the above equations from the experiment in the absence of attacks yield the
desired noise variances.
The following theorem ensures that the the above two tests are sufficient to restrict the mali-
cious sensor to adding an additive distortion that can only have zero power asymptotically.
Theorem 17. Define
vx[t+ 1] := z2x[t+ 1]− z2x[t]− h cos(θ2[t])ug2(zt1, zt2)− h cos(θ2[t])e2v[t]− h cos(θ2[t])w2x[t],
(9.12)
so that for an honest sensor, vx ≡ 0. If the reported sequence of measurements satisfy (9.8) and
(9.9), then,
lim
t→∞
1
t
t−1∑
k=0
v2x[k + 1] = 0 (9.13)
Proof. Since the sequence of reported measurements {z2x} satisfy (9.8), we have using (9.12)
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
k=0
(h cos(θ2[k])w2x[k] + vx[k + 1])
2 = σ˜2x. (9.14)
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Expanding the above and using (9.10), we get
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
k=0
v2x[k + 1] + 2h cos(θ2[k])w2x[k]vx[k + 1] = 0. (9.15)
Similarly, since the reported measurements satisfy (9.9) we have,
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
k=0
(h cos(θ2[k])w2x[k] + h cos(θ2[k])e2v[k] + vx[k + 1])
2 = σ2c . (9.16)
Expanding the above and using (9.10), (9.11), and (9.15), we arrive at
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
k=0
cos(θ2[k])e2v[k]vx[k + 1] = 0. (9.17)
Now, define Fk := σ(xk, yk−1, θk−1, ek−22v , zk), ŵ[k] := E[w[k]
∣∣Fk+1], and w˜[k] := w[k] − ŵ[k].
Then, for k such that cos(θ2[k]) 6= 0, we have ŵ[k] = σ2wσ2e+σ2w (e[k] + w[k]). Now,
t−1∑
k=0
cos(θ2[k])w2x[k]vx[k + 1] =
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k]) 6=0
cos(θ2[k])w2x[k]vx[k + 1].
Expressing w2x[k] as ŵ[k] + w˜[k], substituting for ŵ[k] using the aforementioned expression, and
rearranging the terms gives
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k]) 6=0
cos(θ2[k])w2x[k]vx[k + 1] =
β
1− β
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k]) 6=0
cos(θ2[k])e2v[k]vx[k + 1]
+
1
1− β
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k])6=0
cos(θ2[k])w˜2x[k]vx[k + 1], (9.18)
where β := σ
2
w
σ2e+σ
2
w
< 1. Now, (cos(θ2[k])w˜2x[k],Fk+2) is a Martingale Difference Sequence. Also,
vx[k+1] ∈ Fk+1, since vx[k+1] = zx[k+1]−zx[k]−x[k+1]−x[k]. So, the Martingale Stability
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Theorem (MST) [49] applies, and we have
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k]) 6=0
cos(θ2[k])w˜2x[k]vx[k + 1] = o(
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k]) 6=0
v2x[k + 1]) +O(1).
Substituting the above in (9.18), and the result in (9.15), we get
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k])6=0
v2x[k + 1] +
2hβ
1− β
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k])6=0
cos(θ2[k])e2v[k]vx[k + 1] + o(
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k])6=0
v2x[k + 1]) +O(1)
+
t−1∑
k=0,
cos(θ2[k])=0
v2x[k + 1] = o(t). (9.19)
Dividing the above by t, taking the limit as t→∞, and invoking (9.17) completes the proof.
Now we demonstrate the performance of dynamic watermarking for the transportation system.
The specific strategy that the sensor uses to fabricate the measurements is the same as (9.4), except
that now, n[t] ∼ N (0, σ2x + σ2e).. The two tests (9.8) and (9.9) of dynamic watermarking are
employed by the controller. The asymptotic tests (9.8) and (9.9) were converted to statistical tests
for implementation by checking if for each time, the LHS of (9.8) and (9.9) are within thresholds
1 and 2 respectively of their asymptotic values.
Fig. 9.3 plots the LHS of (9.8), and Fig. 9.4 plots that of (9.9) as a function of time. As can
be seen, the false measurements pass test 2 but fail test 1, indicating an attack. The restoration of
collision freedom for the automatic transportation system is shown in the attached video clip.
9.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we have addressed the problem of cybersecurity of advanced transportation
systems, whether autonomous or those that provide driver assist. This is an exemplar of the broader
class of cyber-physical systems for which there is great current concern on the issue of security. We
have shown how collisions can be caused in such systems by attacking the sensor, even though the
control logic contains a collision avoidance module. To provide security against such attacks, we
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Figure 9.3: Test statistic of error test 1 as a function of time. Reprinted with permission from [2].
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Figure 9.4: Test statistic of error test 2 as a function of time. Reprinted with permission from [2].
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have considered the usage of dynamic watermarking where actuators inject small private excitation
signals into the system and check the reported sensor measurements for statistical consistency with
the injected noise. We have extended the theory of dynamic watermarking that has been developed
for linear systems to nonlinear systems describing the equations of vehicular motion. We have
implemented dynamic watermarking on a prototypical laboratory transportation systems and have
shown how it restores collision freedom.
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10. CONCLUSIONS
In this thesis, we have considered the problem of security of networked cyber-physical systems.
Securing such systems is not the same as securing a communication network due to the fundamen-
tal role played by sensors and actuators in interfacing with and controlling the physical plant. In
this thesis, we have studied certain fundamental problems arising in this context.
Analogous to the classical notions of controllable and unobservable subspaces of a linear sys-
tem, we have introduced in Chapter 3 the notions of securable and unsecurable subspaces of a linear
dynamical system, which have important operational meanings in the context of secure control. In
Chapter 3, we have presented their operational meaning in the context of deterministic linear dy-
namical systems, and in Chapters 4 and 5, we have extended them to the context of stochastic
linear dynamical systems. Specifically, we have shown that the malicious sensors and actuators
cannot distort the state estimation performance of the honest nodes along the securable subspace
of the system, no matter what attack strategy they employ; any performance degradation that they
can cause is restricted to the unsecurable subspace of the system if they are to remain undetected.
We have developed in Chapter 6 the general procedure of dynamic watermarking that imposes
private excitation signals on the actuation signals whose presence can then be traced around the
loop to detect malicious behaviors of sensors. We have also rigorously established the security
guarantees provided by dynamic watermarking in a variety of control system contexts, including
a class of nonlinear systems. Chapter 7 addresses the problem of designing security-guaranteeing
dynamic watermarks. Specifically, given a finite-dimensional perfectly-observed linear dynamical
system affected by process noise of arbitrary probability distribution, we have derived in Chapter
7 the necessary and sufficient conditions that the probability distribution of the watermark should
satisfy in order for the fundamental security guarantee of dynamic watermarking to hold. Chapter 8
addresses a scenario in which there are malicious sensors and actuators mixed with honest sensors
and actuators, and wherein the honest actuators watermark their control inputs to detect malicious
sensors. The state space of any such system can be decomposed into two orthogonal subspaces,
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called the watermark-securable and the watermark-unsecurable subspaces, such that the malicious
sensors and actuators cannot degrade the state estimation performance of the honest sensors and
actuators along the watermark-securable subspace. The watermark-securable subspace is larger
than the securable subspace that can be guaranteed in the absence of Dynamic Watermarking. A
certain subset of the watermark-securable subspace was characterized in Chapter 8. Finally, in
Chapter 9, we have demonstrated the efficacy of dynamic watermarking in securing a prototypical
intelligent transportation system.
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